The fighting in Basra might rightfully be seen as Iraq's critical and long-awaited "Altalena Moment." This refers to an incident in Israel's 1948 War of Independence, shortly after Israel proclaimed its statehood. Newly elected Prime Minister David Ben Gurion declared that all Jewish militia groups either had to turn in their guns, or accept amalgamation into the newly formed Israel Defense Forces (IDF), built around the pre-Independence Haganah. The Irgun Zvai Leumi, the militantly nationalist militia (in reality a terrorist group) led by Menachim Begin, did not accept this decree. Instead, it had a load of weapons and ammunition shipped from Europe to Israel on a converted LST renamed the Altalena. When Ben Gurion learned of the Altalena's arrival off Haifa, he ordered all the armaments aboard turned over to the IDF. Begin refused, unless the Irgun got its cut and was allowed to remain independent. Ben Gurion ordered the Altalena to remain offshore and instructed the IDF to stop any attempts to offload the cargo.
Begin had the Altalena run up on the beach at Haifa, and Irgun members began unloading the weapons. IDF troops then cordoned off the beach and ordered the Irgun both to stop unloading and to put down their arms. A firefight broke out, and Ben Gurion ordered the IDF to sink the Altalena. It was a seminal moment in the history of Israel: would the IDF refuse to fire on fellow Jews (a very sticky proposition, given that the Holocaust ended just three years earlier)? If they would not obey the order to fire, would Israel be able to establish itself as a modern nation state, a state in which military power resided exclusively with the legitimate government?
The IDF obeyed orders. The ship was shelled, caught fire, and sank. A number of the Jewish crewmen were killed or wounded. More members of the Irgun were killed and wounded in street fighting throughout the beach district of Haifa. Most of the survivors, including Menachim Begin, were arrested. For a while, Ben Gurion's name was mud. But he had made his point: the government of Israel would continue to exercise civilian control over the military. Jewish militias would not be allowed to compete for power. Authority was vested in the political process, and not in violent action. Israel would survive, and thrive, as a democratic state.
This stands in marked contrast to the experience of the Palestinians, who have, throughout their tragic history, been unable to transcend the tyranny of the gunmen. Mahmood Abbas proved unwilling or unable to disarm the factions--not merely Hamas, but his own Fatah militia as well. The security forces of the Palestinian Authority remain impotent against these and other armed militias, and thus the PA itself is incapable of wielding authority against the will of the gunmen. Had there been a Palestinian "Altalena Moment" (e.g., if Abbas had taken action against Hamas rocketeers firing into Israel), there might be more hope for peace between Israel and Palestine today. At least, the Israelis would actually have someone with whom to negotiate a settlement.
In Iraq, there was always the danger that Malaki's government would only take action against Sunni factions, and not against fellow Shi'ites. In particular, there was the strong possibility of Sadr setting himself up as a state-within-a-state, and thus a constant conduit of unrest and Iranian interference. By taking strong action against Sadr and other Shi'ite intransigents, Malaki is demonstrating to some extent that he places national above factional interests. If he succeeds in suppressing the Mahdi Army--by far the most numerous and dangerous of the Shi'ite private armies--this will go a long way to establishing the credibility of the Iraqi Security Forces, and thus, the legitimacy of the Malaki government and its successors. In short, it could be a decisive turning point in the political as well as the military struggle, the moment at which Iraq's transition to a functioning representative democracy and a legitimate nation-state became irreversible.
