Donetsk, Ukraine
ON THE FIFTEENTH DAY of Ukraine's orange revolution, I arrived in Kiev. My car got stuck in a traffic jam caused by a demonstration at the parliament. I abandoned the car and joined the rally. The demonstrators' determination was stunning. The sea of people was perfectly orderly and calm. Two slogans predominated: "Yushchenko is our President" and "Do not stop our Freedom!" A third line ran "East and West together!"
This was a call for law and order, freedom, and national unity. Some groups marched under Ukrainian flags, some under the orange flags of opposition candidate Viktor Yushchenko emblazoned with the name of their town or village. The demonstration didn't seem to have any class identity at all. Hardly any names of businesses, parties, or organizations were to be seen. No one talked about social or economic issues. This was pure politics. Ukraine's orange revolution is a classical liberal revolution, like 1848, or the Velvet Revolution in Prague in 1989. This rising against lawlessness and repression, for democracy and freedom, is a true bourgeois revolution.
Half in jest, people call it a revolt of the millionaires against the billionaires. Three of the revolutionary leaders are very wealthy businessmen (Yulia Tymoshenko, Oleksandr Zinchenko, and Petro Poroshenko). They criticize not big business, but "bandits." The incumbent candidate, Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovich, gets his key support from the three most prominent oligarchic groups, which between them reportedly put up $300 million for his campaign. But overwhelmingly the Ukrainian business community supports the challenger, Yushchenko,
in protest against the capture of the state by these three.
Ukraine's presidential election also reflected a sharp regional divide. Yushchenko won big in 17 western and central districts. They are predominantly Ukrainian-speaking, though several are Russian-speaking. Yanukovich won equally massively in 10 Russian-speaking eastern and southern districts, scaring voters with the specter of western Ukrainian nationalism.
To get a better idea of what was going on, I traveled to Donetsk, Prime Minister Yanukovich's stronghold in the east, to talk to business leaders, especially some of the steel barons. I was impressed. These self-made billionaires are as smart as they are dynamic. To them, politics is a means of advancing their business. They have bought up old Soviet steelworks and turned them around. One has opted for upstream vertical integration in raw materials (iron ore and coal), while another has concentrated on downstream purchases of steelworks in New Europe.
At present, they sell most of their steel to China and quite a lot to the Middle East, but they are painfully aware that the Chinese bonanza won't last long. Then they will have to sell more to Europe, which protects itself against Ukrainian steel. In order to break down that barrier, they want to buy downstream companies in Europe, have Ukraine join the World Trade Organization, and develop a free trade agreement with Europe.
I asked them about their business interests in Russia. Nobody seemed to own any significant assets there. Nor do they have any real Russian partners, though they sell a bit to their big neighbor. Energy they acquire on a free market, whereas the Russian steel companies are their severest competitors. However geographically close they are to Russia, the Donetsk steel barons long for Europe.
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