PRESIDENT BUSH only looks like he's operating by the seat of his pants in Middle East policy. Actually he has a three-pronged strategy. Prong one is to give the Israelis as much time as possible for their military drive to uproot the Palestinian terrorist infrastructure. Number two is to keep some distance between the United States and Israel so as not to end up tied to everything Israeli prime minister Ariel Sharon does. And the third is to keep other important American interests in mind, including the desire for allies when military action is taken against Iraq, probably later this year. What happened last week, when the president called on Israel to pull back its troops and dispatched Secretary of State Colin Powell to the Middle East, was that part three, America's other interests, became more urgent than number one, giving Sharon a long leash.
The fundamental idea behind the strategy is to give aid and comfort to Israel, but without Bush ever saying so explicitly. Instead, the president couched his favoritism toward Israel in an endorsement of Israel's right to defend itself against terrorist assaults. Bush also reiterated that he's "a committed friend of Israel." But the strategy isn't to side with Israel at all costs. And if the costs get too great in the view of the White House, the president will have to change course and yank Israel back. Within five days of Israeli tanks' entering the West Bank in pursuit of terrorists, Bush decided the costs had gotten
out of hand. His speech in the Rose Garden announcing a new course was delivered two days later.
What were the costs? CIA director George Tenet warned about the ominous spread of anti-American and anti-Israel protests, particularly in Jordan, where the government of King Abdullah is weak. Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak threatened to eliminate diplomatic relations with Israel entirely, a threat that especially alarmed Bush. British prime minister Tony Blair said the violence between Israel and the Palestinians needed to be curbed before joint U.S.-British action against Iraq could be taken. The State Department clamored as usual for restraining the Israelis. And White House advisers fretted over how impotent and confused Bush looked in his reluctance to intervene forcefully. So the costs, as perceived by the White House, were wider upheaval in the Middle East, harm to so-called moderate Arab states, alienation of other countries, a reversal of Egypt's historic recognition of Israel, a roadblock to moving against Iraq, and potential political harm to Bush.
That's quite a list. Still, Bush could have resisted the pressure to step in and given the Israelis more time, but certainly not the additional four to six weeks that Israeli military officials said it would take to finish the job of quashing Palestinian terrorism. Even when bending, however, he was far more passionate in denouncing Arafat than in calling for Sharon to ease up. In fact, he appeared to read most of his 18-minute statement from a teleprompter--except for the section excoriating Arafat, which Bush seemed to know by heart.
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