

AMENDMENT NO. \_\_\_\_\_ Calendar No. \_\_\_\_\_

Purpose: To require a report on support provided by the Government of Iran for attacks against coalition forces in Iraq.

**IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES—110th Cong., 1st Sess.**

**H.R. 1585**

To authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2008 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for other purposes.

Referred to the Committee on \_\_\_\_\_ and  
ordered to be printed

Ordered to lie on the table and to be printed

AMENDMENT intended to be proposed by Mr. LIEBERMAN

Viz:

1 At the end of title XV, add the following:

2 **SEC. 1535. REPORT ON SUPPORT FROM IRAN FOR ATTACKS**

3 **AGAINST COALITION FORCES IN IRAQ.**

4 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-  
5 ings:

6 (1) Since January 19, 1984, the Secretary of

7 State has designated the Islamic Republic of Iran as

1 a “state sponsor of terrorism,” one of only five  
2 countries in the world at present so designated.

3 (2) The Department of State, in its most recent  
4 “Country Reports on Terrorism,” stated that “Iran  
5 remained the most active state sponsor of terrorism”  
6 in 2006.

7 (3) The most recent Country Reports on Ter-  
8 rorism report further stated, “Iran continued [in  
9 2006] to play a destabilizing role in Iraq... Iran  
10 provided guidance and training to select Iraqi Shia  
11 political groups, and weapons and training to Shia  
12 militant groups to enable anti-Coalition attacks. Ira-  
13 nian government forces have been responsible for at  
14 least some of the increasing lethality of anti-Coali-  
15 tion attacks by providing Shia militants with the ca-  
16 pability to build IEDs with explosively formed pro-  
17 jectiles similar to those developed by Iran and Leba-  
18 nese Hezbollah. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard  
19 was linked to armor-piercing explosives that resulted  
20 in the deaths of Coalition Forces.”

21 (4) In an interview published on June 7, 2006,  
22 Zalmay Khalilzad, then-United States ambassador to  
23 Iraq, said of Iranian support for extremist activity  
24 in Iraq, “We can say with certainty that they sup-  
25 port groups that are attacking coalition troops.

1       These groups are using the same ammunition to de-  
2       stroy armored vehicles that the Iranians are sup-  
3       plying to Hezbollah in Lebanon. They pay money to  
4       Shiite militias and they train some of the groups.  
5       We can't say whether Teheran is supporting Al  
6       Qaeda, but we do know that Al Qaeda people come  
7       here from Pakistan through Iran. And Ansar al  
8       Sunna, a partner organization of Zarqawi's network,  
9       has a base in northwest Iran."

10           (5) On April 26, 2007, General David Petraeus,  
11       commander of Multi-National Force-Iraq, said of  
12       Iranian support for extremist activity in Iraq, "The  
13       level of financing, the level of training on Iranian  
14       soil, the level of equipping some sophisticated tech-  
15       nologies... even advice in some cases, has been very,  
16       very substantial and very harmful."

17           (6) On April 26, 2007, General Petraeus also  
18       said of Iranian support for extremist activity in Iraq,  
19       "We know that it goes as high as [Brig. Gen.  
20       Qassem] Suleimani, who is the head of the Qods  
21       Force.... We believe that he works directly for the  
22       supreme leader of the country."

23           (7) On May 27, 2007, then-Major General Wil-  
24       liam Caldwell, spokesperson for Multi-National  
25       Force-Iraq, said, "What we do know is that the Ira-

1       nian intelligence services, the Qods Force, is in fact  
2       both training, equipping, and funding Shia extremist  
3       groups... both in Iraq and also in Iran... We have  
4       in detention now people that we have captured that,  
5       in fact, are Sunni extremist-related that have, in  
6       fact, received both some funding and training from  
7       the Iranian intelligence services, the Qods Force.”

8           (8) On February 27, 2007, in testimony before  
9       the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate,  
10      Lieutenant General Michael Maples, director of the  
11      Defense Intelligence Agency, said of Iranian support  
12      for extremist activity in Iraq, “We believe Hezbollah  
13      is involved in the training as well.”

14          (9) On July 2, 2007, Brigadier General Kevin  
15      Bergner, spokesperson for Multi-National Force-  
16      Iraq, stated, “The Iranian Qods Force is using Leb-  
17      anese Hezbollah essentially as a proxy, as a surro-  
18      gate in Iraq.”

19          (10) On July 2, 2007, Brigadier General  
20      Bergner detailed the capture in southern Iraq by co-  
21      alition forces of Ali Musa Daqdaq, whom the United  
22      States military believes to be a 24-year veteran of  
23      Lebanese Hezbollah involved in the training of Iraqi  
24      extremists in Iraq and Iran.

1           (11) The Department of State designates  
2 Hezbollah a foreign terrorist organization.

3           (12) On July 2, 2007, Brigadier General  
4 Bergner stated that the Iranian Qods Force operates  
5 three camps near Teheran where it trains Iraqi ex-  
6 tremists in cooperation with Lebanese Hezbollah,  
7 stating, “The Qods Force, along with Hezbollah in-  
8 structors, train approximately 20 to 60 Iraqis at a  
9 time, sending them back to Iraq organized into these  
10 special groups. They are being taught how to use  
11 EPFs [explosively formed penetrators], mortars,  
12 rockets, as well as intelligence, sniper, and kidnap-  
13 ping operations.”

14           (13) On July 2, 2007, Brigadier General  
15 Bergner stated that Iraqi extremists receive between  
16 \$750,000 and \$3,000,000 every month from Iranian  
17 sources.

18           (14) On July 2, 2007, Brigadier General  
19 Bergner stated that “[o]ur intelligence reveals that  
20 senior leadership in Iran is aware of this activity”  
21 and that it would be “hard to imagine” that Aya-  
22 tollah Ali Khamenei, the Supreme Leader of Iran, is  
23 unaware of it.

24           (15) On July 2, 2007, Brigadier General  
25 Bergner stated, “There does not seem to be any fol-

1 low-through on the commitments that Iran has made  
2 to work with Iraq in addressing the destabilizing se-  
3 curity issues here in Iraq.”

4 (16) On February 11, 2007, the United States  
5 military held a briefing in Baghdad at which its rep-  
6 resentatives stated that at least 170 members of the  
7 United States Armed Forces have been killed, and at  
8 least 620 wounded, by weapons tied to Iran.

9 (17) On January 20, 2007, a sophisticated at-  
10 tack was launched by insurgents at the Karbala Pro-  
11 vincial Joint Coordination Center in Iraq, resulting  
12 in the murder of five American soldiers, four of  
13 whom were first abducted.

14 (18) On April 26, 2007, General Petraeus stat-  
15 ed that the so-called Qazali network was responsible  
16 for the attack on the Karbala Provincial Joint Co-  
17 ordination Center and that “there’s no question that  
18 the Qazali network is directly connected to the Ira-  
19 nian Qods force [and has] received money, training,  
20 arms, ammunition, and at some points in time even  
21 advice and assistance and direction”.

22 (19) On July 2, 2007, Brigadier General  
23 Bergner stated that the United States Armed Forces  
24 possesses documentary evidence that the Qods Force  
25 had developed detailed information on the United

1 States position at the Karbala Provincial Joint Co-  
2 ordination Center “regarding our soldiers’ activities,  
3 shift changes, and defenses, and this information  
4 was shared with the attackers”.

5 (20) On July 2, 2007, Brigadier General  
6 Bergner stated of the January 20 Karbala attackers,  
7 “[They] could not have conducted this complex oper-  
8 ation without the support and direction of the Qods  
9 Force.”

10 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-  
11 gress that—

12 (1) the murder of members of the United  
13 States Armed Forces by a foreign government or its  
14 agents is an intolerable and unacceptable act of hos-  
15 tility against the United States by the foreign gov-  
16 ernment in question; and

17 (2) the Government of the Islamic Republic of  
18 Iran must take immediate action to end all training,  
19 arming, equipping, funding, advising, and any other  
20 forms of support that it or its agents are providing,  
21 and have provided, to Iraqi militias and insurgents,  
22 who are contributing to the destabilization of Iraq  
23 and are responsible for the murder of members of  
24 the United States Armed Forces.

25 (c) REPORT.—

1           (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 30 days after  
2           the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 60  
3           days thereafter, the Commander, Multi-National  
4           Forces Iraq and the United States Ambassador to  
5           Iraq shall jointly submit to Congress a report de-  
6           scribing and assessing in detail—

7                   (A) the external support or direction pro-  
8                   vided to anti-coalition forces by the Government  
9                   of the Islamic Republic of Iran or its agents;

10                   (B) the strategy and ambitions in Iraq of  
11                   the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran;  
12                   and

13                   (C) any counter-strategy or efforts by the  
14                   United States Government to counter the activi-  
15                   ties of agents of the Government of the Islamic  
16                   Republic of Iran in Iraq.

17           (2) FORM.—Each report required under para-  
18           graph (1) shall be in unclassified form, but may con-  
19           tain a classified annex.