The Petraeus Doctrine for fighting counterinsurgency (COIN) operations may be the best chance of success for U.S. forces in Iraq, but not everyone is thrilled with the COIN manual Petraeus recently coauthored with Marine Corps Lt. Gen. James F. Amos. John A. Tirpak, executive editor of Air Force magazine, writes that "Petraeus and Amos damn airpower with the faintest of faint praise." The Air Force, Tirpak says, "wasn't thrilled about the Army-Marine Corps counterinsurgency document, which the service said gave short shrift to airpower's capabilities." Tirpak sums up what Petraeus and Amos wrote:
In a counterinsurgency, airpower is mostly useful as a means of hauling around ground forces while keeping an eye on the bad guys. Air strikes are probably too blunt an instrument to be of much value, and ground commanders should think twice before asking for them. If air strikes are used, though, a ground forces commander definitely should control them.
Petraeus and Amos warned that "commanders [should] exercise exceptional care when using airpower in the strike role," because even when those strikes are justified it still "works to the insurgents' benefit."
Said one Air Force general, if airmen had written it, it would be "different."
The idea that the Air Force would prefer a different counterinsurgency strategy than the one set forth by the Army and Marines, aka the guys who actually do the fighting, is pretty absurd. Of course the Air Force would prefer a more prominent role in Iraq, and the increased funding that would accompany it, but it's hard to argue with Petraeus's logic: "Inappropriate or indiscriminate use of air strikes can erode popular support and fuel insurgent propaganda. For these reasons, commanders should consider the use of air strikes carefully during COIN operations."
And Petraeus does concede that "avoiding all risk may embolden insurgents while providing them sanctuary." So it's not as though the Air Force is entirely left out of this new strategy. But, support for the Petraeus Doctrine, and its emphasis on limited air strikes, is likely to undermine funding support for blunt, Cold War-era Air Force weapons systems like the B-52 bomber. Earlier this week, Deputy Defense Secretary Gordon England made the case for reducing by 20 the Air Force's fleet of B-52 bombers from the currently mandated 76.
The most outspoken critic of such a reduction is Senator Byron Dorgan, who says "Our B-52s are the lowest-cost bombers to operate and have decades of life left . . . Maintaining them is the best use of taxpayer dollars. It makes no sense to try to save money by cutting the most cost-efficient tool in our long-range arsenal."
And Dorgan is right that the B-52 is a remarkable efficiency in the Air Force budget, capable of delivering tremendous firepower anywhere in the world at a mere fraction of the cost of delivering a similar payload by F-16s or F-22s. Still, it's hard to imagine what kind of role the B-52 might play in COIN operations. The military is looking to field ever smaller munitions, and the B-52, capable of delivering 50,000 pounds worth of bombs on target, doesn't really fit that mission. Of course, missions change.
Not a terribly effective method for urban counterinsurgency operations.
