In a country that for the past year has consistently ceded ground to terrorists, the storming of the Lal Masjid mosque in Islamabad was a rare bit of good news. As Pakistani forces wrapped up their raid on July 11, their examination of 73 bodies recovered from the so-called red mosque suggested that most of the dead were militants--and that they included mosque leader Abdur Rashid Ghazi. Yet while Western observers would surely like to view the raid as evidence that Pakistani president Pervez Musharraf has regained his determination to fight terrorism, the facts counsel against undue optimism.

Pakistan's move to clear the mosque following an extended standoff was indeed a major accomplishment. Lal Masjid leaders had recruited fighters and suicide bombers to fight coalition forces in Afghanistan. Abdur Rashid Ghazi and his brother Mohammed Abdul Aziz were known for issuing fatwas in favor of what one U.S. intelligence source described as "every jihad imaginable." Both brothers met fitting ends: Abdur Rashid died, and Abdul Aziz was captured trying to flee while disguised as a woman in a burka.

The Lal Masjid was by no means Pakistan's most militant mosque, but its location in the capital made it a conspicuous symbol of the challenge Musharraf faces. Tensions between the mosque and the government have simmered for years. The government mounted a botched raid in July 2005 after evidence emerged suggesting that one of the suicide bombers who had struck London's mass transit system that month had been radicalized at the Lal Masjid.

These tensions

China applied enormous pressure to Musharraf. His previous attempts to order military strikes against the Lal Masjid had met with rebuffs. In late January, after the Pakistani army refused to raid the mosque, Musharraf ordered his air force to do so--only to see this order refused as well. Musharraf's eventual solution was to send in 111 Brigade, which is personally loyal to him.

Though the raid on the Lal Masjid achieved Musharraf's objectives, it would be unwise to conclude that he is finally getting tough on militants. More than anything, Musharraf's handling of the affair highlights his weakness. He acted erratically and inconsistently, offering concessions precisely when he should have turned up the heat. Musharraf's negotiations with the mosque could most charitably be described as a carrot and stick approach lacking any apparent strategy for shifting between the two.

The single most poorly timed move during the standoff came on July 6, when Musharraf offered amnesty to everyone holed up in the mosque on the very day he was targeted for assassination. There are differing accounts as to whether Musharraf made the offer before or after the assassination attempt--but no analyst I spoke with would have been surprised if it had followed the attempt on Musharraf's life. In dealing with the Lal Masjid, Musharraf consistently followed up tough talk with concessions, right up until the raid began.