Yesterday we posted the text of the letter, which calls on Secretary Gates to maintain production of the F-22 and the C-17 "until the final publication of the next Mobility Capabilities Study and the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review can be reviewed and studied." The push-back is being organized by Utah Senator Orrin Hatch, who today we learn has succeeded in corralling at least eleven senators to join him. They are:
Senator Robert Bennett (R-UT), Senator Maria Cantwell (D-WA), Senator Saxby Chambliss (R-GA), Senator John Cornyn (R-TX), Senator James Inhofe (R-OK), Senator Johnny Isakson (R-GA), Senator Patty Murray (D-WA), Senator David Vitter (R-LA), Senator Roland Burris (D-IL), Senator Christopher Dodd (D-CT), Kay Bailey Hutchison (R-TX)
Hatch should be commended for getting the ball rolling on this. The Democrats include the two senators from Washington, the embattled Connecticut senator whose state produces the engines for both aircraft, and Roland Burris (Boeing HQ is in Chicago). Notably absent is Senator Kit Bond, whose state is home to thousands of jobs connected to Boeing's C-17, but Armed Services may be doing their own letter and there are likely to be other, less-visible attempts to push back in the coming weeks.
One key question: where is Senator McCain? Is he satisfied with Gates because the Navy came out ok, at least in the short run? Or, is he satisfied because Boeing may be totally out of the air-mil business if the tanker deal goes the other way, as well? Or, is he sitting on his hands because he thinks procurement reform is the first step -- which by the time they finish with will have nothing left to reform about because we won't be buying anything anyway?
It hard to be optimistic that either of these aircraft will be preserved by Congress. Gates is putting tremendous pressure on the Air Force to stay away from the Hill (and given that he fired the last Air Force chief of staff for lobbying Congress behind his back you can bet they aren't going to defy the boss), the White House is pressuring leadership, and leadership is pressuring members. Not many folks are likely to stick their necks out on this. But before you get the idea that somehow Democrats are more committed to fiscal responsibility than the defense contractors who fill their campaign coffers, keep in mind that the F-22 is an existential threat to the much-larger Joint Strike Fighter Program, which supports jobs in just about every district in the country and which is controlled by Lockheed -- also the prime contractor on F-22.
Lockheed is not lobbying the Hill, lest they jeopardize their much larger contract for JSF, and lest they accidentally help their last domestic competitor in the market for fighter aircraft stay in the fighter business. Boeing has no choice but to follow Lockheed's lead, even though Boeing does about one-third of the business on F-22, and that leaves just about nobody to stand up for the program.
Even if you think the F-22 isn't a far superior aircraft to the still imaginary F-35, and even if you think that 187 copies is more than enough to meet the Air Force's requirements, the fact that American will in the future have only one supplier of fighter aircraft should be deeply troubling. There used to be a bipartisan consensus on the need to maintain America's defense industrial base, and when it comes to shipbuilding, that consensus still exists. But for whatever reason, no one is worried about the loss of what was once a thriving and hypercompetitive fighter aircraft market. Likewise, termination of the C-17 program will, in the words of one industry expert, "put America out of the business of wide-bodied lift aircraft."
What conservatives should really be pushing for is an across-the-board effort to maintain American military strength. The administration is prepared for congressional push-back on particular programs -- indeed, they're probably counting on it, hoping that it becomes a circular firing squad where dollars given to one program preclude adding back funds to others: F-22 versus FCS; C-17 versus F-18. A better strategy for members of Congress worried about the implications of the Obama cuts would be to call for a one-year "program freeze" -- no major alterations in the defense modernization program -- or, better yet, a budget built around the recommendations made, at Secretary Gates' request, by the Joint Chiefs of Staff last November, until the Quadrennial Defense Review is complete. Secretary Gates is proposing significant changes without any prior analysis; it's a "trust me" proposition based solely upon his personal judgment and the budget restraints imposed by the White House.
Secondly, Congress should revive the National Defense Panel as a safeguard against a defense review where the outcome has been predetermined by spending restraints. Indeed, when the QDR legislation was first passed, the blue-ribbon NDP was intended to be a permanent congressional check and balance. In the mid-1990s, the Congress had no one confidence in the Clinton Administration's budget-first, strategy-after process, and there's no reason the Congress should accept it from the Obama Administration. The constitutional responsibility for funding the American military rests with Congress, and it should get a considered second opinion before it blindly follows the new president's first guess on how to reshape and reduce the military.
