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Don’t Be Seduced by the Sequester

Feb 18, 2013, Vol. 18, No. 22 • By WILLIAM KRISTOL
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It’s understandable that Republicans are tempted by the prospect of allowing the “sequester”—the automatic cut to defense and domestic discretionary spending agreed to as an enforcement mechanism for the 2011 debt ceiling deal—to go into effect on March 1. It’s understandable because Republicans are in favor of cutting domestic spending. It’s understandable because Republicans are desperate to secure what they think could be a political victory over Barack Obama and Harry Reid. It’s understandable because going to the trouble of fixing the sequester would be difficult, and the effort to do so will create strains within the Republican conference.

An aircraft carrier


But what’s understandable isn’t always responsible. Allowing the sequester to go into effect would be deeply irresponsible.

It’s true that the sequester will cut domestic discretionary spending. On the other hand, it will do so ham-handedly, with no reforms to domestic programs, and with the big-ticket entitlements untouched. Far more important, the sequester will endanger national security—cutting the military abruptly and arbitrarily to levels far below what Republicans have ever thought desirable.

It’s also true that President Obama has been utterly unserious about dealing with spending, and that he’s now disingenuously criticizing a sequester he proposed and insisted on in 2011. This seems to be a chance to defeat and embarrass the president. He deserves defeat and embarrassment. There will be opportunities for both. But this is not the right one, not at the expense of national security.

But wait, say Republican tacticians, it’s a chance to gain leverage against the president.

Leverage for what? The GOP pols who talk about “leverage” never explain what they’re going to use that leverage for. The Republican House can and should prevent further tax increases, and for that matter domestic spending increases, regardless of how the sequester battle turns out. The sequester gives Republicans no leverage here. And the House will have no more ability to insist on needed entitlement reforms or on the shape of next year’s overall budget with the sequester in effect than if it’s not.

Meanwhile, there’s the small matter of defense and the national interest. The sequester would do real damage to both. So Republicans should resist seduction by the sequester, overcome the temptation of embracing it, and should instead take the lead in fixing it.

The Republican House, to its credit, did pass legislation in 2012 that would have fixed the sequester in a responsible way. The current Republican House should do so again, this month, before the sequester goes into effect. And it should then pressure the Senate, and the president, to come to the table and agree to an acceptable alternative to sequester, one that would avoid crippling reductions to a military that’s already suffered from large and arbitrary cuts imposed by the Obama White House.

Republicans—as well as Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta and defense experts across the political spectrum—have explained so many times how damaging the sequester would be to our military that there’s no need to restate the case here. But consider last week’s announcement by the Navy that, just 48 hours before its deployment from Norfolk to the Gulf, the USS Harry S. Truman would not sail but instead be put on alert to “deploy on short notice.” This will leave only the USS John C. Stennis in the Gulf, until it is replaced by the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower—meaning our aircraft carrier presence in the Persian Gulf will be reduced from two carriers to one. Christopher Harmer, naval specialist at the Institute for the Study of War, explains the consequences:

It’s a drastic move: The continuous deployment of two U.S. aircraft carriers to the Persian Gulf area guarantees an immediate and crushing military response to any provocation—especially to one coming from the Iranians. .  .  . The typical deployment pattern for two carriers in this area is to station one carrier in the Persian Gulf, inside the Strait of Hormuz, and one outside the Persian Gulf, patrolling the Arabian Sea, Somali Basin, Gulf of Aden, Red Sea, or Indian Ocean. .  .  . Maintaining one aircraft carrier inside and one outside the Strait of Hormuz ensures that the Iranian Navy is constantly aware that any attempt to close the Strait will result in an overwhelming military response. A two-carrier presence has a much greater deterrent effect than a single carrier would.

Harmer continues:

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