The Economist published a good article on the state of play with the potential Taliban takeover in Pakistan. Give it a read. The article was close to perfect, but there is one point that is incorrect and needs to be clarified so the situation in Pakistan is understood. The Economist claimed that the Swat Taliban has no links to al Qaeda:

The Taliban, almost exclusively Pushtun, are not popular in Pakistan. Though often anti-American, and bothered by a growing extremist fringe, most Pakistanis are moderate. Unlike some Taliban leaders, Mullah Fazlullah is not known to have links to al Qaeda.

Given the rapid expansion of the Taliban and the corresponding apathy of the Pakistani people, there's plenty of room for debate about the popularity of the Taliban and the moderation of the Pakistani people. But the real error here is that al Qaeda and other non-Taliban Islamist terror groups are known to operate in Swat.

The largest contingent, the Tora Bora Group, is led by a brutal and efficient al Qaeda commander known as Ibn Amin. The Tora Bora Group is estimated to have more than 1,000 fighters operating in Swat. Amin is known to run an al Qaeda training camp in the village of Peuchar. Amin and the Tora Bora Group couldn't operate in Swat without the countenance of Fazlullah.

This is an important point because Pakistani officials, including Ambassador Husain Haqqani, want us to believe the Swat deal was signed with "local" clerics who have influence with the local Taliban. In fact, this has been the Pakistani government's justification for signing peace deals in North and South Waziristan, Bajaur, Swat, Mohmand, Bannu, Arakzai, etc. And when they finally cut a new peace deal in Dir and Buner (where Amin is now leading operations) the Pakistanis will also claim the deals were struck with disaffected locals.