Air Force Times:

The democratic Republic of China, commonly called Taiwan — which America backs and the communist People’s Republic of China considers part of its territory — frequently irritates Chinese leaders with calls for greater independence from the mainland. But while the American military mulls its options, Chinese missiles hit runways, fuel lines, barracks and supply depots at U.S. Air Force bases in Japan and South Korea. Long-range warheads destroy American satellites, crippling Air Force surveillance and communication networks. A nuclear fireball erupts high above the Pacific Ocean, ionizing the atmosphere and scrambling radars and radio feeds.

This is China’s anti-U.S. sucker punch strategy.

The scenario comes from a RAND report which drew on Chinese military journals and other unclassified documents to construct a best guess of how a conflict between the U.S. and China would kick off. It's a lot of asymmetric type stuff, but real heart of any Chinese first-strike would, according to the authors, be rather conventional: hitting runways and taking out aircraft at U.S. air bases in the region. To which they offer some simple solutions like adding an extra layer of concrete to all the runways and storing fuel underground. They also recommend keeping American aircraft, including larger aircraft, in hardened shelters, which the report says "would be expensive and difficult but likely worth the cost."

Another interesting item, straight from the report this time:

Chinese analysts assess that even a small number of casualties is sufficient to spark strong popular opposition and erode domestic support for U.S. participation in a conflict. The U.S. experience in Somalia is usually cited in support of this assertion.

It's hard to gauge just how damaging Somalia was to American credibility. It's been much discussed that al Qaeda interpreted that retreat as a sign of U.S. weakness. (And of course, bin Laden claimed that it was al Qaeda trained affiliates that shot down the American helicopters in the Battle of Mogadish.) It seems the Chinese drew the same conclusion--Americans don't have the stomach for a fight. Which leads to the obvious question: how would the Chinese interpret an American withdraw from Iraq?

Also, doesn't this sound an awful lot like the attack on Pearl Harbor? Strike at the U.S. ability to project power across the Pacific, inflict a maximum amount of damage and casualties in a very short period of time, convince the American people to abandon the fight. At the very least the parallels extend beyond the geography of the conflict (Taiwan=Philippines?). But that wasn't a good strategy then, and I don't buy it now. I'm thinking this type of attack ends more like Tora! Tora! Tora! than Black Hawk Down.