China's African Offensive
On July 15th, after nine days of captivity, Zhang Guohua, an executive with the China Nuclear International Uranium Corporation (Sino-U), was released by the Niger Movement for Justice (MNJ). Within days of the abduction, heeding MNJ’s call for foreign companies to withdraw, the China Nuclear Engineering & Construction Corporation, parent company of Sino-U, suspended its uranium-prospecting operation in Niger’s northern Agadez region.
Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) at the Great Hall
of the People in Beijing, Nov. 5, 2006. (Xinhua Photo)
The kidnapping in Niger is one of a string of attacks on Chinese nationals in Africa this year. In April, in a pre-dawn attack, guerrillas of the Ogaden National Liberation Front killed nine Chinese workers and 65 Ethiopians while they slept on the campground of a Chinese-owned oil exploration field in eastern Ethiopia.
In January, a Chinese engineer was killed and another injured in a Chinese stone materials plant in Kenya. And in three separate incidents in Nigeria this year, a total of 16 Chinese nationals were kidnapped, though all were subsequently released unharmed.
Motivated initially by political ideology, Chinese involvement in Africa began in the 1960s. More recently, the explosion of Chinese investment on the resource-rich continent is driven by China’s energy needs and Beijing’s "go-out" national strategic policy adopted at the 16th party congress in 2002. From Angolan oil to Zambian copper, African-Chinese trade between 2000 and 2006 grew from $10 billion to $55.5 billion. And by 2009, Chinese aid to Africa is expected to reach $10 billion. In the past 12 months, Chinese president Hu Jintao has visited 17 African countries, more than any other head-of-state.
Unlike Western countries, China typically attaches no conditions to its investment in, and economic aid to, Africa. One recent example of the practical effects of this tactic concerns Zimbabwe. In 2005, ostracized by Western governments and investors over human rights abuses in that country, President Robert Mugabe launched a "Look East" policy. China is now Zimbabwe’s second largest trade partner, behind only South Africa.
China’s economic offensive across Africa carries geopolitical implications as well. Since President Bush announced the creation of a unified military command for Africa this past February, Chinese media have been following the development closely.
After the April killing of nine Chinese oil workers in Ethiopia, Chinese media were quick to conclude that the incident was the result of internal strife in that restive country and that the action was not specifically targeted at China’s presence there. It was also noted that with the creation of the Africa Command, the Pentagon is putting the continent on a par with its Pacific Command and that "the unshakable superpower status of the United States has obtained yet another powerful pillar."
In fact, China’s suspicion of U.S. objectives in Africa pre-dates the Africa Command. A 2006 opinion piece in People’s Daily titled "U.S. steps up military infiltration into Africa" underscores Beijing’s concerns over the U.S. presence on the continent:
[The] U.S. military presence in Africa has two obvious tendencies: one is to deepen military cooperation in North Africa and the Horn of Africa for anti-terrorism purposes; and the other is to cooperate with West Africa for oil security. From strategic [sic] perspective, Washington’s Africa policy has combined anti-terrorism, oil and garrisoning.