When I asked Senator McCain about MRAP on Monday, some folks seemed confused. But there's no doubt that the MRAP program, which seeks to replace up-armored Humvees in Iraq with sturdier, mine resistant and ambush protected (MRAP) vehicles, has risen to the level of presidential politics. In fact, Joe Biden's whole campaign for president looks to be built around this one issue.

Screen shot of MRAP on the homepage of Biden's campaign website.

On Monday, McCain said that MRAP is "kind of a reversal from the usual DoD procedure where they get a good idea and it takes them an inordinate length of time to get it into practice and into operational capability." But, on Tuesday we learned that the program has, in fact, taken an "inordinate length of time" to get going. Biden's response to that news: "It's easy to throw around words like outrageous and shocking, but this is both." Maybe. But there are some legitimate reasons for that delay. The Armchair Generalist offers this snarky take on Biden's comments:

Come on, Joe. You didn't just join the Senate last year and find out how defense acquisition really works. Funny thing, the Marine Corps - the smallest of the four services - didn't want to casually decide on a multi-billion dollar investment for a vehicle that amounts to a huge armored bus with lousy gas mileage, no main gun, and no maintenance plan (other than contractor support) at the same time as when they have their Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle to justify. Yeah, that's really shocking. But whatever you do, Joe, don't look into the fact that the production of MRAPs is limited by the high-tech steel they need for the bottom of the vehicles, so that the intended production buy for vehicles going to those troops in Iraq goes through 2009 - you know, after the period where we expect to start getting troops back home. That might "shock" you, too.

It's going to take a while to get these vehicles fielded no matter what Congress does. The largest producer of MRAP vehicles, Force Protection, can produce roughly 200 vehicles a month, but hopes to have that number closer to 300 by early next year. The Army is requesting 17,700 MRAP vehicles, and the Marine Corps is in the market for maybe 5,000 more.

Meanwhile, there's another Humvee-replacement program--the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV)--that risks being marginalized. JLTV offers much of the protection of MRAP--a v-shaped hull and substantial armor protection--at far less cost and in a far more deployable package. Because of its weight and size, MRAP may be ideal for Iraq, but it won't make the military any lighter, faster, or more mobile--it's not a 'transformational' technology. As Robot Economist points out:

The first thing that jumps out at me is the dramatic increase in volume and weight between the up-armored Humvee and the MRAP candidates....

The increased weight might raise questions about how the Army and Marines could deploy MRAPs from the U.S. to the theater, particularly airlift feasibility....

The C-17 has enough cargo capacity (85 tons) to carry an M1 Abrams, so it can probably fit as many as two MRAPs on board. [Force Protection's] Cougar and [BAE's] Nyala also appear to come under the limits of the C-130's mere 22 tons of lift....