Counterinsurgency, Not Counterterrorism

Over at Small Wars Journal, I sat down with Peter Godwin -- author, war correspondent, and veteran of the Rhodesian Bush War-- for a discussion on counterinsurgency tactics and strategy. Godwin's experiences with the British South Africa Police -- a Rhodesian police/paramilitary outfit -- were strikingly similar to the challenges faced by coalition forces in 21st century Afghanistan. Unsurprisingly, Godwin rejects the minimal footprint strategy (advocated by Vice-President Biden) and offers a sound reiteration of General McChrystal's population-centric approach to winning in the Hindu Kush. An excerpt:

It's important to stay away from the body count mentality. COIN conflicts are not won by such thinking. They are won by holding territory, and denying the enemy free range in 'liberated' areas. At present, it's my understanding that there are large areas of Afghanistan where the Taliban has relatively free range - that's what happened too, by the end of the Rhodesian conflict - where much of the countryside was in guerrilla hands (though the Security Forces could enter at will - they didn't have continuity of presence. 'Who owns the night?' is the simple question you ask to determine this.)

Clear-and-hold worked for a time in Vietnam, it worked for the British in Malaya, and it worked in Iraq. It should be noted that the Rhodesians -- lacking the manpower to control their countryside and obsessed with the Biden concept of operations (kinetic ops and kill-ratios) -- ultimately lost their war. Should the Obama administration adopt a Rhodesian-style COIN strategy in Afghanistan, we're likely to suffer a similar fate.

Read the whole thing here.