The Binding of King Abdullah
The new king of Saudi Arabia will need help if he wants to reform his country.
12:00 AM, Aug 19, 2005 • By ALI H. ALYAMI
THE LONG-AWAITED DEATH of King Fahd of Saudi Arabia brought most of his subjects more hope than grief--hope that the new king, Abdullah, might move toward freedom of speech and other democratic reforms. It is hard to imagine that this sentiment is shared by the large and profligate ruling family. One powerful wing of the ruling family, the six remaining Sudairi brothers, had dreaded Abdullah's ascent to the throne and had delayed it for more than a decade.
Abdullah knows the Sudairi Six regard him as weak and naive, too lenient toward the captive population, and thus a danger to the absolute rule of the Saudi dynasty. He is unlikely to forget that his half-brother King Saud (1953-64) was ousted from power and exiled to Greece for much the same reason.
Prominent among the anti-Abdullah princes are Sultan and Nayef. Both are in a position to torpedo Abdullah's efforts to reform the system, if indeed he tries. Sultan's titles include crown prince, first deputy to the king, defense minister, inspector general, and general director of aviation. Nayef is interior minister. All secret and regular police, informants, religious police, the judicial and prison systems, all municipalities, mayors, governors, and media fall within Nayef's sphere of influence. These two men's control over internal and external security means that without their consent it will be near-impossible to bring about genuine reform. Given their obvious hostility to Abdullah's earlier embryonic reform gestures, it is evident Sultan and Nayef have both the means and motivation to frustrate the transformation of Saudi Arabia.
PRIOR TO HIS APPOINTMENT as crown prince and head of the National Guard in 1982, Abdullah was largely marginalized. When King Fahd fell ill in 1995, however, Crown Prince Abdullah suddenly became the de facto ruler, at a time when major domestic and international problems loomed. Terrorism was intensifying, the country's economy was faltering, unemployment was very high, and the Saudi people, especially the young, were growing restless. These problems festered, even as the price of oil soared.
Once Abdullah assumed management of domestic and international affairs, he started to talk about national reconciliation, limited elections, women's rights, human rights, and domestic religious tolerance. He encouraged people to tell him what they expected of him and of the government. Abdullah met with reformers and accepted their petitions in January 2003, even telling them, "Your demands are my project." Abdullah also told the reformers, however, that he "could not do it alone." Although Abdullah did not fundamentally alter the regime's harmful policies, his statements sparked exaggerated hopes among Saudis. Inside the royal palaces, meanwhile, Abdullah's moves caused disquiet and fueled Nayef and Sultan's animosity toward him.
Two major considerations prompted Abdullah to reach out to the public: insistent pressure from the international community, especially the United States, for political reforms and guarantees of human rights, and the need to demonstrate to his royal foes that, if pushed too far, he could go over their heads to secure his position. In other words, already as crown prince, Abdullah understood that if he wanted to stay alive and eventually become more than a puppet king, he needed support from sources outside of his family.
WHEN IT COMES TO EXTERNAL SOURCES OF SUPPORT, Abdullah, like his predecessors, relied almost exclusively on the United States to protect him and his family. The attacks of September 11, 2001, and the ensuing revelations linking extremism and terrorism to Saudi Arabia's longstanding policies of oppression and extremist religious indoctrination fundamentally changed the U.S.-Saudi relationship and provoked a reassessment in Washington of America's blind support for the Saudi regime.
In the meantime, King Abdullah and his family know that the West is stuck with them until an alternative democratic group of Saudis can be prepared to replace them or until the country has descended into turmoil to the point where a Wahhabi version of Khomeini's revolution is about to seize power. In case of the latter, the West would likely intervene militarily to secure the oil installations in eastern Saudi Arabia.
Any reforms that Abdullah may introduce have been and will continue to be predicated on these assumptions. He believes that introducing cosmetic reforms will extend his family's control over the country. The partial and exclusionary municipal elections and the government-controlled National Human Rights and Journalists Associations are good examples of what reform means to the House of Saud, in that they did more to strengthen the position of the ruling family than to increase citizens' political participation.