Our Country’s Battles
We have today an aging and shrinking Air Force and Navy, an Army that is overstretched, reserve forces that are far too ‘active’ in their rate of deployment, and too few dollars to rebuild and modernize.
But this is precisely what the QDR does not do. As Representative Buck McKeon (R-CA), the committee’s ranking minority member, noted in his own opening statement, “The QDR is supposed to shape the Department for 2029—not describe the Pentagon in 2009.” McKeon concluded that the QDR avoided its primary task of looking to future force requirements precisely because to do so would have exposed the administration to the criticism that its defense plans are more about a self-imposed budget constraint than actual strategy.
A new, conservative-led Congress could, of course, force the administration to be more responsible. But we must reckon with conservatives themselves. They are at present so upset with the increasing level of federal debt that, in the rush to cut spending and reduce the deficit, there is risk they may lump defense in with all the other federal programs to be cut.
No doubt, the Pentagon could be made more efficient. But efficiencies will only go so far. State-of-the-art weapons and military platforms are expensive, and so is the all-volunteer military that uses them with incredible capability. Republicans are only kidding themselves if they think defense reform will fix the procurement and modernization problems we now face. The gap between what is needed to modernize the military and the resources being provided is larger than any “reform” can bridge.
And there may be an even more serious problem on the conservative side: the lack of a clear strategic vision. There is a sense among conservatives, especially among many in Congress, that, if we can just get our economic house in order, all else will be well. Yet, since the end of World War II, the overriding premise of American grand strategy has been that if we as a country want peace and prosperity at home, we must have a military sufficiently dominant to deter major threats, police the international commons, and, when necessary, win the wars we wage. Although not cheap, such a strategy provided the underpinning for six decades of remarkable prosperity and success all across the globe. This is something conservatives know in their bones, but spend too little time actually articulating.
Take, for example, Representative Paul Ryan’s (R-WI) detailed blueprint for getting federal spending under control and restoring America to some level of fiscal sanity (“A Roadmap for America’s Future”). This is a serious plan for achieving those goals. Yet missing in his analysis is thinking about what resources the Pentagon might need to do its job. While Ryan rightly points to the “fatal arithmetic of imperial decline” if the United States doesn’t get its fiscal house in order, the only substantive remark in his plan about defense spending—another type of fatal arithmetic—is that, “if the nation is at war,” the otherwise mandatory cap on government spending should be lifted. Obviously, this is a sensible loophole—but it leaves hanging the question of what we should be willing to spend to acquire a military of sufficient size and quality to stave off fighting a major war to begin with.
The Roadmap’s introduction concludes with a quotation from Thomas Jefferson:
But, of course, this really isn’t the total sum of good government. To think so is to give too little thought to the priorities of national defense—an attitude that, in the case of Jefferson and his followers, left the nation unprepared for the war that came in 1812 and allowed the capital to be sacked.
None of this is to suggest that Congressman Ryan isn’t aware of the importance of defense spending and U.S. military readiness. As the ranking member of the Budget Committee, he is necessarily focused on getting federal spending under control. His plan, though, is a useful reminder that, if conservatives gain sway in November, they should not ignore America’s military needs. In the 1990s, many Republicans were all too willing to let Democrats cut defense spending even as they focused on fighting about domestic programs. It’s far from clear that the U.S. military can withstand another eight years of flat or declining budgets and remain the preeminent global force it is today, continuing to spare us the costs that come with a world in which there is increasing anarchy and less order as American military power recedes.
—William Kristol & Gary Schmitt