In today's New York Times, under the headline "Bush Distorts Qaeda Links, Critics Assert," the paper itself greatly distorts the evidence concerning al Qaeda's presence in Iraq. The paper paints a picture of al Qaeda in Iraq is, in important ways, highly misleading. Here are several reasons why as well as some additional observations:
(1) First, an observation: The Times states that when Zarqawi relocated to Iraq he did so "with support from senior Qaeda leaders, American intelligence agencies believe." This directly contradicts what has been reported at various times over the past several years by the New York Times and other media outlets. A common argument that has been made is that Zarqawi wasn't really an al Qaeda operative until 2004, when he swore bayat (loyalty) to bin Laden and was made emir of al Qaeda in Iraq. (Of course, many top al Qaeda operatives worked alongside bin Laden for years without swearing bayat. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the alleged mastermind of 9/11, is a good example.)
In an editorial prior to the war ("Elusive Qaeda Connections," February 14, 2003), for example, the New York Times argued, "…Washington has yet to establish publicly that [Zarqawi] is an important figure in Al Qaeda or maintains active links with Mr. bin Laden." Daniel Benjamin, one of President Clinton's former NSC counterterrorism officials, took this argument a step further in a September 2005 piece reviewing Jean-Charles Brisard's book on Zarqawi. Benjamin argued, "many Western intelligence services saw him less as a lieutenant of bin Laden than a rival - a view now widely accepted."
There was always evidence tying Zarqawi to al Qaeda (for example, he helped plan attacks with top al Qaeda operative Abu Zubaydah at the turn of the millennium). But it is interesting to see that the intelligence officials quoted in this piece recognize the role that al Qaeda played in supporting Zarqawi's activities in Iraq all along.
(2) Unfortunately, the Times muddles the evidence tying Zarqawi to another of his sponsors inside Iraq, Saddam Hussein's regime:
"Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a Jordanian who became the leader of Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia, came to Iraq in 2002 when Saddam Hussein was still in power, but there is no evidence that Mr. Hussein's government provided support for Mr. Zarqawi and his followers." (emphasis added)
This is simply not true. The authors may disagree with the notion that the evidence is conclusive, but to say there is "no evidence" is demonstrably false. In this piece I summarized what three high-level al Qaeda associates (including one who actually recruits jihadis to send to Iraq for suicide bombing missions) had to say about Zarqawi and his associates' ties to Saddam's regime prior to the war.
In fact, George Tenet confirmed for us in his new book that the intelligence community connected the dots on Zarqawi and Saddam prior to the war as well. Tenet says that the evidence the CIA had gathered on Zarqawi was one of the reasons there was "more than enough evidence" to be worried about Saddam's relationship with al Qaeda.
(3) The Times ignores another important prewar link between Saddam's regime and al Qaeda. The authors state that "Abu Ayyub al-Masri is an Egyptian militant who emerged as the successor of Mr. Zarqawi, who was killed near Baquba in an American airstrike last year." This is correct, but the paper does not bother to report any of al-Masri's history inside Saddam's Iraq. Again according to George Tenet, al-Masri was in Baghdad throughout much of 2002, cooperating with Zarqawi and setting up al Qaeda cells. It is worth remembering that al-Masri was a top aide to al Qaeda's number 2, Ayman al-Zawahiri, since 1982! It seems highly unlikely that a top terrorist like al-Masri could operate in Baghdad without Saddam's tacit approval, at the very least.
(4) The authors are inconsistent in how they report on al Qaeda's operations inside Iraq. In one instance they say it is a "mostly foreign-led group" and in another they say American intelligence agencies have concluded that "the militant group is in many respects an Iraqi phenomenon" whose membership is "overwhelmingly Iraqi."
So, which is it? The answer is that it is both. The foreign AQI leaders have done their best to recruit locals to their side. Look at Baqubah where, according to Michael Yon, perhaps as many 1,000 local Iraqis were recruited over to al Qaeda.
What the paper does not say is that American forces, as well as Sunni tribes and factions who are now unfriendly to al Qaeda, are competing for the "hearts and minds" of Iraqis in places like Baqubah. Al Qaeda was winning this competition at one point, but in recent months the momentum has shifted. Time will tell who wins in the long run.
But this is an important "Qaeda link" that should not be distorted as the debate over Iraq heats up.
