Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri
Monday, October 12, was the ninth anniversary of al Qaeda's suicide attack on the USS Cole. Seventeen American sailors were killed in the attack.
It is worth remembering that the mastermind of the operation, Abd al Rahim al Nashiri, is currently held at Guantanamo. Much of the media's coverage of al Nashiri has been centered on the fact that he was waterboarded and subjected to other so-called "enhanced interrogation techniques" (EITs). Much less attention has been paid to the plots Nashiri was working on when he was captured in November 2002, and how those plots were stopped.
Here is how the DOD's short biography of Nashiri recounts the attacks that didn't happen:
At the time of his arrest, Nashiri was arranging funding for a plot to crash a small plane into the bridge of a Western navy vessel in Port Rashid, UAE, an operation he had hoped to execute in November or December 2002. He also was orchestrating additional attacks, one targeting a US housing compound in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, which he had planned for mid-2003. Nashiri abandoned a plot that he was involved in earlier in 2002 to attack warships in the Strait of Hormuz, but his operatives - on orders from Bin Laden - in October 2002 rammed the French tanker MV Limburg off the coast of Yemen with a small boat. Other plots Nashiri was involved in included a car bomb attack against a Saudi military installation at Tabuk aimed at killing US military personnel, attacks on oil tankers in the Strait of Gibraltar and Western warships passing through the Port of Dubani, and attacks against land-based targets in Morocco, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia.
There is every indication that Nashiri -- who was the head of al Qaeda's operations in the Arabian Peninsula at the time of his capture -- was getting ready to unleash a new round of terror when he was captured. U.S. intelligence officials stopped Nashiri and his operatives, some of whom are also held at Gitmo, in their tracks. The question is: How did they do it?
CIA Inspector General John Helgerson, who is a self-styled critic of the enhanced interrogation program, conceded in his May 7, 2004 report, titled "Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities (September 2001 - October 2003)," that Nashiri gave up information on his fellow terrorists as a result of coercive interrogations.
According to the IG, EITs were used on Nashiri "immediately upon his arrival" into the CIA's detention and interrogation program. The IG wrote, for example:
The interrogation of Al-Nashiri proceeded after [REDACTED] the necessary Headquarters authorization. [REDACTED] psychologist/interrogators began Al Nashiri's interrogation using EITs immediately upon his arrival. Al Nashiri provided lead information on other terrorists during his first day of interrogation. On the twelfth day of interrogation, [REDACTED] psychologist/interrogators administered two applications of the waterboard to Al Nashiri during two separate interrogation sessions. Enhanced interrogation of Al Nashiri continued through 4 December 2002, [REDACTED]
While Nashiri gave up "lead information on other terrorists during his first day of interrogation," he decided at some point to clam up. In particular, Nashiri's debriefers and interrogators found that he was giving up information that was of mostly historical value. They decided to up the ante in response. The IG explained what happened next:
With respect to Al Nashiri, [REDACTED] reported two waterboard sessions in November 2002, after which the psychologist/interrogators determined that al Nashiri was compliant. However, after being moved [REDACTED] al Nashiri was thought to be withholding information. Al Nashiri subsequently received additional EITs, [REDACTED] but not the waterboard. The Agency then determined al Nashiri to be "compliant." Because of the litany of techniques used by different interrogators over a relatively short period of time, it is difficult to identify exactly why al Nashiri became more willing to provide information. However, following the use of EITs, he provided information about his most current operational planning and [REDACTED] as opposed to the historical information he provided before the use of EITs.
So, according to the IG's report, it was only after the use of the EITs that Nashiri "provided information about his current operational planning." That planning undoubtedly included the Port Rashid operation and the plot to blow up a U.S. housing compound in Riyadh (which, if executed, would likely have been similar to the Khobar Towers bombing in 1996). Note that when the IG wrote about it being "difficult to identify exactly why al Nashiri became more willing" to provide these details, he was undoubtedly talking about the variety of EITs that were employed because they were used from Nashiri's first day in custody. And the language surrounding that sentence is all about the implementation of the EITs.
So the facts of the case are this: (1) Nashiri is an accomplished terrorist who managed to orchestrate an attack against an American warship that killed 17 sailors and also did incredible damage to the vessel. (2) He was working on his next round of attacks at the time of his capture. (3) U.S. intelligence officials learned about al Nashiri's plotting, at least in part, because of the intelligence he gave up during coercive interrogations and the debriefings that followed.
On the ninth anniversary of the USS Cole bombing, we should be thankful that our U.S. intelligence professionals stopped Nashiri from killing more American servicemen.
