Losing Strategy

London

IN ATTACKING LONDON ON JULY 7, al Qaeda once again demonstrated its global reach. The attacks, carried out by a handful of British-born suicide bombers inspired by al Qaeda, overshadowed the presence in Gleneagles, Scotland, of the world's most powerful leaders at an expanded Group of Eight summit. Among this elite group, the United States, Britain, Russia, and India have suffered al Qaeda-inspired attacks on their soil in the past four years. Other G-8 countries, including Canada, France, Germany, and Italy, have disrupted terrorist cells operating on their territory. And that's not to mention the many other victims of al Qaeda violence: Spain, Turkey, Indonesia, Thailand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Jordan, Israel, Afghanistan, Iraq, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, and Kenya. Global terrorism is recasting international politics--but not necessarily to the advantage of the terrorists.

True, the globalization of Islamist terror demonstrates that an important source of power in international affairs--the ability to seize the geopolitical initiative--lies with today's transnational jihadists as much as with the strong states that traditionally order the international system. Further terrorist attacks could encourage vulnerable states to make a separate peace with al Qaeda, as did Spain after the 2004 Madrid bombings. But al Qaeda's string of attacks do not reflect a brilliant grand strategy of dividing the West. To the contrary, Osama bin Laden's historic accomplishment has been to unite most of the world against his cause; to deprive his movement of a national base; and to demonstrate the impotence of violent Islamist extremism in the face of popular aspirations to democratic modernity.