As the security situation in Afghanistan continues to spiral downward, the notion that the United States and her allies should open talks with the Taliban has gained wide acceptance in Washington. Anonymous aides to President-elect Obama have indicated that talking to the Taliban (as well as Iran, a country that continues to aid terrorist attacks in both Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as throughout the Middle East) is a great idea. "Advisers also said Obama is open to supporting discussions between the Afghan government and "reconcilable" elements of the Taliban," the Washington Post reported yesterday.
The problem is that "the Taliban"--Mullah Omar's traditional organization, the Haqqani family's faction, and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's faction Hizb-i-Islami--have no interest in negotiating. The so-called Taliban who attended "talks" hosted in Saudi Arabia at the end of September are really outsiders who have been kicked out of the group for being to moderate. The rumors that the Taliban have made a split from al Qaeda, a precondition for talks, are just that.
Mullah Omar issued several press releases stating that the only terms he'd agree to are the full withdrawal of Western forces and the restoration of the Taliban government. Omar has mocked the West for its defeatist statements and said his forces are "on the verge of victory." The Haqqani Network remains closely aligned with al Qaeda. And Hekmatyar, who is also aligned with al Qaeda (and is supported by Iran, interestingly enough), has been stringing along the West since 2003 with claims he's interested in reconciliation, but has yet to abandon his terror allies.
So what is the solution? In an op-ed at The Small Wars Journal, Joseph Collins, an Afghanistan expert and a retired Army colonel who teaches strategy at the National War College, tells us we should fight harder, and negotiate from a position of strength, not weakness. This in turn would allow us to peel off the low-level Taliban fighters from their radical leaders.
To create favorable conditions for reconciliation and later negotiations, we must first step up our military efforts. General Petraeus is right: we can not kill our way to victory in Afghanistan. We can, however, create a more pliable enemy, one eager to negotiate, if we defeat Taliban offensive operations and threaten their sanctuaries. While wizards may imagine ways to do more militarily with less, in the short run, more Afghan and NATO troops, as well as more aid money will be essential.
Collins clearly and succinctly explains the reasons why negotiations with the Taliban are problematic, such as the political problems negotiations cause with Afghanistan's other ethnic groups. There is no quick fix in Afghanistan, and negotiations at this time would only complicate, not improve, the security situation. Read the whole thing, as they say.
