When Daniel Met Julian
The rise and fall of WikiLeaks
Apr 25, 2011, Vol. 16, No. 31 • By JONATHAN V. LAST
WikiLeaks’ policy for handling information was -similarly clever: The site promised to publish every leak that came its way, in full, with no editing, in the order in which it arrived. This scheme encouraged leakers by assuring them that, whatever risks they incurred, their labors would at least bear fruit.
For a time, the system worked. WikiLeaks published damning documents about a shady Swiss bank and the Church of Scientology. They published 6,700 Congres-sional Research Service reports and documents showing that high-level executives had plundered an Icelandic bank just before it failed. (They also published items with no probative value—such as the hacked contents of Sarah Palin’s personal email account.) Assange and Dom-scheit-Berg were fêted by the hacker community and techno-utopians of the kind who idolize anarchist-philosopher Pierre-Joseph (“Property is theft!”) Proudhon. (Dom-scheit-Berg calls Proudhon’s What Is Property? “the most important book ever written.”)
But in 2010, the organizational focus of WikiLeaks changed. In April, the site published gun-camera video of a July 2007 American airstrike in Iraq that killed 18 people, including two journalists. It marked a significant departure from protocol. First, the video was pushed to the front of the queue and published ahead of other leaked material. Second, WikiLeaks manipulated the footage, editing it down, adding subtitles, giving it a sensational title, and even putting an antigovernment quotation from George Orwell at the beginning of the film. And finally, it marked the beginning of WikiLeaks’ partnership with the traditional media.
WikiLeaks debuted the video, which they titled “Collateral Murder,” in Washington, D.C., at the National Press Club. Reporters flocked to the story, and to WikiLeaks. Networks paid for the “rights” to air it. Four months later, when WikiLeaks received 91,000 leaked documents from U.S. Central Command in Afghanistan, the New York Times, the Guardian, and Der Spiegel jumped at the chance to get exclusive access. In October, WikiLeaks published a similar cache of documents about the Iraq war. And in November, they published a mass of diplomatic cables. In each case, a harem of large media outlets—eventually Le Monde and Al Jazeera joined—eagerly disseminated the material, on terms dictated by WikiLeaks.
The media’s complicity in WikiLeaks’ agenda was astonishing. At one point, WikiLeaks ran into trouble with PayPal, which froze the organization’s assets. (WikiLeaks had registered with PayPal as a nonprofit, even though they were not.) Dom-scheit-Berg asked a New York Times reporter to intercede on their behalf. The reporter called PayPal and bullied the company, demanding to know why the assets of “a project being supported by the New York Times” were frozen. PayPal released the account immediately.
Throughout WikiLeaks’ aestas mirabilis the site was unmolested by Western governments, even as it sought to wreck American foreign policy and put soldiers in harm’s way. In 2010, Assange went so far as to change WikiLeaks’ mission statement. Where the site once labeled itself “the most aggressive press organization in the world,” Assange now called it “an insurgent operation.” His choice of words was not an accident.
Yet no one tried to put a halt to this insurgency. A handful of American companies, including PayPal, Amazon, Visa, and MasterCard, stopped doing business with WikiLeaks. France’s minister of industry demanded that a French Internet service provider drop WikiLeaks as a customer. (A French judge prevented the company from doing so.) And that was that. The prevailing belief was that the Internet bestowed magical powers and nothing could be done to stop Assange and his confederates. With thousands of anonymous volunteers and a secret, dispersed network of servers, WikiLeaks was bulletproof.
Only, WikiLeaks wasn’t quite as advertised. For starters, Dom-scheit-Berg admits that the website was far from impregnable. Early on, leakers submitting material were completely exposed to outside eyes. When a German tech writer pointed this out, Assange released a statement saying—untruthfully—“The article currently being spun about WikiLeaks source protection is false.” After the first story appeared pointing to their security holes, Assange and Dom-scheit-Berg conspired to mislead reporters about their operation. “To create the impression of unassailability to the outside world, you only had to make the context as complicated and confusing as possible,” Dom-scheit-Berg explains. “To that end, I would make my explanations of technical issues to journalists as complex as I could.” Prior to early 2010, Dom-scheit-Berg says, the entire site could have been taken down easily by an outsider.
Similarly, WikiLeaks’ human resources were vastly exaggerated. They had a single attorney who had offered them services pro bono, yet they pretended to have an army of lawyers. They accomplished this subterfuge by employing dozens of fake email addresses, which they used to communicate with the outside world. (Dom-scheit-Berg’s favorite alter ego was “Daniel Schmitt,” the name of his traumatized cat.)
How many sock-puppet emails did Assange and Dom-scheit-Berg use? Lots. “When ‘Thomas Bellman’ or ‘Leon from the tech department’ answered an email and promised to forward a request on to our legal services, it was usually just me,” Dom-scheit-Berg writes. “Julian, too, used a host of pseudonyms. . . . [E]ven today I don’t know whether some of the names are real people or alter egos of Julian Assange. ‘Jay Lim,’ for instance, is responsible for legal questions. Jay Lim? Someone Chinese, maybe? I’ve never met him. Nor did I ever have any contact with Chinese dissidents who, as rumor had it, were involved in setting up WikiLeaks.”
And not just the legal department:
And not just the volunteers, either:
When the other seven “board members” were eventually tracked down, they all denied having anything to do with WikiLeaks.
The organization’s first big story concerned a Swiss bank that was helping the super wealthy dodge taxes. WikiLeaks published a list of these tax dodgers. The leaker, however, had made a small mistake: One of the names was slightly transposed so that an innocent bystander in Germany was “outed” as a corrupt, tax-dodging plutocrat. The poor fellow contacted WikiLeaks begging them to make a correction. They did, sort of, adding the following note to the documents: “According to three independent sources, this document, the summary and some of the commentary are false or misleading. WikiLeaks is investigating the matter.”
It was gracious of them, except for one thing: “Three independent sources?” Dom-scheit-Berg explains: “That sounded good. Unfortunately it was made up.”
Domscheit-Berg claims that this was the only error in the history of WikiLeaks. If so, that’s an act of Providence because there was almost no verification of incoming documents. WikiLeaks publicly claimed that they conducted rigorous “authenticity checks” on all submissions to insure they were genuine. This was another half-truth. Dom-scheit-Berg says these authenticity checks were
And it wasn’t as though there weren’t signals that Assange and WikiLeaks might be working with unclean hands. When WikiLeaks approached the New York Times, the Guardian, and Der Spiegel about publishing excerpts of the Afghan war diaries, the only condition the papers put on the agreement was that names be redacted to protect Afghan civilians on the ground. Assange objected, telling the assembled editors, “Well, they’re informants. So, if they get killed, they’ve got it coming to them. They deserve it.” Eventually Assange relented, and his media partners forged ahead. But the week before the documents were to be published, the papers discovered that Assange had not done any redacting at all.
He was trying to snooker them. Assange’s plan was to postpone the redacting, get the big papers to run their stories, and then renege on his deal by publishing the full, unexpurgated documents. By chance, the papers discovered this double-dealing at the last minute, and forced him to scrub the documents. Despite Assange’s gambit, they continued their partnership.
There are, perhaps, ideological reasons why the media were so eager to join forces with WikiLeaks that they ignored all the signs that they were in league with bad actors. But there is no good explanation why the American government was so cowed by WikiLeaks as to be paralyzed. Even once WikiLeaks’ security apparatus was built, it would have been an easy matter to bring down the operation: Simply submit reams of fake—or even old and useless—documents. Such a flood would have paralyzed WikiLeaks’ meager human resources and, because of the protocols of anonymity, would have been impossible to trace.
We’re lucky that WikiLeaks was run by Julian Assange and Daniel Dom-scheit-Berg and not a more capable, stable group of anti-Americans. After a series of personal slights, Assange and Dom-scheit-Berg broke up on August 26, 2010. In an intense chat-room session, Assange suspended his former number two for “disloyalty, insubordination, and destabilization in a time of crisis.” Dom-scheit-Berg quit the group shortly thereafter. The architect went with him. When the pair left WikiLeaks, they returned control of the main server to Assange, but dismantled the security system they had built and reinstituted the primitive version that had existed before they came on board. History is written by the nerd with the superadmin access.
At the end of the day, it’s not even clear how much of WikiLeaks’ anti-Americanism had to do with America. At one point in his book, Dom-scheit-Berg visits Russia and is amazed at what a terrible, corrupt country it is. “You can say what you like about many people’s number-one enemy, the United States,” he writes, “but in Moscow the situation was also acute.”
So why didn’t WikiLeaks go after Vladimir Putin? Or perhaps China’s regime, with its litany of human rights violations? Or Iran, even, with its persecution of women, gays, and student protesters? In the most telling passage of Inside WikiLeaks, Dom-scheit-Berg admits that one of the big reasons “why we focused on the United States was the language barrier. None of us spoke Hebrew or Korean. It wasn’t easy to gauge the significance of a document even when it was written in English.”
The people who built WikiLeaks can be excused for their stupidity. But the people who enabled them and their assault on America should have known better.
Jonathan V. Last is a senior writer at THE WEEKLY STANDARD.