The Blog

Counterinsurgency Success in Haswa

11:13 AM, Sep 13, 2007 • By BILL ROGGIO
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Combat Outpost Corregidor, Baghdad Province
A crucial indicator of success or failure of the "surge"--the deployment of an additional five U.S. Combat brigades and supporting soldiers--is the ability of U.S. forces to involve the local population in the provision of security. The crux of the General David Petraeus's counterinsurgency plan for Iraq is to provide the security to allow the local, provincial, and central governments to move forward with political accommodations. Security comes first, the more difficult political compromises needed to reconcile the reconcilable come second. To gage the progress of the surge, we visited Combat Outpost Corregidor, which is situated in the Baghdad Belts, the regions surrounding the capital where the insurgency has staged attacks into the capital and established bases of operations.

We saddled up with Bravo Troop, 1st Battalion, 89th Regiment of the 2nd Brigade, 10th Mountain Division, commanded by Captain Christian Cosner. Bravo Troop and the 2/10 Mountain had their tour extended from 12 to 15 months in support of the new counterinsurgency plan. The 2/10 has been in Iraq for 12 months and would have left for home by now.

After a quick introduction to the troops, the convoy of up-armored Humvees headed out from Camp Striker, part of the sprawling network of Camps south of Baghdad, to Camp Corregidor, a combat outpost near the town of Al Haswa in southern Baghdad Province.

The first leg of the trip was down Main Supply Route Tampa, the main artery which runs north to south and acts as a vital supply line from Kuwait in the south to points north of Baghdad. The massive supply columns and smaller convoy running up and down Tampa are frequent targets for both Sunni and Shia insurgents alike.

This particular stretch of Tampa used to be particularly dangerous for Iraqi and Coalition forces--over 20 attacks a week were reported on this segment of Tampa just a few months ago. Today the attacks on this stretch of Tampa have been averaging two to three a week, and some weeks no attacks are encountered. But even this number can be deceptive, as a found and disabled IED is counted as an attack incident. "Some of the IEDs found on this route are dummies," Captain Cosner noted.

The convoy headed off hard-paved primary road of Route Tampa onto secondary paved and dirt roads snaking through sprawling farmlands crossed with irrigation ditches. The roads are narrow and lined with high reeds--perfect sites to plant deadly roadside bombs or launch ambushes. But the insurgency remained silent this day, and uneventful convoys have become the norm for Bravo Troop and other units operating in this area.

Corregidor

Combat Outpost Corregidor is unlike any forward base I've seen in Iraq. The outpost, which is adjacent to the town of Al Haswa, was established in the mansion-like compound of a sheikh who has long since fled Iraq. The outpost was set up in April of 2007, and Bravo troop deployed here in May. There are three phone lines, an Internet café with 4 computers, satellite television, a separate dinning facility and a gym. Most of the outpost is air conditioned, or if it isn't, will soon be.

The outpost is currently being upgraded, with troops operating circular saws and running electrical lines late into the evening. Many of the soldiers here would rather be out here rather than at the headquarters at Camp Striker.

The Area of Operations

Corregidor is located in southern Baghdad province, just southwest of the capital. The outpost is in the heart of Area of Operations (AO) Wolverine, approximately 240 square kilometers of farmland roughly delimited by Anbar province to the west, Yusifiyah to the south, and Route Tampa to the north.

The Al Haswa region is largely split into eastern and western sectors, with the western areas largely Sunni, and the eastern areas largely Shia. Today, the Sunni areas are secure, and the west, while quiet, serves as an area where the Mahdi Army conducts executions of those captured elsewhere, and dumps and buries their bodies in the farmlands. But there is little violence directed at Coalition or Iraqi Security Forces or the local population.