Tip of the Iceberg

IN THE COURSE of the campaign against international terrorism, the United States and its allies have uncovered hundreds of documents authored by both leaders and members of al Qaeda and allied terrorist networks. These documents, which currently reside in a classified database known as HARMONY, contain everything from loose papers to personal letters to bureaucratic documents to official statements and threats issued by al Qaeda and its allies. These documents, which contain important information with regard to the inner workings of al Qaeda, its leading personalities, field commanders, clandestine terrorists, and rank-and-file members, have been completely beyond the public access until now.

In late 2005, the Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) at West Point was given 28 declassified documents from the HARMONY database in order to help the CTC "provide an analysis of potential network vulnerabilities and conflicts of interests within the organization" in order to support the efforts of U.S. military planners. The CTC's detailed analysis on how best to exploit al Qaeda's operational vulnerabilities is well worth reading on its own right, but what is far more interesting is the information contained in the declassified HARMONY documents that hints that there is far more to come.

For instance, take Document #: AFGP-2002-601693, titled "Status of Jihad" by the HARMONY database. In it, an individual using the kuniyat (assumed name) of Abu Mus'ab writes to one Abu Mohammed, which the translator speculates--based on references to his release from prison--as likely being Abu Muhammad Asem al-Maqdisi, the preferred kuniyat of Iraqi insurgent leader Abu Musab Zarqawi's mentor Isam Mohammad Taher al-Barqawi.

According to the substance of the letter, Abu Mus'ab has apparently fallen out of favor with Abu Qatada, a London-based cleric who, prior to his arrest, was widely considered to be bin Laden's most senior representative in Europe. In the letter, Abu Mus'ab is seeking Abu Mohammed's support. Having met Zarqawi himself, Abu Mus'ab claims that the future Iraqi insurgent leader agrees with him that the al Qaeda-backed Muslim insurgencies fighting in Bosnia, Chechnya, Kashmir, and Tajikistan are in fact made up of polytheists and supporters of secular democracy because of their willingness to seek an accommodation with secular powers, a point of view that has apparently.

According to Abu Mus'ab, this has led to Zarqawi being accused of takfir (declaring Muslims to be kafir or infidels) by other al Qaeda members.

This anecdote is interesting because it goes toward establishing a factual basis for the widely-reported rift between Zarqawi and the rest of the al Qaeda leadership--prior to his public pledge of allegiance to bin Laden in October 2004.

Nevertheless, analysts looking in the HARMONY documents for evidence to support their contention that Zarqawi was not part of al Qaeda prior to the U.S. invasion of Iraq will be sorely disappointed: According to Abu Mus'ab, Zarqawi refrained from joining the other man "because of his love for leadership and the organization"--with "the organization" here almost certainly referring to al Qaeda.

To support his position, Zarqawi produced a 200 page research paper by senior al Qaeda ideologue and terror theoretician Abu Musab al-Suri (also known as Mustafa Setmariam Nasar, captured by U.S. forces in Pakistan in November 2005). At the letter explains, this lengthy paper "said that it is permissible to fight under the banner of infidelity . . . supporting his opinion with quotes from here and there."

This is an interesting revelation given the traditional image of Zarqawi as an avowed fanatic; it may explain why he has been able to so easily establish alliances with secular Iraqi Baathists and Shiite Iranian Revolutionary Guardsmen without compromising his beliefs. According to Abu Mus'ab, Zarqawi believed the Taliban governor of Jalalabad to be an infidel, yet Zarqawi continued to cooperate with the Afghan theocracy until its collapse.