Last night from Hugh Hewitt:

The EADS Tanker Can't Refuel The USMC Osprey?

Boeing's Mark McGraw just told me that on air. Doesn't it strike you as a pretty significant advantage for Boeing that its proposed tanker could refuel the new Marine Corps platform while the Airbus tanker can't? If there was a huge gap between the two tankers, that might not make a difference, but by every account, it was a dead heat, so this difference seems very significant on its face.

Word on the street is Boeing lost on four of five evaluation criteria; how that amounts to a dead heat, I don't know. Regarding the ability to refuel "new" Marine Corps platforms, the new MV-22 Osprey at present is not fitted for aerial refueling, but when it is, it, like other helos, will use the probe-and-drogue system shared by the rest of the Navy. At present, because of their low speed, helos do not refuel from jet tankers, but instead use KC-130 Hercules, which are more closely matched to them in speed. The Osprey, being capable of 300 knots, could, flying flat out, match speeds with a jet tanker, but it would be iffy. Assuming that this is a mission requirement, both the Boeing and Airbus tankers are dual-capable; i.e., they have both flying boom (used by the Air Force) and probe-and-drogue (used by the Navy) units, just like the existing KC-10.

The Boeing offering is smaller, has less range, less cargo capacity, and less fuel transfer capacity. On the bright side, Boeing says it is cheaper (we'll have to wait on that one), and can be operated from forward bases (why on earth would you want to do that?), which the company claims obviates the shorter range. But then Boeing ignores the vulnerability and strategic issues inherent in forward basing, as well as the additional cost of shipping fuel to forward bases, to say nothing of the O&M costs associated with creating forward base detachments for every tanker squadron in USAF.

All-in-all, sounds like McGraw is blowing smoke, but the Boeing objective at this point is to keep the protest alive through the election cycle in the hope that the new President and Congress will be more protectionist in outlook and will cancel the contract award (ideally, from his perspective, mandating a sole source award to Boeing).

Boeing was arrogant and ticked off its customer by ignoring mission requirements--in effect, telling the Air Force that it knew better than they did what the Air Force needed. This is never a good business strategy. They also assumed that USAF would never make a major award to a foreign manufacturer. Obviously, this was a faulty assumption. As to why the Airbus award constitutes a dire threat to U.S. national security, your guess is as good as mine. We buy a commercial airframe, half of which is built in the U.S., from Airbus, and we give it to Northrop to stuff with all the refueling, communications and other mission equipment, which is worth more than the value of the airframe. The Airbus deal will create as many new jobs in the U.S., albeit at the expense of some Boeing jobs--my guess is a net gain in U.S. employment. Security of supply is not an issue, given that France is a member of the LOI (Letter of Intent) Six, which all have memoranda of agreement in place with each other to ensure access to parts and services from each other. The Boeing protest, and its supporters, in short, are making a straightforward protectionist argument, which in the long run will come back to bite all U.S. defense manufacturers.