The man in charge
Although Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice's visit to Moscow on Tuesday resulted in a cordial agreement to "tone down the rhetoric," the relations between Russia and the United States remains relatively tense.
Some astute analysts have pointed out, however, that the current rhetoric of confrontation may stem largely from domestic conditions in Russia, namely the high-stakes "succession games" now being played out in the Kremlin. Writing for the Wall Street Journal on Tuesday, Leon Aron, the director of Russian Studies at AEI, argued that
While Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice is in Moscow for talks, she might see for herself the reason for the increasingly tense relations between the two countries, and the increasingly harsh climate inside: the jitters that next year's presidential succession is already generating in the Kremlin. . . . The erosion or outright eradication of what might be called shock-absorbers of democracy that endow the process and the result of a transition with legitimacy…has ushered in uncertainty and risk.
Perhaps with this conundrum in mind, the Russia weekly Kommersant-Vlast' has released a series of fascinating transcripts that shed some light on the inner workings of the Kremlin. Mockingly titled "The Self-Manual of the [Ruling] Apparatus" and interspersed with sardonic "administrative instructions," the article presents 33 instances of President Putin's interaction with members of his "vertical of power."
One preferred method of keeping underlings in line, according to the Russian weekly, is "the Loyalty Test:"
Subordinates must be concise and uncritical. Loyalty of the subordinate is easy to test, for instance, by misstating his [family] name or the patronymic. The main purpose of this exercise is to carefully gauge his reaction. The most loyal subordinate will pretend that he has not noticed the error. Conclusion: subordinates must respond to the names that are assigned by their superiors.
The paper gives numerous examples in which Putin appears to intentionally misstate the names of his subordinates. At a meeting on June 15, 2004, Putin addresses his foreign minister Sergei Viktorovich Lavrov:
PUTIN: "Sergei Leonidovich, you will take part in the next meeting of the foreign ministers of the Organization of the Islamic Conference. Which issues will be addressed?"
LAVROV: "A wide variety of questions: the situation in the Middle East, the situation in Iraq, Afghanistan, Cyprus, other regions…"
And again on December 20, 2004, Putin addresses Lavrov by a different name:
PUTIN: "Sergei Dmitrievich, today we will begin international consultations with our German partners. What is our level of readiness and what main issues will we discuss?"
LAVROV: "We have conducted thorough preparations, in consultation with all government agencies. The talks promise to be highly productive…"
Lavrov passes the test, making no mention of his boss's error. Another method of demonstrating authority is referred to as "Rule #22, (Re)Confirm and Overrule":
Any report from a subordinate may be reconfirmed. This allows keeping the administrators in check and grants additional levers in constructing the system of checks-and-balances.
We see this put into action on July 20, 2006 in a conversation between Putin and Aleksandr Khloponin, governor of the Krasnoyarsk region:
PUTIN: "Remember, you've promised me to begin working on the Ice Palace project?"
KHLOPONIN: "As of today, the investors have been found. Already this year, we plan on constructing the foundation. And, I think, we will finish building the palace next year."
PUTIN: "Do the investors know that they have been found?"
KHLOPONIN: "Of course."
Here the paper describes Rule #32, "The Public Humiliation":
It is better to humiliate subordinates publicly. Because the authority of the superiors is unquestionable, others will interpret the humiliation only with approval--subordinates will be grateful that they were not subjected to it.
Putin puts Rule #32 into action at a cabinet meeting on November 13, 2003:
