Fighting for Philosophy
When Ludwig met Karl.
Apr 15, 2002, Vol. 7, No. 30 • By DAVID GUASPARI
LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN and Karl Popper met only once--just after World War II, when Popper addressed the Cambridge University Moral Sciences Club. Popper challenged Wittgenstein head on: Philosophy, he said, addresses genuine problems and not, as Wittgenstein would have it, "puzzles" that disappear when proper mental hygiene clears up our conceptual muddles.
In response Wittgenstein became agitated, fiddling with the fireplace poker as he argued, and eventually stormed out. Versions of this story include claims that he did so in exasperation at Popper's obtuseness, or after Bertrand Russell snapped at him ("Wittgenstein, put down that poker at once!"), or after Popper skewered him with a witty retort. Popper's autobiography declares a winner. When Wittgenstein, shaking the poker for emphasis, challenged him for an example of a genuine moral principle, Popper rose to the occasion: "Not to threaten visiting lecturers with pokers." Twenty years after Popper's autobiography, and half a century after the quarrel, a friend of Wittgenstein (and a witness) still cared enough to call Popper, in print, a liar.
In "Wittgenstein's Poker," David Edmonds and John Eidinow use the incident as a hook from which to suspend accounts of the protagonists' intimidating personalities, of the brilliant fin de siecle Viennese society into which (in very different social spheres) they were born, and of their radically opposed philosophical views.
Wittgenstein--routinely called magnetic, intense, passionate, pure, incandescent--was born into fabulous wealth. Sent to Manchester as an engineering student, he sought out and dazzled Bertrand Russell in Cambridge, but cut short his studies with Russell to enlist in the Great War. He pulled strings to get a posting to the front and wrote a classic of analytic philosophy, the "Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus," in the trenches. After the war he renounced his inheritance and disappeared into the life of a rural grade-school teacher--using, he said, the pain of teaching to overcome the pain of philosophy. He eventually regained interest in philosophy and was coaxed back to Cambridge. "God has arrived," said John Maynard Keynes. "I met him on the 5:15 train." Wittgenstein could not be unoriginal: Among other things, he patented a design for an aircraft engine, helped design a modernist house, and published a dictionary for schoolchildren.
Karl Popper came from the cultivated middle class. Forced to leave college when hyperinflation ruined his father, he got a degree through the back door by enrolling in a teacher's training course. If Wittgenstein was a cult figure, then Popper was (in his own view) a perennial outsider. The famed Vienna Circle of philosophers and mathematicians doted on Wittgenstein, even when he refused to attend their meetings, but they didn't invite Popper to join. Popper fled the Germans not to Oxford or Cambridge but to New Zealand and then to the slightly less remote London School of Economics. He published prolifically, becoming the world's most eminent philosopher of science and (again, in his own view) the leading scourge of fashionable intellectual nonsense: logical positivism, Marxism, Freudianism--and Wittgenstein.
A clash between Wittgenstein and Popper should be high drama, but played out as low comedy: Famous Philosophers Duel with Red-Hot Pokers! The book's one flaw is to run with this gimmick and pretend that some mystery needs solving. No suspense is spoiled by disclosing that Popper's story is found implausible, though not a calculated lie. And nine-tenths of the book--vivid biographies and cultural history, clear and defensible broad-brush summaries of philosophical ideas--are irrelevant to this resolution.
The silly spat threatens to distract readers from an impassioned conflict of ideas. Popper's views are clear. His most celebrated teaching identified the distinguishing mark of scientific knowledge as its "falsifiability." A genuinely scientific theory has definite consequences (predictions) that can be challenged by public procedures. Scientific knowledge is what we provisionally accept because it has, so far, passed all the tests. The permanent threat of refutation makes that knowledge more reliable than the humanly fallible and prejudiced scientists who discover it. A natural correlate is Popper's spirited defense of the "open" society--with its liberal politics of piecemeal trial-and-error reform--against "closed" utopian and totalitarian regimes that derive their authority from pseudo-scientific claims to know, and know how to shape, the human future.