THE CEDAR REVOLUTION HAS TAKEN so many interesting narrative turns, it is easy to forget that the Lebanese opposition confronts a criminal regime in Syria that is more isolated than ever and for that reason quite possibly more dangerous than before. While some repentant skeptics have grudgingly begun to credit the Bush vision for democracy in the Middle East, the White House has prudently refrained from gloating because the outcome is far from resolved. For all the appeasing noises the Damascus regime has made, it may decide not to leave Lebanon without a fight. Some analysts believe that Bashar al-Assad cannot leave Lebanon lest his government fall, and others fear that he will depart only after he has set Lebanon aflame.
While Syria's foreign minister announced last week that the country's armed forces will be pulled out before Lebanon's May parliamentary elections, the pro-Syrian government in Beirut has initiated stalling tactics that could postpone the elections and consequently the Syrian withdrawal. The Syrian-controlled security apparatus appears to be in a state of disarray, but even when, or if, the Assad regime evacuates, it will continue to exercise considerable influence over Lebanese politics and the economy through the myriad intelligence services that have penetrated virtually every Lebanese institution over the last 15 years. Thus, even if Syria withdraws, Assad will continue to be a major force in Lebanese affairs.
Jacques Chirac reportedly has warned the White House that the Assad regime cannot afford to withdraw without risking collapse. A recent report in the Beirut
Daily Star estimates that Syria earns more than $2 billion a year in Lebanon, almost half of which goes directly to Assad favorites. This number doesn't include revenues earned from illegal sources, like narcotics. Perhaps as significantly, Syria's regional prestige will take a major hit. The last Arab nationalist stronghold will have been chased from another Arab country by Western powers that didn't fire a shot. Maybe Iran will not brook a Syrian ally that is feeble. And if Iraq or Saudi Arabia smells fear in Damascus, Assad might expect a Sunni insurgency like the one he's assisted in Iraq to rise up at home against his Alawite regime. Further, a peaceable withdrawal from Lebanon means Syria will have lost what it considers its major bargaining chip in securing one of its key national interests--the return of the Golan Heights from Israeli control.
No one knows for certain whether the three bombings in Christian areas over the last few weeks were engineered by Syrian intelligence, local allies, or by other Lebanese actors who believe they can profit from the confusion. Regardless, there is concern that Assad intends to make good on his threat to bring armageddon to Lebanon, just to remind everyone who's in control, no matter what side of the border his troops are stationed on. This is the scenario that everyone fears.
"If the Syrians are willing to play it clean, the U.S. and the Europeans are not seeking to attack them," says Farid al-Khazen, an opposition candidate in the May elections and dean of the political science department at the American University of Beirut. "Ironically, what would be best for the [Assad] regime is if it fully implemented [U.N. Security Council resolution] 1559. Before, Syria was in trouble over Iraq; now its survival depends on how much it is willing to cooperate in Lebanon."
|
