THE RECENT DECISION by CBS to cancel a television program about President Ronald Reagan because it was "not balanced" revealed that those who had created the program reflected a belief held by the left in American politics that Reagan was not capable of governing in a responsible manner. Although I am a longtime liberal Democrat in the Hubert Humphrey tradition, I feel compelled to share my personal experiences with President Reagan, which led me to a contrary conclusion.
My first meeting with Ronald Reagan took place in Palm Beach, Florida, in the winter of 1978. The occasion was a large fundraising dinner sponsored by the American Friends of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. I was the national chairman of the organization, and Governor Reagan was our speaker of the evening. We sat next to each other during the dinner, and as we began talking, he mentioned to me that he owned Israel Bonds.
When I told him of my former association with Humphrey, it was as if a bond suddenly formed between us. "Hubert was my good friend," he said, adding that Humphrey had on occasion spent the night at his executive mansion when in California. He told me that Humphrey had been very helpful to him when he was president of the Screen Actors Guild. "Hubert helped me a great deal as we fought the Communists," he said, and he told me that he and Humphrey had been among the organizers of the liberal anti-Communist Americans for Democratic Action (ADA). "Hubert would have made a great president," Reagan said. My wife and I now recall that shortly after we came to Washington in 1949, we were at the home of James Loeb, the national director of ADA. Our dinner was interrupted by a phone call from Ronald Reagan, then an actor. It was clear Jim considered him an ally.
In 1980, President Carter asked me to leave my law practice and accept a temporary diplomatic assignment at a 35-country meeting in Madrid of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. With the defeat of Carter and the election of Reagan in November, I properly submitted my resignation and happily prepared to return to private life. Much to my surprise, General Al Haig, whom I knew and who was designated as Reagan's secretary of state, telephoned me to say that both he and the president wanted me to remain in Madrid. I agreed. When I met with President Reagan shortly thereafter, he obviously recalled our earlier meeting in Florida.
DURING THE MORE THAN TWO YEARS in Madrid that followed my reappointment, I had a number of occasions to discuss with President Reagan the human rights issues that were on our Madrid agenda. The most significant of those occasions came toward the end of our negotiations. In late 1982, I reported to Secretary of State George Shultz that I saw signs the Soviets were eager to end the conference and were probably prepared to give us most of what we and our NATO colleagues were proposing for the final agreement and declaration. They had lost their battle to kill NATO's deployment of Pershing and cruise missiles, partly because of the severe criticisms of the Soviet Union coming out of the Madrid meeting. I told Secretary Shultz, however, that I was no longer satisfied with our demands, which primarily entailed verbal commitments. I felt we should demand the release of victims of Soviet repression, many of whom were in prison or unable to obtain visas to leave the country. Secretary Shultz understood my concerns, but was surprised by my suggestions and pointed out that they would change the rules in the middle of the contest. As we talked further, his interest increased and he said that my proposal required a decision to be made above his pay grade. He called the president, and in a few minutes we were driving to the White House.
The president listened to my proposal carefully. I pointed out to him that our NATO partners as well as the Soviet Union would oppose the serious change I was proposing. Shultz predicted that all of NATO, particularly Germany, would oppose this change in our objectives for the Madrid meeting. The president listened carefully and then said, "George, you take care of [German foreign minister] Genscher should he call, and I will take care of the chancellor should he call me. I like Max's proposal."
The president then asked me how I would proceed, and I acknowledged that I had not arrived at a plan of action. But I explained that I knew it was important for me to talk to the KGB general who was in charge of the Soviet delegation. It was also very important that I not consult with our allies, primarily because our new demand would appear to be unattainable and likely to prolong the sessions, but also because publicity would make it much more difficult for the Soviets to accept my proposal.
