PRESIDENT BUSH has made plain from the start that the war on terrorism will be long and large. What he seems reluctant to admit is that it will also be expensive.
Since September 11, the United States has routed the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan, committed thousands of troops to assist in the fight against terror groups in the Philippines, Georgia, and elsewhere, and stationed aircraft in Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Bulgaria. The U.S. military presence in the Persian Gulf has been strengthened, and preparations for the destruction of Saddam Hussein's regime and some sort of democratic reconstruction in Iraq are underway. In case the Saudis won't cooperate, alternate airfields and command centers are being readied in Turkey and the Gulf emirates.
Yet despite these expanded commitments and the tensions mounting throughout the Middle East, not to mention President Bush's fierce rhetoric, the implications of a larger war seem to a remarkable degree lost on Washington. Neither the administration nor Congress treats the war as a reason to accelerate the rebuilding and reform of the U.S. armed forces. The great gap between strategic ends and military means inherited from the Clinton years remains. The Pentagon's budget shortfalls affect everything from its most immediate needs to its hopes for long-term modernization and "transformation."
From the start, the administration has failed to acknowledge the likely true cost of the war. Its original wartime supplemental defense appropriation of $20 billion was not enough; the estimated costs of Afghanistan alone quickly exceeded $2 billion per month. Yet
recently, the Office of Management and Budget cut 30 percent from the extra funding required to cover the reserve and National Guard mobilization after September 11. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld has therefore chosen to send 14,000 soldiers home early, rather than reduce other programs to cover the $1.5 billion to keep them on the job.
Though the president touts his 2003 defense budget request, it will do little more than fund the Clinton program. When immediate war costs and past budget gimmicks are factored in--things like mandatory personnel and health care costs--the requested $48 billion "increase" shrinks to about $10 billion worth of new capability.
This is consistent with the administration's narrow view of military requirements prior to September 11. George W. Bush campaigned on a promise to "skip a generation" of weapons. Now it appears the only program slated for cancellation is the ill-starred Crusader howitzer, and the Bush administration plans no near-term expansion of the military.
In particular, Rumsfeld opposes any increase in the number of active-duty troops. Two weeks ago he told a group of soldiers, "Resources are always finite, and the question is, would we be better off increasing manpower or increasing capability and lethality?"
The trouble is that today's varied missions require lots of manpower. The failure to complete the victory in Afghanistan is partly due to the administration's reluctance to send in sufficient numbers of U.S. troops and keep them there. Any campaign in Iraq will pose similar challenges. Even the victory in the Balkans remains at issue because of doubts among local factions about our willingness to keep troops there in sufficient numbers.
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