Taiwan's President Ma Ying-jeou announced recently that China has dropped its objections to the self-governed island's participation as an observer in the World Health Organization (WHO). This is truly great news for Taiwan. Though it is a far cry from a full seat at the United Nations, limited participation in the WHO will afford Taiwan greater opportunities to interact with other countries and, perhaps more important, will help Taiwan to better protect itself, and the many international travelers that it hosts, from epidemics like the swine flu. As positive as this development may be, and though cross-Strait relations have warmed over the past year, Taipei should not become complacent in protecting itself against Chinese provocations. Beijing still intends to unify Taiwan with the Mainland, by force if necessary. As such, while Taipei pursues diplomatic means to ease cross-Strait tensions, it must also continue to modernize its military in order to deter more aggressive Chinese policies.

China's decision to permit Taiwan's WHO participation was not an altruistic gesture. True, Beijing faces potential costs to this course of action. Namely, it risks weakening its claim to sovereignty over the island; President Ma, however, has agreed that Taiwan will enter the WHO as "Chinese Taipei" to placate Beijing. Rather, Beijing's decision to acquiesce to Taiwanese observership was the result of a cold calculation of costs and benefits. And for China--to the detriment of American and Taiwanese interests--the long-term benefits may far outweigh the near-term costs.

Over the past year, cross-Strait relations have seen significant improvement.

Short-term gains are mutually beneficial, but if China's efforts are successful, it will gain at Taiwan's expense over the longer term. For all of the positive steps China has taken over the past year, it has failed to renounce the right to use force to unify Taiwan with the Mainland, and has not pulled back from the eastern coast its thousands of missiles aimed at the island. Beijing continues to think of Taiwan as an integral and inseparable part of China. Make no mistake, Beijing may have dropped its objections to Taipei's participation in the WHO, but it is not about to drop its irredentist claims to the "lost province."

In its own mind, at least, China's recent policies--the resumption of direct cross-Strait flights, greater economic ties, and the donation of pandas to Taiwanese zoos--are in large part aimed at progressing towards its goal of unifying Taiwan. This "panda diplomacy" benefits China economically while, Beijing hopes, improving its image in Taiwan. A seemingly friendlier China appears to be a less threatening China. Only a year after President Ma's inauguration, there are Taiwanese already questioning the wisdom of high levels of defense spending. If China is making efforts to improve relations, they ask, isn't Taiwan's security environment improving? Given Beijing's new direction, need Taiwan continue to worry about its defense as it has for so long?