TODAY MARKS THE first anniversary of the momentous events of January 11, 2007, when Bangladesh's constitutional government was replaced by military rule. For 365 days, Bangladeshis have lived under a state of emergency: their constitutional rights have been suspended, civil liberties limited, and hundreds of thousands--ranging from former prime ministers to ad hoc peddlers--arrested under the banner of "fighting corruption." One year after taking power, the military "caretaker" government's promises to implement a better, truer democracy have not been fulfilled.
To the contrary, the unelected, paraconstitutional government of Bangladesh can claim credit for two appalling developments: the politicization of the army, which has blurred the lines between the army and civilian administration and has introduced into the army the same corruption rampant in Bangladeshi politics; and the creeping delegitimization of democracy, which has occurred as various undemocratic actions--arrests of perceived enemies, the exclusion of duly elected leaders from political life, the ban on "indoor politics," which forbids private political discussions--are normalized under the army's rule.
Despair is setting in among many Bangladeshis. But in the West, and even among some in Bangladesh, there is denial rather than despair. Some reject the idea that a military coup took place. Bangladesh's two previous military takeovers both had a visible military face. The uniqueness of the new takeover is that the military hand is hidden in the velvet glove of a renowned technocratic team, led by Fakhruddin Ahmed, an internationally acclaimed, world-class economist.
But the refusal to recognize the coup as a coup goes deeper than
that. Perhaps Western democrats never believed Bangladesh really capable of democracy, or perhaps they are willing to endorse a fictional democracy if doing so is in line with perceived international interests. Or perhaps new global risks have prompted the international community to accept an unelected government in Bangladesh: the belief that Islamism must be contained at all costs is taken to justify support for this new order, even if it means the indefinite suspension of democracy.
It is hard not be reminded of Pakistan. Bangladesh, once known as East Pakistan, is afflicted by many of the same ills: Islamism is a rising threat; corruption has eroded the political system; democracy appears a luxury too dear for the present; and the military, as the foremost professional institution, is the most trustworthy partner against the rise of Islamism. In both countries, moreover, reform will depend on the government bureaucracy and the expatriates.
One difference between the two, however, is in the response of Western diplomats. When Parvez Musharraf declared the state of emergency in Pakistan in November 2007, governments of democratic nations expressed their disapproval and dismay. "The people of Pakistan deserve the opportunity to choose their leaders," declared John Negroponte when he flew over to Islamabad. But a year has passed since the military assumed power in Bangladesh, and the silence of much of the world amounts to complicity in the destruction of Bangladesh's democratic potential.
While the West remains silent, Bangladesh sinks deeper into crisis. The country's currency has lost 10 percent of its value, leading businessmen are kept behind bars, and the price of commodities such as edible oil and rice are being forcibly kept down by the army's experiment in state-controlled economics.
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