The Magazine


Dec 1, 1997, Vol. 3, No. 12 • By PAUL WOLFOWITZ and ZALMAY M. KHALILZAD
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Fourth, in cooperation with our friends and regional allies, we should arm and train opposition forces.

Fifth, we should restore Radio Free Iraq and resume our support for Iraqi opposition radio programming, which dried up in 1996.

And last, we should be prepared to provide military protection for Iraqi units defecting from Saddam to the resistance movement. It was a grave mistake not to provide such support when Iraqis rose up against Saddam in 1991.

A strategy of removing Saddam will take time. However, when the United States acts, as President Bush did in the Gulf and as President Clinton finally did in Bosnia, the whole strategic picture changes. Actions that are difficult or impossible now will become more feasible after we have taken the first steps.

There is no guarantee of success; this course certainly entails risks. However, Saddam Hussein is not 10 feet tall. In fact, he is weak. But we are letting this tyrant, who seeks to build weapons of mass destruction, get stronger. Will this be Bill Clinton's most important foreign-policy legacy?

Zalmay M. Khalilzad is a senior strategist at the Rand Corporation and served as assistant undersecretary of dense for policy planning in the Bush administration. Paul Wolfowitz is dean of the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies of the Johns Hopkins University and was an undersecretary of defense during the Bush administration.