Don't Pivot to Beijing
10:29 AM, Apr 12, 2013 • By VANCE SERCHUK
The Obama administration’s handling of Beijing has undergone a significant evolution since 2009, and in many respects is at the heart of the story of its broader Asia policy. At first, the administration had great expectations for the U.S.-China relationship, signaling new willingness to be respectful of Beijing’s core interests and sensitivities in the hope that this would lead to greater cooperation on global challenges, such as Iran, climate change, and, yes, North Korea. While the White House hardly threw U.S. allies and partners neighboring China under the bus during this period—the first foreign leader Obama greeted in the Oval Office was the Japanese prime minister, and the first state visit he hosted was for the Indian prime minister—there was an unmistakable sense that the new administration was inclined toward a more Sino-centric view of Asia. This sense was deepened by voices in Washington calling for a U.S.-China “G-2” arrangement, and disavowing as retrograde any kind of U.S. role in upholding a regional “balance of power” in Asia—which is to say, a military hedge against Beijing’s rise.
Responsibility for upending the Obama administration’s initial approach to China belongs overwhelmingly to China itself, which reciprocated the White House’s gestures of deference and graciousness with unprecedented military and diplomatic assertiveness. From torpedoing climate change talks in Copenhagen to muscle flexing in its territorial disputes with its neighbors, Chinese behavior had begun to set off alarm bells not only across Asia, but in Washington, by the end of 2009.
To its credit, the Obama administration then switched gears, and by mid-2010, Secretary of State Clinton was confronting the Chinese over their bullying in the South China Sea—declaring a U.S. national interest in freedom of navigation in these waters at an ASEAN summit in Hanoi, to the applause of Southeast Asians and the fury of Beijing. The concept of the U.S. pivot—or “rebalance,” as it was later rebranded—to the Asia-Pacific soon followed.
With the departure of Secretary Clinton, however, some in Asia now worry about the prospects of another pivot by the Obama administration—this time, away from the tough-minded, ally-centric approach to China that it gradually tilted toward over the past three years, in favor of another run at strategic partnership with Beijing, which they fear will inevitably come at their expense.
The continuing crisis surrounding North Korea has sharpened these concerns, as the most obvious path to pressuring Pyongyang of course runs through its lone protector, Beijing. Recent hints by Chinese leaders of impatience with the North Koreans, some suspect, may tempt the Obama Administration to downplay or dodge tensions with China on other fronts, in the hope of winning increased help.
The Obama administration may have inadvertently compounded these fears in its recent public messaging, which has suggested that the Pentagon’s pivot to the Asia-Pacific is being accelerated in response to North Korean provocations—the implication to China being, if you don’t want more American ships, aircraft, and missile defenses in the skies and waters of the western Pacific, you need to do something to restrain your friends in Pyongyang.
The problem with this construction is that it implies that, were the Kim regime actually to be brought to heel, the U.S. might then be prepared to scale back its plans for a defensive build-up in Asia. Given that many of China’s neighbors are today as much if not considerably more worried about Beijing’s rapidly growing military capabilities as they are about North Korea’s saber rattling, this is an unwelcome linkage.
As imperative as it is to try to enlist Beijing’s help on North Korea, as well as numerous other challenges around the world, these efforts should not, and need not, come at the expense of U.S. allies and partners in Asia, or the longstanding U.S. commitment to upholding the broader balance of power in the region. That is because our best hope for persuading China to exercise its growing power responsibly, not only in the case of North Korea but beyond, is by working with and through Beijing’s neighbors, not by bypassing them.
Secretary Kerry in many respects is the perfect envoy to reassure America’s friends that the second term Obama administration continues to understand all of this, and that its commitment to them, and broader approach to the region, remains unchanged and undiminished. This is because Kerry is himself perceived in the region as potentially more inclined than his predecessor toward a Sino-centric strategy.
In the case of Japan, for instance, Kerry has yet to reiterate Secretary Clinton’s strong public message to the Chinese over their dispatch of ships and aircraft to the Japanese-held Senkaku islands. While Clinton bluntly warned during her final days in office that the U.S. opposed “any unilateral efforts that would seek to undermine Japanese administration” of the islands, Kerry, by contrast, has thus far only said that he appreciates Tokyo’s “restraint” in the ongoing tussle over the Senkakus.
Many in Asia also suspect that Kerry is simply less interested in their part of the world than Clinton was, and more inclined to devote his time and attention as secretary to the assorted crises in the Middle East. It doesn’t help matters that, despite extensive international travel as chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee over the past four years, he rarely ventured east of Islamabad. (No one in Japan, for instance, can seem to recall the last time he set foot here—never a good sign.)
As the Obama administration’s own evolution during its first term shows, Kerry’s trip can start to lay to rest some of these doubts and concerns—and hopefully, he will do so. Otherwise, North Korea won't be our only problem in Asia.
Vance Serchuk is a Hitachi-Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellow, based at the Canon Institute for Global Studies in Tokyo.
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