Likud member Yuval Steinitz has an interesting piece in Haaretz. He argues:

In recent years, a concept of ''victory from the air'' developed, negating the need for ground maneuvers or improved firepower on ground or in sea. In the case of Lebanon, a specific concept of repelling Katyusha rockets and missile fire in the air was developed -- hence, the belief that it was possible to conduct a broad confrontation with Hezbollah with no action on the ground.

As a result, infantry, tank, and artillery forces were neglected. One factor that made neglect in the military power structure more severe was the self-persuasion of senior security force members who believed that conventional warfare had seen its final days. A total of 23 years without frontal conflict between the I.D.F. and Arab armies allowed ministers of defense, chiefs of staff and other experts to develop a military version of the ''end of history'' theory.

It was expressed in the belief that the conventional military threat to Israel had been permanently replaced by the threat of unconventional weapons, on one hand, and terror, on the other. This concept remained intact even though we witnessed a conventional clash between the United States and Iraq, a clash which included broad ground maneuvers alongside the battle in the air.