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The Next Generation of Jihad

New leaders are following a new strategy.

12:00 AM, Jun 28, 2007 • By KYLE DABRUZZI
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IN THE PAST YEAR, we have seen the battlefield deaths of such prominent terrorists as Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in Iraq, and Shamil Basayev and Abu Hafs al-Urdani in Chechnya, as well as a host of less publicized kills and captures. While the death of any prominent terrorist is a victory for the United States and its allies, CIA director General Michael Hayden has acknowledged that al Qaeda's loss of veteran leadership since 9/11 "has been mitigated by the group's 'deep bench' of lower-ranking personnel capable of stepping up to assume leadership responsibilities." As they learn from their predecessors' mistakes, these new leaders may be even more lethal; they are already perceptibly changing jihadist strategy.

Though they represent disparate communities, the new terrorist leaders are employing similar strategies. First, they are more aware of their international image than their predecessors. While they seek to strike fear into their enemies, they also wish to appear reasonable to their constituents and the larger Muslim population. The Taliban engaged in massacres and Zarqawi distributed videos showing the beheading of captives, but the new leaders minimize overt acts of brutality that could undermine public support. Second, the new jihadists consider management of civil society more than their predecessors did. They do not wish to preside over failed states. The Islamic Courts Union (ICU) in Somalia, for example, actually succeeded in modestly raising the country's standard of living during its rule. Third, these new leaders have exploited advanced communications technologies to improve their outreach and forge broader alliances.

This article will examine four prominent figures representing this new generation: Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys in Somalia, Abu Ayyub al-Masri in Iraq, Faqir Mohammed in Pakistan, and Aris Sumarsono (also known as Zulkarnaen) in Indonesia.

ON JUNE 5, 2006, THE MILITANT ICU seized Mogadishu and over the next few months consolidated control over much of Somalia. However, as the ICU moved on Baidoa, the last bastion of the UN-recognized transitional federal government, Ethiopian forces swept through the country, forcing the ICU from Mogadishu and other major cities. The Ethiopian government had been concerned about the ICU's rise because its predecessor and major component, al-Ittihad al-Islamiya (AIAI), had sponsored Islamic separatist groups in the Ethiopian border province of Ogaden.

But the Ethiopian intervention hardly signals the end of the ICU. The UN's Monitoring Group on Somalia warned in late 2006 that "the ICU is fully capable of turning Somalia into what is currently an Iraq-type scenario, replete with roadside and suicide bombers, assassinations, and other forms of terrorist and insurgent-type activities." That assessment is proving accurate, as the ICU appears to be gaining strength in its fight against the Ethiopians.

A prominent leader of the ICU-led insurgency--and its titular commander--is Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys. As a 42-year-old Somali army colonel fighting in the 1977 war against Ethiopia, he won a medal for bravery. Aweys then worked to establish himself as a respected religious figure and also a political leader with considerable clout in Islamic extremist circles. In 1991, Aweys cofounded and led AIAI, which sought to create an Islamic state in the Horn of Africa. Then, starting in 2006, he served as head of the ICU's consultative council. In this capacity, he shaped the ICU's policies, which brought a strict version of sharia (Islamic law) to Somalia--but in a manner that was more consistent with economic growth and civil society than previous jihadist attempts at imposing Islamic law.

As the ICU gained power, Aweys pursued the three new jihadist strategies. First, he committed himself to winning over rather than alienating the Somali population. He sought to harness Islam, Somali nationalism, and Somalis' distaste for the warlords' rule. The ICU portrayed itself as the only major faction in Somalia that upheld Islamic ideals. "The Somalia people are a homogenous people having the same culture, same language, same religion, same sect also," Aweys told Newsweek in a rare interview. "The only system they can accept to choose is Islam; no one can force them to take another." He exploited Somali nationalism by describing the Ethiopian government's support for the transitional government as meddling in Somali affairs. And he positioned the ICU as an alternative to the chaos and corruption of the warlords' rule. His emphasis on stability and rule-of-law won the sympathy of the Somali business community, among others.