The Blog

A Lesson in Rogue Regimes for the White House

Why North Korea might follow Pakistan's example.

1:01 PM, Apr 30, 2013 • By CHRISTOPHER GRIFFIN
Widget tooltip
Single Page Print Larger Text Smaller Text Alerts

Over the past fifteen years, Pakistan has demonstrated how nuclear weapons can allow a country to engage in limited hostilities without triggering all out war. It has also shown that once a nuclear-armed state initiates hostilities, the international response will focus on restoring stability, with denuclearization reduced to a secondary goal.

President Obama

The Pakistan model may provide North Korea with a dangerous option for breaking the diplomatic stalemate that’s been in effect since denuclearization talks were dissolved in 2009. Since then, in a strategy known as “strategic patience,” the Obama administration has insisted that unless Pyongyang wants to discuss its prior commitments to denuclearization, our governments have nothing to talk about. A limited conflict could change that calculus and compel talks instead about how we can live with a nuclear North Korea. To that end, Pyongyang may well be looking to take a page out of Islamabad’s playbook.

In 1999, just one year after its successful nuclear tests, Pakistan’s military launched a limited, conventional war when it occupied the Kargil-Dras sector of Kashmir. In the three months that followed, hundreds of thousands of Indian and Pakistani military personnel were mobilized, and thousands of them died. After the conflict nearly escalated to a nuclear exchange, Islamabad withdrew in humiliating defeat.

Although Kargil was an embarrassment to Islamabad, it focused the world’s attention on establishing some semblance of stability in the region. In March 2000, President Bill Clinton made the first visit of an American president to Pakistan in 30 years, where he called on the country to work “to prevent escalation, to avoid miscalculation, to reduce the risk of war.” Ever since, the United States has forgotten about putting the nuclear genie back in the bottle, and focused on securing Pakistan’s weapons against terrorists and confidence building measures.

Whatever Pakistan’s leadership learned from the Kargil Conflict, the fiasco did not dissuade Islamabad from using violence to pressure India on Kashmir and other disputes. In the years that followed, Pakistan escalated its longstanding support of proxy fighters and terrorists.

In December 2001, a five-man team organized by Pakistan-based terror organizations Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed attacked India’s Parliament, killing seven in a shoot-out while the building was occupied by senior Indian officials. This attack triggered a months-long standoff in which both militaries were again mobilized and more than a thousand personnel died. After months of international pressure, the two sides stood down, eventually reaching a formal ceasefire in late 2003.

Indian authorities were frustrated by the delays when its military mobilized for the 2001-2002 standoff with Pakistan, as well as the international pressure that built during those weeks not to retaliate against Islamabad. In response, officials in Delhi announced in 2004 a military option called Cold Start, under which Indian armed forces could respond to future attacks in a number of days, before international pressure could be brought to bear, or Islamabad could fully mobilize its nuclear arsenal. Cold Start was intended to put Pakistan on notice that future provocations could be met with a near-immediate military response with the intent of crippling Pakistan’s forces before Islamabad could mobilize its nuclear arsenal.

In November 2008, the effectiveness of India’s new military concept was tested when another terror team attacked targets throughout the city of Mumbai, killing more than 150 civilians. The lone survivor among the attackers later told Indian investigators that the terrorists had received direct support from Pakistan’s military intelligence service. The Indians did not respond with Cold Start, which showed that in spite of their new doctrine India was reluctant to risk rolling the nuclear dice in response to future provocations by Pakistan.

In the latest tit-for-tat move, Pakistan tested a short-range tactical nuclear missile in April 2011, which it describes as a “quick response system [that] addresses the need to deter evolving threats.” This system would provide Islamabad with an additional option for countering India’s conventional military capabilities, and it also enhances the risk that a limited conflict could spiral out of control.

Recent Blog Posts

The Weekly Standard Archives

Browse 20 Years of the Weekly Standard

Old covers