No.
And I'm surprised that Ralph Peters--who is a razor sharp strategist--argued otherwise. If the U.S. Navy is to be in the statement-making business, as Peters suggests, better we choose a battle on our own terms rather than Iran's. While I normally enjoy Peters' writing, I found the following to be a bit...off:
Oh, from Washington's perspective we did the right thing by "exercising restraint." But Washington's perspective doesn't amount to a gum wrapper in a gutter. What matters is what the Iranians think.
They now believe that the Bush administration, our military and the entire United States are afraid of them.
Doubtful. Iran likes to bluster, but at the end of the day, the Supreme Leader and friends all understand who wields the big stick. But they're also well aware that we're addicted to foreign oil, and are thus reluctant to provoke OPEC's number two petroleum supplier, lest an attack further destabilize an already wobbly market. Ultimately, I think the evidence supports Goldfarb's contention that exercising restraint allows for a more flexible response--one than can be better tailored to freak the Mullahs out--rather than Peters' one-dimensional, screw the rules of engagement approach.
