With the ongoing imbroglio over Senator McCain's comments linking Iran and al Qaeda, it is worth reviewing what Saddam's own files have to say about Iran's support for al Qaeda. Not only do Saddam's Intelligence files confirm that his regime had a significant relationship with al Qaeda, but they also provide more evidence of Iran's hand in al Qaeda's terror. Some may say this is impossible: How could two states that hated each other as much as Saddam's Iraq and the mullah's Iran support the same terrorist group(s)? However, such thinking is very narrow-minded.
The IPP study proposes that we think of our terrorist enemies as cartels. In this sense, each of these parties competes in some important ways, but they are also capable of collaborating when it suits their interests. The IPP's paradigm for understanding terrorism is very similar to the one Michael Ledeen proposed in his book, The War Against the Terror Masters. Ledeen has proposed that our terrorist enemies are best compared to rival mafia families, who can bitterly fight one another only to band together when facing a common foe, like law enforcement agencies. James Woolsey, the former head of the CIA, has proposed a similar way of understanding modern Islamic terrorism as well. For Woolsey, terrorist organizations and their sponsors are capable of forming "joint ventures" to fulfill their common interests--e.g. attacking Americans.
Numerous examples of such collaboration can be found throughout the history of Middle Eastern and Islamic terrorism. For example, Yasser Arafat and his PLO allied with both Iraq and Iran at various points throughout Arafat's terrorist career. Hamas, a terrorist group which is the ideological cousin of al Qaeda and likewise an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood, has drawn support from Saudi Arabia, Iran, and previously Saddam Hussein's Iraq. Today, the Sunni Hamas is strongly allied with Iran. And the man who served as Osama bin Laden's protector and mentor from 1991 through mid-1996, Hassan al-Turabi, was quite open about his relationships with both Saddam Hussein (who he called a "close" ally) and the Iranian Mullahs. Turabi turned his Sudan into a melting pot of terrorism, bringing together disparate groups under a common anti-Western, anti-American banner. (See here and here for my two part series on Turabi.) This does not mean that Saddam's Iraq and Iran necessarily had to cooperate with each other (although they did when it came to illicit deals under the oil-for-food program), just that each was capable of supporting terrorist groups that shared their immediate interests.
So, then, we should not be surprised to find that Iraq's intelligence files contain evidence of Iran's support for an especially violent al Qaeda affiliate: the Algerian GSPC, previously known as the GIA. As noted in my last post, Saddam Hussein's regime clearly made common cause with the GIA and GSPC at various times. But according to an Iraqi Intelligence file, Iran also played a prominent role in sponsoring the GIA/GSPC as well as other armed Islamic groups fighting an insurgency against the Algerian regime. These groups are Sunni, and the principal opposition group is openly allied with al Qaeda, yet Iran (with help from Syria) had no trouble being one of the "most important" countries to support them.
From an Iraqi Intelligence memo dated September 10, 1999 (emphasis added):
Iran is considered one of the most important countries that finances the armed groups in Algeria through its embassy, the cultural legation and some Iranians living outside.
First, our sources confirm that the most important point to finance the Armed Islamic Groups with money to buy weapons is the Iranian Embassy in Damascus; the embassy plays the role of the mediator between the Iranian authorities and the Armed Islamic Groups in Algeria.
Syria knows very well that there are a lot of Algerians visiting the embassy, but Syria never interfered, the thing that upset the Algerian authorities, which asked Damascus two years ago, through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its embassy in Damascus, to expel the Islamic Algerians living in Syria. The authorities also asked Syria to extradite some Islamic Algerians to Algeria, but Syria refused the request under the pretence that all Islamic Algerians living in Syria or visiting it did not violate the limits of entertainment and they did not violate the laws of the country.
Under the insistence and importunity of the Algerian authorities, Syria was forced to expel some of the suspected Islamic names in Damascus, and the others stayed.
The Iranian Cultural Center in Damascus, near "Al-Marjah" Square, plays the same role too; where some Islamic persons visited the center from different Armed Islamic organizations (The Islamic Army for Salvation, the Armed Islamic Group).
[Tom's Note: The Islamic Army for Salvation is known as the "FIS" and it was founded, in part, by so-called Arab Afghans allied with al Qaeda. The "Armed Islamic Group" is the al Qaeda affiliate, the GIA, which grew out of the FIS. Ultimately, the GIA became the group known as the GSPC and has changed its name again just recently.]
From Damascus, the network ramifies toward Europe in the following countries: Germany, Belgium, France, England, Morocco
Second, Germany comes after Damascus.
In Germany, some Iranian personages supervise regular meetings with the Armed Islamic Group, and some money deliverance operations are carried out there too.
As to weapon purchase, it is done through:
France and Belgium, smuggled later through Morocco.
Third, Morocco spared no effort to exert pressure on Algeria to stop supporting the Western Sahara; one of the most important pressures is receiving tens of Iranians to hold meetings with the Armed Groups in Morocco. To guarantee the success of contact operations between the Iranians and the Algerians, Iran opened a cultural center in Wajdah City, although there are no Iranians in that Moroccan city.
Our sources confirmed that weapons are delivered from Iran to the above-mentioned center in Wajdah city directly, where some Algerian armed members are trained to use the weapons smuggled later through the borders….
As a reminder, Sheikh ''Ali Taskhiri," a well-known Iranian personage, is considered one of the Iranian personages that has a vast knowledge in the Algerian file, and he has a big role in bringing tens of Algerians to study in Iran since 1979. We have no information about his recent role, because he kept himself out of sight, maybe due to illness.
We should also take into our consideration the successive visits of some Islamic group members to Iran, especially in the last years.
So, Saddam's intelligence services told him that Iran was directly sponsoring al Qaeda's Algerian affiliate. Of course, the Algerian government knew that too; they even temporarily cut off diplomatic relations with Iran in 1993 because of it. The GSPC is today one of al Qaeda's most dangerous affiliates, and openly threatens Europe. So, U.S. counterterrorism officials should be very concerned about Iran's longstanding support for this group, as evidenced even in Saddam Hussein's intelligence files.
