The Magazine

The Spanish Disposition

From the March 29, 2004 issue: Why the war on terror didn't matter to voters.

Mar 29, 2004, Vol. 9, No. 28 • By PABLO PARDO
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ARE THE SPANISH COWARDS? Or do they simply not grasp the nature of the war on terror?

The answer to the first question is decidedly "No." Spain has endured 40 years of Basque terrorism, carried out by separatists who follow an ideology almost as weird as al Qaeda's--a mixture of radical leftism and nationalism--yet nobody has ever talked of capitulating to the terrorists and granting independence to that region. Meanwhile, the small and underfunded Spanish Army has been stretched to its limits by going to patrol Kabul. Last May, 62 soldiers were killed when the plane they were flying in from Afghanistan crashed in Turkey. If we compare the size of the Spanish armed forces with the U.S. Army, this one crash killed the equivalent of 1,300 G.I.s--more than twice the combat deaths America has suffered in Iraq. Not a single voice was raised against Spanish participation in the operation.

However, Spaniards do not understand the larger world. President Bush recently said on Spanish television that outgoing Spanish prime minister José María Aznar "is a man who understands the war on terror, clearly knows the stakes" in that war. True, but Aznar was never able to transmit his understanding to the Spanish public--and in this, he has company in other Western governments.

Aznar was incapable of conveying to his fellow Spaniards that the principles he was applying in Basque country were the same ones he was putting into practice in his approach to Iraq: a policy based on an active defense of national security when threatened by rogue individuals, organizations, or states.

But for Spaniards--as for much of the European public--Iraq was never seen as a problem, and even Islamic terrorism generally was seen as a minor issue. Of course, Mohammed Atta, the probable ringleader of 9/11, planned part of that attack from the Spanish coastal city of Tarragona. And Islamic fundamentalists have been arrested and sentenced in Spain since the mid-1990s, notably by Judge Baltasar Garzón (the same judge who tried to prosecute Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet).

But the Spanish public never thought it would be the target of a massive terrorist attack like 9/11. That was not "our war." Of course, everyone believed the police should act, and they certainly did. Spain also participated in Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, but mainly as a way of showing solidarity with the Americans and to make known that Spain is a country ready to take on international responsibilities. It was not understood to be a matter of life or death. Why? Because everybody thought that Spain was too small and irrelevant to attract the terrorists' attention. No matter that it has a border with Morocco, a growing Muslim population, and that the name "Al Andalus"--Arabic for southern Spain--quickens the pulse of al Qaeda fundamentalists, with its evocation of a fallen (and future?) Islamic empire.

Imperial nostalgia is of course something the Spanish people should understand. The Spanish national psyche is deeply marked by the country's long decline, from the 16th century to the 1960s, going from being the world's preeminent power to being a banana republic. In the process, Spain became almost totally isolated from the rest of the West. (Que inventen ellos--"Let others invent," Miguel de Unamuno, one of the leading Spanish intellectuals of the 20th century, notoriously remarked.) At the same time, the Army increasingly interfered in politics, culminating with 36 years of military government after the bloody civil war.

THIS HISTORY shaped attitudes that persist to this day. Governments that try to tie Spain to any international military organization or alliance have had to overcome huge resistance. The catchphrase no tenemos vela en ese entierro ("we don't have a dog in that fight") is always on our lips. The great powers, we suspect, are just going to use us before ditching us.

Aznar was unable to make a dent in this type of thinking. His main argument for the Iraq war was, "Trust me." But the public didn't. His fellow citizens never believed he was acting in the defense of Spain's security. Instead, they accused him of being an egomaniac, obsessed with his "legacy."

Meantime, the Spanish people stuck to their old beliefs. They thought that globalization was a one-way street, that they could reap its fruits, but none of its perils. Therefore, supporting the United States in the crisis of Iraq was simply playing with fire.