Two and a half years ago--in the wake of elections in Afghanistan, the Palestinian territories, and especially Iraq (as well as the fall of Lebanon's pro-Syrian government)--we were witness to what became known as the "Arab Spring." Commentators were declaring President Bush's "freedom agenda" a success.

In February 2005, New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman declared the Iraqi election a "tipping point" in Middle East history. "[W]e're seeing the equivalent of the fall of the Berlin Wall there," Friedman said. Such unlikely voices as NPR's Daniel Schorr, the Washington Post's Jefferson Morley, and columnists in Der Spiegel and the Guardian were saying, explicitly or in essence, "Bush was right."

Today the situation looks very different. The Freedom Agenda is being criticized from almost every quarter--and the main reason is Iraq. It is said that our efforts to plant democracy there have been a colossal failure. Iraq is fractured and fragmenting, violent, and politically paralyzed. Whereas exporting democracy was once considered a worthy endeavor, many people now fear it will usher in chaos. A bumper sticker puts it this way: Be Nice to Us, or We Will Bring Democracy to You.

But Iraq's problems are not the product of democracy, and they shouldn't be laid at the feet of liberty. In fact, the causes of Iraq's difficulties lie elsewhere.

For one thing, the Phase IV (post-major combat operations) plan was deeply flawed. After 35 years of Saddam Hussein's demonic rule, Iraq was a traumatized society. In many respects, it was non-functioning. The Bush administration (in which I served) did not sufficiently anticipate this. In the aftermath of the fall of Saddam, basic order was not provided. For too long there was an aversion among some in the administration to nation-building, even though we had taken on one of the great nation-building projects in history. We tried to hand over responsibility to the Iraqi Security Forces before they were ready. There was a reluctance to recognize the growing insurgency--and once we did, it took too long to put in place the right counterinsurgency strategy.

Fortunately President Bush, facing enormous political pressure to wind down the war, refused to give up on Iraq. Eventually he made wholesale changes, including embracing the idea of "the surge" earlier this year. Under the extraordinary leadership of General David Petraeus and his team, the right strategy has now been put in place. This year is turning out to be a much better year than 2006. Almost every meaningful security metric is improving. The task in Iraq remains difficult--but we now have a decent shot at a decent outcome.

Beyond that, al Qaeda made Iraq the central front in its jihadist campaign. Osama bin Laden, Ayman al Zawahiri, and Abu Musab al Zarqawi --all non-Iraqis--pursued their strategy with cunning savagery; they successfully turned sectarian tensions into widespread sectarian violence. The presence of brutal foreign terrorists in that tortured land made a difficult situation far more challenging.

And then there is Syria--and especially Iran, which is training and financing militias, exporting weapons to Iraq, and inciting violence. Iran is the world's leading state sponsor of terrorism, and it is earning that appellation every day in Iraq.