By definition, all of the international summits are a success and the next one in Strasburg-Kehl, where the allies will celebrate the 60th anniversary of NATO, will be no different. The final press release will most certainly reflect the collective satisfaction of the Alliance's achievements in its first 60 years of existence and will offer best wishes for the members in the coming decades.
In a way they are right: Doesn't everyone--even the French--want to be part of this western defensive organization? NATO as an institution is not in danger. Its effectiveness and centrality, however, are. The Alliance currently has three big problems that are going to determine the organization's future. The first is an operational problem: Afghanistan. The allies went to that country because many believed that Afghanistan was the good war as opposed to the bad one in Iraq. Moreover, the large majority went there because they thought the American troops had already defeated the Taliban and al Qaeda terrorists and, therefore, their mission was going to focus on reconstruction and not security. No matter what anyone says, that was the spirit that led NATO to take charge of ISAF in 2003. Precisely for that reason, only a few of the allies, and countries that are not members of NATO like Australia, have been prepared to take on combat missions. A couple of years ago, the joke on the ground was that the real meaning of ISAF was: "I See Americans Fight". Today, the situation has not improved: Americans are the ones that are going to try to change the delicate balance of forces that exists today in Afghanistan and which threatens to become an embarrassment for NATO as a whole. The allies can only expect two things there: defeat or victory. To achieve the latter, they have to be willing to take on a responsibility that they have been eluding for the last few years. NATO cannot, and should not, be only the U.S. Marines.
Second, NATO has a serious political problem. There has been a loss of credibility with regard to collective defense and the necessary solidarity among its members, and this has gotten worse with its capitulation to Russia. The European allies' dependence on Russian energy supplies and the United States' dependence on Moscow to stop unwanted situations, like the nuclearization of Iran, has meant that NATO has in fact accepted the Kremlin's policy of imposing its own sphere of influence on Eastern Europe. We have seen the invasion of Georgia and Moscow's repeated meddling in Ukraine, the constant threats and bravado of its leaders, its neo-imperial vision and its threats to return to the Cold War with military deployment in the Caribbean. Instead of acting calmly, clearly avoiding provocation but with a firm hand, the allies have preferred to forget their promises to Georgia and Ukraine. To keep Moscow happy they have applauded Obama's decision, even though it was unilateral, to abandon the anti-missile shield on European soil. Ronald Reagan embraced the Russians from a position of strength, and he brought the communist regime to an end. The recent NATO Council of Ministers has continued its sessions with Moscow in exchange for nothing. Germany, France, and Italy must be happy because they stress having good relations with the Kremlin above all else, but the Baltic countries and the Polish, Czechs and Hungarians cannot be pleased. If Russia gets its way without paying a price, Georgia will not be the last to be trapped in its net. Deploying part of its infrastructures and forces in the more eastern members of the Alliance would be enough to reinforce the feeling of solidarity that is needed in any military alliance. They have a legitimate right to do so, and this would allow the allies to hold talks with Moscow on a more equal basis.
