The Iraqi government’s willingness to take on the Mahdi Army in its strongholds in Baghdad, Basra, and elsewhere in the South is perhaps the most significant news story from Iraq this year. In 2006 and 2007, analysts, pundits, military officers, and politicians said the Shia militias--particularly the Mahdi Army, pose the greatest long term threat in Iraq. Now that the Iraqi government has decided to take on the Mahdi Army, the press is fixated on distinct incidences of failure of the Iraqi security forces in their efforts to dislodge the Mahdi Army from their strongholds.

In today's New York Times, Michael Gordon focuses on the desertion of a company of Iraqi soldiers from their outpost in Sadr City. The story is factually accurate. A company of about 80 Iraqi soldiers abandoned their post. They deserted while engaged with the enemy, which is a serious crime during war. This is the main focus of the article.

Yes, Gordon touches on the fact that the Iraqi and U.S. military scrambled to get a unit to replace the company--and succeeded. Gordon briefly mentions the other Iraqi units on the line held. They even “fought hard.” He even recognizes the Iraqi Army is in Sadr City! But these are just one-off statements of little significance to the narrative, which summed up in a single paragraph:

This episode was a blow to the American effort to push the Iraqis into the lead in the struggle to wrest control of parts of Sadr City from the Mahdi Army militia and what Americans and Iraqis say are Iranian-backed groups.

The fact is the Iraqi Army is still inside Sadr City. A security zone has been carved out of 1/3 of the Mahdi Army controlled district. One company broke, the rest fought and seem to have acquitted themselves well, even if they expended plenty of ammunition (note: the Mahdi Army does the same thing).

Gordon also fails to tell us what unit of the Iraqi Army this is. This is important, as some divisions are greener than others. The likelihood here is that this was one of the young brigades from the 11th Division. The 44th Brigade of the 11th Division, which is in Sadr City, went through what is called “Unit Set Fielding”--where a unit is formed and receives its equipment--in December of 2007. The 43rd Brigade went through the training in January of this year. The 11th Division was commissioned to form in November 2007.

How do I know this? DJ Elliott meticulously tracks the formation of the Iraqi Army in his Iraqi Security Forces Order of Battle, which is updated monthly at The Long War Journal. Is it too much to ask the New York Times, with its near limitless resources, to do the same?

The article also misses the wider implications of what is occurring with the Iraqi security forces. In 2006, Iraqi units either refused to go to Baghdad or did not have the logistical capabilities to deploy. Those that did were severely undermanned. In 2007 the logistical and manning issues were largely resolved, but Sadr City remained off limits. In 2008, just three weeks after the Iraqi security forces took on the Mahdi Army in Basra, which sparked fighting in Baghdad, the Iraqi Army is 1/3 of the way into Sadr City. That is the story you are not being told.