How is it that we find ourselves unable to dispatch the Taliban seven years after their downfall? Winning in Afghanistan requires us to understand the changed nature of the war we are fighting and to adapt our strategy appropriately. Simply killing militants is not enough.

The war in Afghanistan is no longer purely a counterterrorism effort against al Qaeda and the senior Taliban leadership. It bifurcated long ago, and its second branch is a counterinsurgency against a range of groups who are flouting both the central government and the traditional authority of village and tribal elders and moderate mullahs. Often well funded by the Taliban or other enemies of the Afghan government and the coalition, and sometimes incorporating foreign fighters, these groups use money and guns to recruit from the vast pool of illiterate young men who see only continued poverty in the village and tribal status quo. The militants find their opportunity in the unraveling of the social and economic fabric since the Soviet invasion.

Against this shifting alliance of convenience between well-funded extremists and local malcontents, the Afghan government is fighting for its life. Historically decentralized, Afghanistan is a polyglot state made up of myriad ethnic groups and tribes. The present collapse from within, therefore, will not likely be defeated from the top down. While building up the central government is important, that effort will be in vain without a complementary effort to build systems and institutions at the local level, which can eventually be connected to the national government. Accepting

Beyond that, the changed nature of the war makes necessary four key strategic adaptations.

(1) Increase the local and international security presence and its intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities; focus on population-centric operations.More international security forces, particularly in the east and south, are crucial. The increase must be accompanied by an intensified effort to raise and develop Afghan forces. Furthermore, we must devote more intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets to the contested areas. As a rule, each battalion-sized task force should have constant unmanned-aerial-vehicle and close-air-support coverage.

These forces must concentrate on protecting the population. To that end, they must build allies among the people; reduce the friction associated with the presence of foreign forces; work with local leaders to promote security in villages and on roads; promote local solutions to local problems; crush the militants when they reveal themselves; and give people compelling reasons to support the government and the counterinsurgency.

(2) Invest in bottom-up capability; attack the problem from both ends. Decentralization can be a powerful force on the side of the government if used responsibly. Afghan identity works from the inside out: Family, clan, village, and tribe are far more compelling to the individual than the nation. Afghans regard their elected village, district, and tribal shuras (councils) as their true representatives, not the appointed district administrators or provincial governors. Empowering these local councils to bring effective governance, basic services, and economic opportunity to their people in a manner integrated with national efforts is the best way to connect people to their government.