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The IAEA Exposes Iran’s Shell Game

4:33 PM, Nov 9, 2011 • By THOMAS JOSCELYN
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In order to fool the U.S. intelligence community when it comes to a nuclear weapons program, all a rogue regime has to do is change the name of the government agency housing it. Although that may sound ludicrous, it is one way to read the IAEA’s newly released report on Iran’s nuclear program.

Iran

In 2007, the U.S. intelligence community published the key judgments of a national intelligence estimate on Iran’s nuclear weapons program. The first line read (footnote omitted): “We judge with high confidence that in fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program; we also assess with moderate-to-high confidence that Tehran at a minimum is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons.”

The NIE was roundly criticized at the time as it relied on a slippery definition of “nuclear weapons program,” limited to Iran’s “nuclear weapon design and weaponization work and covert uranium conversion-related and uranium enrichment-related work.” The NIE excluded Iran’s “declared civil work related to uranium conversion and enrichment” from its definition.

The first problem with this is that there is a thin line between a supposedly “civil” uranium conversion and enrichment program and a military one. Once Iran builds up enough enrichment capacity, switching gears to enrich weapons-grade uranium is a short step – not a long one. The second problem is that the NIE’s definition said nothing about Iran’s ballistic missile program, which continued apace and is designed to deliver nuclear as well as conventional weapons.

Then, a third problem arose when it turned out that Iran had not discontinued its covert uranium enrichment efforts. The discovery of a nascent facility at Qom and other suspicious activity made that point clear.

There were other problems with the NIE, too, and few take it as a serious intelligence estimate at this point. But now the IAEA has come along and put the final nail in the 2007 NIE’s coffin.

The IAEA reports:   

Since 2002, the Agency has become increasingly concerned about the possible existence in Iran of undisclosed nuclear related activities involving military related organizations, including activities related to the development of a nuclear payload for a missile, about which the Agency has regularly received new information.

In other words, the IAEA has “regularly received new information” about these activities since 2002 – one year prior to when the U.S. intelligence community judged that such efforts had been “halted.” There are “indications”, the IAEA adds, “that some activities relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device continued after 2003, and that some may still be ongoing.”

So, what exactly was “halted” in 2003? The IAEA’s report provides significant new details in this regard. Iran simply changed the name of the entity overseeing nuclear weapons development, and moved forward with a more disbursed platform, meaning that seemingly different entities handled various aspects of the program. The IAEA suspects that at least some of the work continued on after 2003.

Simply put, Iran has played a shell game.

Tehran’s “undeclared” nuclear program was first managed by a body called the Physics Research Centre (PHRC), beginning “sometime after the commencement by Iran in the late 1980s of covert procurement activities.” The PHRC’s activities “were overseen, through a Scientific Committee, by the Defence Industries Education Research Institute (ERI),” which was “established to coordinate defence R&D for the Ministry of Defence Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL).” In other words, these efforts were overseen by the Iranian military.

Iran claims the PHRC’s work was purely defensive and stopped in 1998. The IAEA adds that Iran “completely cleared the site” used by the PHRC in “late 2003/early 2004.”

By the late 1990s or early 2000s, however, the PHRC’s “activities were consolidated” under the “AMAD Plan.” The IAEA explains: “Most of the activities carried out under the AMAD Plan appear to have been conducted during 2002 and 2003.”

According to intelligence provided to the IAEA, the AMAD Plan’s work focused on “three technical areas”: “the green salt project; high explosives (including the development of exploding bridgewire detonators); and re-engineering of the payload chamber of the Shahab 3 missile re-entry vehicle.”

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