"Between the increase in armor and the changes in tactics, techniques and procedures that we've employed, the number of attacks . . . that have been effective has gone down, and the number of casualties per effective attack has gone down."
--General Peter Pace
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
November 2005
GENERAL PETER PACE issued that statement last November in response to an inquiry about the Pentagon's efforts to combat the threat of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in Iraq. What General Pace did not say was that the number of IED attacks had roughly doubled from 2004 to 2005 and thus better tactics, techniques, and procedures had failed to reduce the overall number of fatalities stemming from the IED threat.
There have been approximately 823 coalition fatalities directly attributed to IEDs. This number represents less than a third of overall casualties, but anecdotal evidence indicates that, among the troops on the ground, no tactic employed by the Iraqi insurgency is as dreaded. In the last month alone, 36 of 55 U.S. fatalities were the direct result of an IED.
If anything, the IED toll may be understated, since the military does not include in it the number of soldiers and Marines killed by small arms fire in the aftermath of an explosion (otherwise known as "complex attacks"). These attacks occur in the open at a time and place of the enemy's choosing--they wait for the bomb disposal team to arrive and then open fire in an IED ambush.
Two weeks ago, I was
contacted by an individual uniquely qualified to comment on both the threat posed by the IED and the military's response. This individual is a staff-level military officer who focused on the IED threat while serving in Iraq during most of 2005. He has been on patrols with U.S. units in the high-threat IED areas around Iraq and has also worked in the Pentagon.
This officer described to me a military that has been ineffective in confronting the IED threat for three reasons: (1) overdependence on technology-based solutions; (2) a stifling culture of bureaucracy; and (3) a failure to compile accurate information on each IED attack.
THE MANHATTAN PROJECT
According to Newsweek, in the spring of 2004, a year after the invasion, General John Abizaid wrote to Secretary Rumsfeld and described IEDs as "the number one killer of American troops" in theater. He requested a "Manhattan Project-like effort" to develop new technologies in order to defeat the menace. For the most part, that's exactly what the military, and the taxpayers, received. The Pentagon spent roughly $6.1 billion between 2004 and 2006 on the effort. The Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO), a Pentagon task force, has a budget of $3.3 billion for this year alone. Though this investment has led to the development of some impressive counter-IED technologies, it has not translated into success in decreasing IED casualties.
While the military has had some success in deploying up-armored humvees to better protect troops on Iraqi roads, insurgents have likewise adapted their tactics. The Washington Post reported late last year that insurgents now have access to Iranian TNT, which is 7 times more powerful than the TNT otherwise available in Iraq. With further assistance from Iran, these explosives are being fashioned into shaped-charges capable of focusing a blast so as to greatly amplify its destructive potential. As Marine Col. Bob Chase told the Post, "We got better armor, they started getting better ordnance."
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