Currently Medvedev is the chairman of Gazprom, but later in the week the proverbial other shoe dropped when it was announced that the present Prime Minister, Viktor Zubkov, will take this position after the election. (Medvedev has already said that if or when he is elected president he will appoint Putin to be the next PM in Zubkov's place.) Zubkov is also Serdyukov's father-in-law, keeping control of Russia's gas empire and its weapons sales in the same family.
One official reason given in the article for this long delay in the two defense ministers meeting is the personnel changes at the MoD--chiefly the promotion of the former Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov, who originally proposed the bilateral discussions, to the post of First Deputy PM. The unfamiliarity of his successor, Serdyuov, with many of the issues that must be addressed at these talks is another. Serdyukov is a former St. Petersburg furniture store manager turned tax administration official. He has no background or experience in military matters. His appointment has been met with some disbelief given the need for a competent manager to reform and revive the Russian military.
This has all caused the bilateral meeting to be postponed from the fall of 2007 until sometime next year, but independent experts consulted by NG state that the change in ministerial personnel or lack of experience by Serdyukov is not the main reason for the delay. "The chief reason is the serious pause that has arisen in the military-technical cooperation between the two nations. Today in
Moscow there is not one large-scale defense contract with Beijing as there was several years ago. Russia at one point earned US $1.8-2 billion dollars per year in contracts in sales to China of weaponry and military technology, which was 40 per cent or more of the total in foreign currency export earnings."
The chief cause of this drop off in orders is China's unhappiness with Russian defense export policy. The major sticking point is Russia's decision to sell some of its most advanced weaponry to China's regional adversary, India, while at the same time "there is no consensus among the military leadership [in Russia] as to what should be sold to Beijing . . . thus far Moscow has not given a positive answer to the majority of the requests or inquiries from Beijing."
Interestingly, China is referred to in the article as "Podnebesnaya," which is an abbreviation of a common name used by Russians when they refer to China. It means "the subheavenly empire." This is almost a Russian variant on the English-language nickname for China, "The Middle Kingdom," but the complete Russian phrase for China of Podnebesnaya Imperia is closer to the Chinese term Tianxia, which means "under heaven." This phrase has long been used in political writing dating back to when the country was ruled by an emperor. According to this line of thought, the emperor was looked upon as the political leader of the entire world and not just China itself.
Russians use the term to telegraph their increasing apprehension about the breakneck speed at which China is expanding its military might and economic clout. Military leaders in Moscow are afraid that China could very well end up ruling the entire world in everything but name, and, as Beijing's neighbor, Russia could be the first domino to fall--hence the hesitation to sell the Chinese military the most advanced systems in Russia's arsenal.
Meanwhile, Russia's defense industry is taking a bit of a gamble that they can hold the Chinese at bay until the planned post-election meeting of the Russian and Chinese defense ministers. Their one singular advantage at present is that China really has nowhere else that it can go to buy its next-generation weaponry and defense technology.
"What saves the Russian arms exporters thus far," says the paper, "is that the EU still maintains its moratorium on military cooperation with China. If this should be changed, then we cannot forget about the billions [in export sales] that are badly needed by the Russian defense-industrial complex."
This leaves a difficult decision in the hands of Russia's next president. Does he allow China access to the most sophisticated and latest defense technology available and gamble that it will never be used against Moscow, or does he bar any such orders from China in the interests of national security.
Political considerations, such as the Russian-Chinese military cooperation that is part of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, weigh in here. So far, Russia has successfully used this military alliance as a counter to U.S. influence in Asia, but this active partnership could evaporate should Russia cut its defense industrial links with China.
Most likely the political leadership's desire to keep making money for itself will see orders to China rising again very soon. The Russian arms exporting monopoly's umbrella company, Russian Technologies, is also run by longtime Putin friend and KGB comrade Sergei Chemezov, who in the last few years has pushed Russian weapons into new markets like Venezuela.
Neither he nor any of the others who personally profit from defense exports want to see the Chinese market become a permanent dead end. Which is why this current situation is likely little more than a temporary pause. Before too long the next Russian president will start the deliveries to Beijing back up again and it will be back to business as usual. Reuben F. Johnson is a regular contributor to THE DAILY STANDARD.
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