powers principles. The executive branch must have the
flexibility to act swiftly in conducting negotiations with
foreign countries regarding the circumstances of detainee
transfers. The Congress designed these sections, and has here
renewed them once more, in order to foreclose my ability to shut
down the Guantanamo Bay detention facility. I continue to
believe that operating the facility weakens our national
security by wasting resources, damaging our relationships with
key allies, and strengthening our enemies. My Administration
will interpret these provisions as consistent with existing
and future determinations by the agencies of the Executive
responsible for detainee transfers. And, in the event that
these statutory restrictions operate in a manner that violates
constitutional separation of powers principles, my
Administration will implement them in a manner that avoids
the constitutional conflict.
As my Administration previously informed the Congress,
certain provisions in this bill, including sections 1225, 913,
1531, and 3122, could interfere with my constitutional authority
to conduct the foreign relations of the United States. In these
instances, my Administration will interpret and implement these
provisions in a manner that does not interfere with my
constitutional authority to conduct diplomacy. Section 1035,
which adds a new section 495(c) to title 10, is deeply
problematic, as it would impede the fulfillment of future U.S.
obligations agreed to in the New START Treaty, which the Senate
provided its advice and consent to in 2010, and hinder the
Executive's ability to determine an appropriate nuclear force
structure. I am therefore pleased that the Congress has
included a provision to adequately amend this provision in
H.R. 8, the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, which I will
be signing into law today.
Certain provisions in the Act threaten to interfere with
my constitutional duty to supervise the executive branch.
Specifically, sections 827, 828, and 3164 could be interpreted
in a manner that would interfere with my authority to manage
and direct executive branch officials. As my Administration
previously informed the Congress, I will interpret those
sections consistent with my authority to direct the heads of
executive departments to supervise, control, and correct
employees' communications with the Congress in cases where such