PRESIDENT BUSH'S inclusion of North Korea in the "axis of evil" was accurate and necessary. It was also liberating. It freed us from the confines of a debate about North Korea that has unfolded along traditional hawk versus dove lines.
The doves, led by South Korean president Kim Dae Jung and former U.S. president Bill Clinton, stressed the need for dialogue, conciliation, and the pursuit of signed agreements with the North. This approach has featured the 1994 Agreed Framework, a North-South summit in June 2000, renewed diplomatic relations between Pyongyang and several Western countries (though not the United States), and the lifting of longstanding U.S. sanctions on North Korea.
If the measure of success is the enhancement of U.S. and South Korean security, then the dovish approach has manifestly failed. Through all the talk and signing ceremonies of the past decade, North Korea has continued to develop the Taepo Dong-2 missile, which will be able to reach the United States, according to the CIA. It also continues to export missile components and technology to Iran, Libya, and Syria. No effort has been made to diminish its stock of chemical and biological weapons, both of which, the CIA recently informed Congress, Pyongyang has the capability to deliver by missile. As for nuclear power, despite the freeze on construction of the Yongbyon nuclear reactors, the fact is that without full inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), to which North Korea has agreed but which have yet to take place, we simply do not know the full extent of Pyongyang's nuclear capabilities.
Meanwhile, the readiness of North Korea's massive conventional army--third largest in the world, for a country with 22 million people--has improved over the past few years after a famine-induced slide in the mid-1990s, largely thanks to aid from the United States and South Korea. As a result, the regime in North Korea is as entrenched and dangerous today as it was when we launched Asia's analogue to the now-defunct Middle East peace process.
In pointing out these failures, hawks have argued for verifiability and strict reciprocity in agreements, immediate IAEA access to North Korea, and an exploration of the possibility of replacing the nuclear reactors being built for North Korea under the Agreed Framework with conventional power plants.
While the hawks' goals are desirable, their approach suffers no less than the doves' from a fundamental flaw: It assumes the legitimacy of the Communist regime in Pyongyang. Indeed, as long as we continue to negotiate with North Korea over what are essentially technical matters, however hard-headed our negotiating posture, we contribute to the legitimacy of the regime. Assuming and undergirding the legitimacy of a regime so plainly illegitimate as Kim Jong Il's is not only contrary to American values but also doomed to fail, just as d tente and arms control with the Soviet Union failed in the 1970s.
President Bush has pointed the way out of this box. By properly labeling the North Korean regime evil, the president has called into question its legitimacy. This allows us to get to the heart of the matter: Getting rid of Kim Jong Il and the sinister clique in Pyongyang is the only lasting solution to the multiple threats that North Korea now poses to the world.
A liberation strategy for North Korea would require at least the following policies:
(1) Public diplomacy. The president's State of the Union speech should be followed up with additional statements by high-ranking officials that indicate the United States' desire for a new regime in Pyongyang. In order to keep the moral high ground, Washington must offer reasons that focus not only on the North Korean military threat, but also on the execrable human rights situation. North Korea is routinely ranked among the very worst offenders in the world by all the monitoring organizations.
Radio Free Asia broadcasting into North Korea, now just 2 hours a day, should be ramped up--ultimately to 24 hours a day--in conjunction with efforts to provide and spread the means of communication in North Korea, as was done successfully in Poland in the early 1980s. Obviously, the United States should oppose additional moves toward extending diplomatic recognition to Pyongyang and including North Korea in international fora.
(2) End financial subsidies to the regime. U.S., South Korean, and international aid legitimizes the North Korean regime, helps sustain its military capabilities, and in all likelihood saved it from collapse in the early to mid-1990s. North Korea has diverted U.S.-provided fuel oil for military purposes. We cannot be sure where our food aid has gone because the inspection regime is a farce: Aid groups must give the government a week's notice before inspecting distribution systems.
