May 19, 2008 • Vol. 13, No. 34
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With less than 100 days to go before the Beijing Olympics, China has stepped up its crackdown on the country’s underground Christian church. Since the beginning of May, the authorities have conducted at least eight raids on house churches. The latest such incident took place yesterday in Beijing. More than two dozen police, along with officials of the religious affairs bureau, interrupted a gathering at the Shouwang Church and took the names, ID card numbers, home addresses, and phone numbers of all church members present.
A May 8 raid was targeted at a three-day Bible study session in Qingzhou city, in the eastern province of Shandong. That gathering, attended by some 30 house church leaders from across China, was broken up by more than 20 public security personnel. The lead pastor, who is from Taiwan, was deported and banned from visiting the mainland for five years. Zhang Yongliang, a local organizer, and his step-father were detained. Musical instruments and a computer found on the premises were confiscated.
Upon his release the following day, Zhang was informed that his church had been outlawed and its music school disbanded. Zhang also faces a fine of between 10,000 to 30,000 yuan (U$1,430 to $4,290). As of this posting, Zhang’s step-father, who was punched and kicked by police during the raid, remains in custody.
On May 4, in Yanji city in the northeastern province of Jilin, pastor Hao Yuji was taken away by police in the middle of a sermon and ordered to dissolve his church. When Hao questioned the reason for his arrest, he was beaten and sustained injuries to his head and chest.
Also on May 4, authorities in Inner Mongolia shut down the Arong Zhen Ge Er Church and charged its 66-year-old pastor, Guo Jingtian, with "conducting an illegal religious meeting." Three days prior to the raid on Guo’s church, Inner Mongolian police detained two ministers of the Daqing Church and confiscated their video camera, books, and household items.
On May 2, in Chengdu City in the southwestern province of Sichuan, a gathering of 44 members of the "Bliss of Autumn Rain Church" was raided by police and officials of the religious affairs bureau. Items confiscated include bibles and hymn and prayer books. One of the church members interrogated by the authorities was Wang Yi, a legal scholar and one of three Chinese Christians who met with President Bush in Washington in 2006.
In two separate raids on May 1 and May 3, four out-of-town evangelists were detained by authorities in Jiaxiang County in Shandong province. All four remain in custody, and two of them have been accused of being members of an "evil cult."
While members of China’s underground Christian church have long been subject to persecution, the timing of the intensified campaign against them is somewhat ironic. It coincides with the May 2 release by the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom of its annual report, which once again designated China as a "country of particular concern."
Even more troubling is that despite the human rights promises Beijing made when bidding for the Games, the stepped-up crackdown began just as the Olympic clock started its 100-day countdown.
With the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (CPN-M) poised to take the helm in Kathmandu, Sino-Nepalese relations are expected to improve greatly. On April 25, a high-level Chinese delegation visiting the country announced that Beijing plans to link Tibet with Nepal by extending a railway line from Lhasa to Khasha on the China-Nepal border in five years.
An April 28 feature piece in Global Times, a newspaper run by People’s Daily, characterizes the CPN-M’s electoral victory as "a historic sea change" that has Washington’s eyes peeled for signs that Nepal’s new government may tilt toward Beijing. Not without glee, the article states that the sea change was brought about by a victory of those once regarded by India as "rebels" and long-referred to by the United States as a "terrorist organization."
Republished by numerous China-based websites and blogs, the article notes that New Delhi had for years sided with Nepal’s royal family and had put behind bars CPN-M guerrilla leaders operating in India. Following its electoral victory, however, India announced its willingness to "unconditionally cooperate" with the CPN-M. This change in policy is attributed by the article to New Delhi’s desire both to prevent Kathmandu from cozying up to Beijing and to dissuade the CPN-M from supporting Maoist insurgents in India.
A post-9/11 United States, the Global Times piece continues, found the CPN-M particularly "heinous" for its communist orientation and guerrilla activities. According to the article, this is why Washington provided the Nepalese government with tens of millions of dollars in military aid to combat the Maoists and why, even after King Gyanendra claimed absolute power for himself in 2005, the United States urged the seven-party alliance not to cooperate with the Maoists.
The article concludes with CPN-M leader Prachanda’s observation that his government has much to learn from China’s experience in socialist construction. Conspicuously absent from the text is any reference to China’s own relationship with the Nepalese royal family, including Beijing’s sales of rifles and grenades to King Gyanendra’s government while it was at the same time exporting arms to the Maoists.
Missing also from the article is any mention of the fact that although King Gyanendra’s 2005 dismissal of the country’s elected parliament was condemned by India, Britain, and the United States, China refused to do so, characterizing it as "an internal matter for Nepal." Indeed, some believe that King Gyanendra’s assumption of total power, which was followed by a trip by the King to China less than three months later, had Beijing’s blessing.
The victorious CPN-M has announced that Nepal’s new government will not seek to play either the India card or the China card. Perhaps an even more germane question is: how will Beijing play the Nepal card?
Tomorrow marks the 40th anniversary of the death of Lin Zhao, a fearless critic of Mao and the Chinese Communist Party who was executed at the height of the Cultural Revolution. This past February, a campaign was launched in Chinese cyberspace calling on the public to gather on April 29 by her tomb in Suzhou, in the eastern province of Jiangsu, for a memorial.
The online proposal seems to have caught the eye of the authorities. Hu Di, one of the signatories, has been summoned by police for questioning. Video cameras have reportedly been installed around Lin Zhao’s grave. A plaque marking the entrance to the cemetery has been removed, and local residents have been instructed by police not to disclose the location of her tomb.
Lin Zhao is the pen name of Peng Lingzhao. In 1957, while studying at Peking University, she was branded a "rightist" and a "class enemy" after criticizing Mao’s Anti-rightist Movement.
In 1960, Lin Zhao drafted a petition regarding the case against Peng Dehuai, the Red Army commander and onetime defense minister who incurred Mao’s wrath for his criticism of the disastrous Great Leap Forward. In October of that year, Lin Zhao was arrested on charges of "active counter-revolution" for publishing an underground magazine. Shortly after her arrest, Lin Zhao’s British-educated father, who had himself been labeled a "counter-revolutionary," committed suicide by taking rat poison.
In 1962, Lin Zhao was sentenced to 20 years in prison. While there, she continued her writings. After the authorities confiscated her pen and paper in September 1964, she used a hairpin dipped in her own blood to write poems and essays on her cell walls, clothes, and bed sheets.
On April 29, 1968, Lin Zhao’s 20-year sentence was changed to death by immediate execution. Gagged and handcuffed, Lin Zhao was shot dead at Longhua Airport in Shanghai. She was 36. Her mother and sister learned of the execution two days later when the police showed up at their doorstep demanding payment for the bullets used to kill her.
The beefed-up security at Lin Zhao’s tomb in anticipation of tomorrow’s graveside memorial is Beijing’s most recent attempt to erase her from the collective memory of the Chinese people. The majority of her writings remain sealed by the authorities. A 2004 documentary titled Looking for Lin Zhao’s Soul was limited to private showings. Filmmaker Hu Jie lost his job with the official Xinhua News Agency because of his involvement in the project. And Lu Xuesong, an instructor at the Jilin College of Fine Arts, was suspended after showing the film to her students.
What has the Chinese government got to fear from a woman who perished four decades ago? Organizers of the memorial expressed one view when they noted that "even though Lin Zhao’s country has witnessed many changes in the 40 years since her passing, the totalitarian politics that she strove to change remain the same."
In the aftermath of the crackdown in Tibet, Chinese internet bulletin boards have become virtual hate sites.
In hundreds of thousands of postings, Han Chinese hurl obscenities against Tibetans, condemn foreign governments for "interfering in China’s internal affairs," and accuse the Western media of "twisting the facts." They express "resolute support" for the government’s action. Some even call for tougher measures to deal with the "splittists" in order to defend China’s territorial glory.
In the absence of a free press, what Chinese citizens know of the Tibet crackdown is filtered through the lens of the state propaganda machine, which defines, in report after report, "the truth" of the March 14 Lhasa Incident as "a serious violent crime involving beating, smashing, looting, and burning" that was orchestrated by the "Dalai clique" in cahoots with "hostile external elements."
Through its control of the media and the Internet, the Chinese government is, in effect, manipulating the nationalist sentiments of the Han, a group constituting more than 90 percent of the population. By professing to be the guardian of territorial integrity and national pride, it is reinforcing its claim to legitimacy.
The late Chinese dissident writer Liu Binyan once said:
Nationalism and Han chauvinism are now the only effective instruments in the ideological arsenal of the Chinese Communist Party. Any disruption in the relationship with foreign countries or among ethnic minorities can be used to stir "patriotic" sentiments of the people to support the communist authorities.
While Han chauvinism is a real factor, another important element is state censorship. The Chinese government’s ability to define the incident--in fact, any incident--to fit its agenda relies on its control of the media. It is thought control in its crudest form.
Many of those who have access to alternative channels of information, however, tend to have a different mindset. Regular listeners of Radio Free Asia, for example, have been voicing their opposition to the crackdown on Tibetans. Some have expressed suspicion about the official version of events. A Beijing listener who uses a proxy server to access foreign websites applies a completely different analytical model to the Tibet issue than do the vast majority of his fellow Han Chinese: "Using Free Gate, I was able to see on the Internet that, in Lhasa, protesting monks were dealt with in a very rough manner, and that even tanks were mobilized. I think it was too much."
Race and ethnic relations are complex issues. In the United States we are witnessing in the presidential primaries an intense debate surrounding how they should be tackled. Americans of all political stripes are, however, free to engage in this debate through media outlets of the right, center, and left. It would be an understatement to say such is not the case in the People’s Republic.
Tomorrow Beijing will put on trial one of its most ardent human rights campaigners. Hu Jia, 34, faces charges of "inciting subversion of state power." Evidence to be used against him includes articles he posted on an overseas Chinese-language website and statements he made during interviews with foreign journalists.
For his work as an activist, Hu, a devout Buddhist, has been called "modern China’s conscience." He called attention to the plight of AIDS orphans whose parents were victims of a scandal involving tainted blood at public blood banks. In June 2004, he was detained for attempting to lay a wreath on Tiananmen Square to honor the victims of the 1989 crackdown on democracy demonstrators.
In February 2006, Hu was abducted by agents of the Beijing public security bureau, driven with a hood over his head to a rural location, and held captive for 41 days. Although suffering from hepatitis-B, Hu was denied medication while his kidnappers interrogated him concerning a hunger strike he had joined to protest police brutality in China.
Upon his release, Hu was kept under house arrest until February 2007. During this time, his wife was tailed by security agents wherever she went. In May 2007, Hu and his wife were both put under house arrest for "endangering state security." A video diary titled "Prisoners in Freedom City" depicting their life under surveillance by China’s security apparatus can be seen here.
Hu Jia’s current trouble with the government likely stems from his call for the international community to demand that Beijing fulfill its pledge to improve human rights ahead of the Olympics. This past September, Hu and Teng Biao, a legal scholar, co-authored an open letter titled "The real China and the Olympics." The letter documents a host of human rights abuses by the Chinese government and also states that:
When you come to the Olympic Games in Beijing, you will see skyscrapers, spacious streets, modern stadiums and enthusiastic people. You will see the truth, but not the whole truth, just as you see only the tip of an iceberg. You may not know that the flowers, smiles, harmony and prosperity are built on a base of grievances, tears, imprisonment, torture and blood.
On December 27, as Hu’s wife was bathing their newborn daughter, security agents stormed into their apartment and dragged Hu away. He was formally charged with subversion on January 29.
On March 6, Hu’s co-author, Teng Biao, was abducted by police from his home in Beijing. Upon his release two days later, Teng stated that he was not free to discuss the matter.
With less than five months to go before the Games, Beijing seems determined to silence its domestic critics. Is there hope yet? Last week Chinese officials found themselves scrambling to improve air quality after world marathon record-holder Haile Gebrselassie indicated that he would skip the competition in Beijing because the city’s notorious smog presented a threat to his health. Will anyone object to competing in a country whose policies present a threat to their conscience?
In the run-up to Taiwan’s first-ever direct presidential election in 1996, China fired three ballistic missiles into the island’s territorial waters in an attempt to dissuade its electorate from voting for the independence-minded Lee Teng-hui. Lee won by a landslide.
Four years later, then-Chinese premier Zhu Rongji warned that Beijing was ready to "shed blood" if Chen Shuibian of the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) were elected leader of Taiwan. Chen won in a three-way race, ending more than a half century of rule by the Nationalist Party (KMT).
On March 22 Taiwan voters will elect a new president. Also on the ballot are two referendums on UN membership--one proposed by the DPP, the other by the KMT. The much-disputed DPP version asks whether the government should seek to join the UN under the name Taiwan. Regarded as a ploy for the self-ruled island to pursue de jure independence, it has drawn criticism from Beijing, Washington, and the EU as a threat to peace in the region.
Beijing, however, seems to have taken to heart lessons from 1996 and 2000. China’s displeasure over the referendums was not conveyed by the country’s top leaders, but instead by Jiang Enzhu, spokesman of this year’s parliamentary session, who warned last week that Chen Shuibian and Taiwan authorities would "pay a dear price" if they pursued their efforts to gain membership in the UN. And there is no sign that Beijing is gearing up to express its disapproval through military gestures.
Singapore-based Lianhe Zaobao finds especially significant the remarks last week of Chinese president Hu Jintao. Hu, while calling for the resumption of cross-Strait dialogue, not only steered clear of the referendum issue but went so far as to claim that Beijing wished to "bring together as many Taiwan compatriots as possible," including those that "once harbored illusions about Taiwan independence, advocated Taiwan independence, and even engaged in activities promoting Taiwan independence."
Besides bitter past lessons, there could be other motivations for what Lianhe Zaobao describes as Beijing’s "soft approach." First and foremost, Chen Shuibian has alienated Washington by insisting on holding the referendum. U.S. opposition to the vote has been articulated repeatedly by senior administration officials, most recently by Secretary Rice last month during her visit to China. Beijing can well afford to appear magnanimous while Washington plays the role of bad cop.
Second, there is a good chance that the referendums will not pass by the required margins. While Taiwan’s "national identity" was a key issue in previous elections, this time it has taken a back seat to economic concerns, as evidenced by yesterday’s televised debate between KMT candidate Ma Ying-jeou and the DPP’s Frank Hsieh. This past Saturday, Hsieh, who has been trailing Ma by double digits, indicated that he might be willing to separate the referendums from the balloting for president.
Beijing’s wait-and-see approach may be paying off.
Affirmation of Vladimir Putin’s accomplishments as president was a constant theme of recent Chinese press coverage of Russia. Yesterday, as Russians went to the polls to elect a new president, Xinhua celebrated with a lengthy piece titled "Putin’s report card." It credits the Russian leader not only with his country’s improved economic performance and growing international clout, but also with instituting a "controllable democracy" that has brought order and stability to a land once teetering on the brink of anarchy.
This is a familiar narrative. Beijing has long favored combining economic reform with continued political authoritarianism. After the 1989 military crackdown on democracy protesters at Tiananmen Square, Deng Xiaoping, the "architect of modern China," justified the suppression as a necessary means of restoring stability in order to further economic progress. It is a line of argument that has been repeated by successive Chinese leaders.
In Putin’s Russia, Beijing sees its policies being vindicated. Indeed, last Wednesday a Xinhua report carried the proud heading "On Russia’s campaign trail the Chinese experience is held in high esteem; The Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping becomes a manual for governing."
Chinese media have gushed over Russia’s economic prosperity, evidenced by rising incomes and punctuated by the presence of Gucci, Armani, and Prada stores in Moscow. "The Putin generation" is portrayed as self-confident, sophisticated, and awash in material comfort. More importantly, it is a generation that values stability.
Unsurprisingly, the lion’s share of Chinese press coverage of the Russian presidential election was given to Dmitry Medvedev, Putin’s chosen successor. Medvedev’s refusal to debate his three opponents was attributed to his being a "dedicated public servant" who had too hectic a schedule attending to his many responsibilities as first deputy prime minister. Special play was given also to Medvedev’s assertion that what Russia needs most is "strong presidential power."
Continue reading "China Likes Medvedev, "Controllable Democracy"" »
Last week China’s ministry of education announced a pilot program that makes Peking opera a component of the music curriculum for grades one through nine. Scheduled to begin in March this year and to last until July 2009, each of the three cities and seven provinces selected for the program will designate 20 local schools to participate.
The repertoire consists of arias from 15 plays, more than half of which are drawn from the so-called revolutionary model operas (geming yangban xi) that dominated the stage and airwaves during the Cultural Revolution.
Revolutionary model operas, or model operas, were the brainchild of Mao Zedong’s late wife Jiang Qing, a one-time actress and infamous member of the disgraced “Gang of Four.” The plays invariably feature proletarian characters fighting heroically against the evil-doers of an oppressive feudal society. They contain melodies with such inspirational titles as “I won't quit the battle until all the beasts are killed.”
During his 1972 visit to China, Richard Nixon was treated to one of the best-known examples of the genre, The Red Detachment of Women. It is a ballet-opera that depicts uniformed women raising swords and rifles against a despotic landlord.
Since the announcement, a heated debate has erupted in Chinese cyberspace over whether Peking opera in general, and revolutionary model plays in particular, should become part of the standard curriculum.
Proponents of the program find the arrangement “highly appropriate.” They note that the syntax of model operas is contemporary and therefore easy for students in the lower grades to learn. One supporter argued that as “la crème de la crème of Chinese culture” Peking opera should be celebrated:
The Chinese people should love our own art. Woe to our nation if our people wear Western clothes, sing Western songs, and reject our own culture.
Opponents of the program countered by asking whether by the same logic preschoolers should be required to study martial arts and the oracle bone script, the earliest form of Chinese writing.
Continue reading "Peking Operas are Back" »
Chinese media have given minimal coverage to president Bush‘s week-long visit to Africa. While Xinhua ascribes the motivation for the five-nation trip to "strategic interests" that include military and energy security, it also acknowledges that the U.S. troop presence in Africa has been "tiny."
By contrast, Beijing seems much more concerned with Japan’s push into the continent, as evidenced by an article titled "Japanese diplomacy takes aim at Africa." The piece appeared in last Wednesday’s edition of Liberation Daily and was subsequently reprinted by Xinhua.
The article states that Tokyo has launched a new round of "diplomatic offensives" in Africa, beginning with last month’s visit to Tanzania by Japanese foreign minister Masahiko Koumura. During that visit, he unveiled a $260 million aid package to help African nations deal with conflicts and natural disasters.
The piece reports that Japan’s new diplomatic targeting of Africa includes the hosting of two major international conferences later this year. The first of these is the fourth Tokyo International Conference on African Development, to be held in Yokohama in May. The other is the G8 Hokkaido Summit in July. Host country Japan has invited 14 non-members to participate in the forum and fully half are from Africa.
The Liberation Daily article further states that these actions are motivated by three factors. One is that, as a formidable voting bloc, Africa could help Japan achieve its goal of becoming a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council. This, in turn, would help transform the country from simply an economic power into a political one as well.
The second factor is the continent’s vast energy resources. And finally, the article explains the push as an attempt to counter China’s growing influence in the region:
The success of the 2006 Beijing Forum on China-Africa Cooperation gave China the upper hand. Green with envy, Japan launched a "diplomatic offensive" consisting of political courtship and economic aid. Japan competes [with China] and stands in [China’s] way wherever possible. Japan believes that if it succeeds in containing and countering China it will weaken China’s influence in Africa.
The main theme of the Liberation Daily piece echoes that of a number of other reports Chinese media ran recently on the inroads Tokyo has made in Africa.
One article’s caption reads "Why is Japan eyeing Africa more and more closely?" It finds especially noteworthy the visit to Botswana and South Africa this past November by Japan’s trade minister Akira Amari, during which Tokyo secured rare-metal exploration deals with both countries. While the report described Amari’s trip as "fruitful," it neglected to mention that Japan embarked on its hunt for rare metals in Africa because China’s increasing domestic demand for these minerals had led it recently to cut back on exports to Japan.
In chronicling Japanese aid to Africa, the report also noted that since the 1990s Japan has been the second largest donor country to Africa, behind only France.
In the end, however, Beijing’s apprehension over Tokyo’s overtures toward Africa may be unnecessary. The "Official Development Assistance Charter" adopted by the Japanese government in 1992 requires Tokyo to link its aid to the promotion of human rights, freedom, and democracy. Chinese aid to Africa, on the other hand, comes with no such strings attached.
Last week World Bank president Robert Zoellick announced the appointment of Peking University professor Justin Yifu Lin as the organization's chief economist and senior vice president for development economics. Lin is the first person from a developing country to hold the Bank’s top economist position, an accomplishment that makes China enormously proud. Lin’s life story is nothing short of fantastic, and it's being told and retold by the Chinese media.
Born in 1952 in Taiwan, Lin was admitted to the elite National Taiwan University in 1971 and elected student body president. After attending a winter boot camp required of all able-bodied male college students, Lin asked to be transferred to the ROC Military Academy, a move that propelled him to instant celebrity status. In 1975 he graduated second in his class. The following year, Lin entered the MBA program at National Chengchi University on a defense scholarship.
Upon receiving his MBA in 1978, Lin returned to the army and was posted on the outlying island of Quemoy, which lies within shelling distance of the mainland. As dusk fell on May 16, 1979, using two basketballs as a flotation device Lin swam 2.3 kilometers and defected to China. He left behind a pregnant wife and a three-year-old son.
Both China and Taiwan kept mum on Lin’s defection. One year after his disappearance, the Taiwanese military declared Lin "missing," and his family received the equivalent of more than $31,000 in compensation.
In China, Lin changed his first name from Cheng-yi to Yifu and earned a master’s degree in political economics at the prestigious Peking University. In 1980, Lin served as a translator for Theodore Schultz during the Nobel Laureate’s visit to Beijing. So impressed was Schultz that he arranged for Lin to enroll in the doctorate program in economics at the University of Chicago. While in the United States, Lin was reunited with his wife. In 1987, after a year of post-doctoral research at Yale, Lin returned to Beijing, where he was later joined by his wife and children.
As the first Ph.D. in economics to return to China since the country began instituting market reforms, Lin soon became a key advisor to the State Council (China’s cabinet), specializing in rural development and the restructuring of state-owned enterprises. He is also the founding director of the China Center for Economic Research, a top government think tank.
While Lin has argued that the government’s first duty is to remove all possible obstacles to the functioning of free, open and competitive markets, he also advocates a gradual approach in transitioning from a centralized to a market-based economy. This past November, while delivering one of Cambridge University’s prestigious Marshall Lectures, Lin stated that "as long as the government is responsive to the needs of the people . . . an authoritarian government can still be very effective." You can see a video of Lin at Cambridge here.
In a letter written to his family in Taiwan long after his defection, Lin stated that "based on my cultural, historical, political, economic and military understanding, it is my belief that returning to the motherland is a historical inevitability; it is also the optimal choice."
Continue reading "World Bank's Chief Economist Swam to China?" »
Last week Beijing pledged $1.39 billion in economic and technical aid to East Timor. The agreement was signed in Dili by visiting Chinese deputy foreign minister Wu Dawei and East Timorese prime minister Xanana Gusmao.
China was the first country to establish diplomatic ties with East Timor after it declared independence on May 20, 2002. The fifth anniversary of the establishment of formal relations between the two countries was marked with much fanfare last year. Over the years, Chinese aid to the impoverished but resource-rich country has included agricultural machinery and foodstuff such as rice and cooking oil.
In a July 2005 interview with Chinese media, Chen Duqing, then-Chinese ambassador to East Timor, stated that aid from China was to focus on five areas. One was construction, including funding for projects such as East Timor’s foreign ministry building, presidential palace, and housing for the country’s veterans. China has also sent medical teams to East Timor, with all non-housing-related expenses picked up by Beijing. In addition, it has trained East Timorese in agricultural technology and business management, and dispatched civilian police to serve in the UN peacekeeping mission to East Timor. In September 2005, the Chinese ministry of public security donated what was described as "police supplies and communications equipment" to the East Timor ministry of interior.
In the same 2005 interview, Chen declared proudly that Beijing’s assistance to Dili was "honest and sincere," even if it was less than what was donated by some other countries. In 2003-2004 annual Chinese aid to East Timor averaged around $6 million, and in November 2005 Beijing provided an additional $6.2 million in grant aid. These pale in comparison with the contributions from Portugal, Australia, and the United States during the same time period.
Beijing has played up the fact that it had long supported East Timor’s fight for independence and that East Timorese leaders regard it as "an elder brother and a most reliable friend." An April 2007 People’s Daily report quoted each of the country’s highest ranking officials--Xanana Gusmao, Ramos-Horta, and Guterres "Lu Olo"--as referring to China as "a good friend." The report also quoted then-president-elect Ramos-Horta as saying that his son was to graduate from the PLA National Defense University with honors the following July.
China has invested in both onshore and offshore energy exploration in East Timor. While returns from these investments are far from certain, last week’s pledge of $1.39 billion in aid signals that Beijing is stepping up its courtship of Dili, thereby expanding its sphere of influence in the region through the skillful use of "soft power."
Beijing’s reaction to reports that Taiwan president Chen Shuibian may be visiting the Spratlys, known in Chinese as the Nansha Islands, has been restrained. Asked to articulate China’s position at a press briefing in Beijing last week, foreign ministry spokeswoman Jiang Yu gave a stock response:
"China possesses indisputable sovereignty over the Nansha Islands and its adjacent waters. We have the resolve and capability to safeguard our sovereignty and territorial integrity. We will continue to be devoted to peace and stability of the South China Sea."
Conspicuously missing was any specific criticism of the independence-leaning Chen for taking what Taiwan media referred to as a trip designed to proclaim sovereignty over the disputed islands.
Taiwan’s United Daily reported on January 20 that Chen’s visit would take place in the run-up to the March 22 presidential election. Chen’s spokesman refused to confirm the report, stating ambiguously that "the president visits various troop units before the Lunar New Year each year."
Taiwan has maintained troops on Taiping Islet (Itu Aba Island), the largest island in the Spratlys, for decades. Over the years they constructed, among other facilities, a radar station and a power plant on this atoll that measures a mere 1.4 kilometer in length and 400 meters in width. Construction of an airstrip began in 2006. And last Monday a Taiwan Air Force C-130 transport plane made a first-ever landing on the islet and returned to Taiwan the same day.
Last Thursday, as Vietnam voiced strong objections to the C-130 landing, Chinese media, which had been following the development closely, cited press reports as saying that Chen would take a C-130 to Taiping Islet in advance of the February 7 Chinese Lunar New Year. Chinese media reports on the possible visit were matter-of-fact and devoid of any personal attack on Chen.
By a curious coincidence, on the same day as Vietnam’s protest the website of the Beijing-backed Ta Kung Pao in Hong Kong carried an article titled "Why are resources in the South China Sea being plundered in a reckless manner?"
First appearing in "Ordnance Knowledge," a bimonthly journal of the China Ordnance Society, the article accuses Vietnam, Malaysia, and the Philippines of stepping up military activities in the area despite the fact that they are signatories to the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea. It states further that these countries, along with Brunei and Indonesia, have reaped enormous economic benefits from oil and natural gas prospecting in the region at the expense of China. Other resources being "plundered" include the ocean’s marine life.
Continue reading "Who Gets to 'Plunder' the South China Sea?" »
Chinese defense minister Cao Gangchuan wrapped up a five-day visit to Indonesia yesterday. While in Jakarta, Cao and his Indonesian counterpart, Juwono Sudarsono, agreed to expand military ties between the two countries.
Chinese press reports on the development carried the heading "Cao Gangchuan visits Indonesia; China will provide assistance to two major Indonesian military plants." The two plants are identified as the state-owned ordnance manufacturer PT Pindad and the shipbuilding firm PT PAL.
Cao’s visit reciprocated the trip to Beijing by Sudarsono in November last year, during which the two countries signed a defense cooperation agreement. In April 2005, Indonesia, the largest and most populous country in ASEAN, became the first member of the group to enter into a "strategic partnership" with China.
The Sino-Indonesian "strategic partnership" encompasses the areas of trade, defense, anti-terrorism, drug interdiction, and maritime security. Chinese media noted at the time that "for China, creating secure strategic space on its periphery is essential to the realization of its rise."
What Beijing found most attractive about this OPEC member was its energy resources. In September 2002, the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) signed what People’s Daily referred to as a "landmark" deal worth $8.5 billion to purchase liquefied natural gas from Indonesia. In addition, the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) has invested heavily in oil exploration in the resource-rich country.
Anti-Chinese sentiment has long been an undercurrent in Indonesian politics. During the 1965-66 coup that brought Suharto to power, the ethnic Chinese community was suspected of supporting the Indonesian Communist party and became the target of mass killings. In addition, tens of thousands were expelled from their homes. In 1967 Suharto issued the "Basic Policy for the Solution of the Chinese Problem." The proposed "solution" included outlawing Chinese characters in public places and shutting down Chinese schools in order to more fully integrate ethnic Chinese into Indonesian society.
Also in 1967, Jakarta severed diplomatic ties with Beijing. Formal relations between the two countries were not restored until 1990, at a time when China was shunned by the international community following the 1989 crackdown at Tiananmen Square.
In discussing Beijing’s "strategic partnership" with Jakarta, Chinese media took pains to note that it began to take shape only when Indonesia entered "a new era of democratization" following the 1998 riots that toppled Suharto, and during which the country’s ethnic Chinese were once again a main target.
Last week’s announcement that Beijing is to provide assistance to Indonesian military plants was not well received by China’s online population. Shortly after the story broke, angry comments began to appear in Chinese cyberspace. Some expressed sadness. Many were outraged over the decision to "arm a wolf" and help a country that "owes the Chinese people a debt in blood." A few postings declared--not without a hint of sarcasm--that "this is yet another act of great wisdom by our government" because it is all "for the sake of Malacca, where our energy lifeline lies."
 From Shipping Times: Royal Navy's Flag Ship HMS Ark Royal in
the company of the Chinese Frigate Saigon, off the Isle of Wight. "China’s new security concept is being realized through joint military exercises with foreign armed forces" is the title of a January 8 report by the China News Service (CNS), the second largest news agency in China behind Xinhua. The article has been making the rounds in Chinese cyberspace, including the website of the official Xinhua news agency.
According to the report, China participated in eight military exercises and two training drills with foreign armed forces in 2007. Those exercises were reportedly designed to prepare for terrorist attacks, while the six maritime drills this past year were characterized as "search and rescue" in nature.
First advocated by Beijing in the late 1990s, the "new security concept" is to "provide the post-Cold War world with a new security pattern." And as the title of the January 8 report indicates, participation in joint military exercises is one way through which China is to sketch out this new security pattern.
The CNS report quoted Lieutenant General Ma Xiaotian, deputy chief of general staff of the People’s Liberation Army, as saying that these joint exercises are not to lead China into any military alliance, nor do they pose a threat to any other country. Worth noting, however, is their increased frequency. In the years from 2002 to 2006, China took part in a total of only 16 joint military drills. And yet, as the report documents, in 2007 alone there were 10.
In fact, the year 2007 is referred to in the Chinese media as "the year of military exercises." Indeed, 2007 witnessed participation in overseas joint drills by all branches of the Chinese military, as well as by the People’s Armed Police (PAP), whose main mission is internal security.
A chronological rundown of these drills is presented in this year-end review in China Daily, which notes that joint exercises in 2007 were marked by several "firsts."
The "Peace-07" exercise in March, for example, was the first time that the Chinese navy joined a multi-national maritime military exercise. It was also the first time its vessels participated in drills overseas without an accompanying supply ship, and the first time they used live ammunition overseas.
Among other "firsts":
In September, the PAP’s "Snow Leopard Unit" conducted an anti-terrorist drill with Russian forces near Moscow. It was the first time the PAP had taken part in such an exercise on foreign soil.
In October, China held its first maritime joint exercises with Australia and New Zealand. During this drill, according to the China Daily article, "a certain type" of Chinese search-and-rescue helicopter made its debut.
The Chinese navy also conducted drills with the navies of Russia, Great Britain, Spain, and France during an 87-day European tour that began on July 24. Especially noteworthy was the September joint exercise with the British aircraft carrier Ark Royal. It was the first time the Chinese navy had held a joint exercise with an aircraft carrier and also its first exercise in the Atlantic.
Chinese media kept a close watch on the violence in Kenya following the December 27 elections that resulted in the deaths of more than 300 people and the displacement of at least 250,000.
China has substantial investments in the east African nation, including telecommunications projects, infrastructure construction, and oil prospecting by the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC).
China is also helping the Kenyan armed forces modernize. Military exchanges between the two countries began in 1996, and April 1997 saw the delivery of the first batch of Chinese made Y-12 aircraft to the Kenyan air force. During his visit to Nairobi this past November, Chinese defense minister Cao Gangchuan pledged to president Kibaki that Beijing would continue to support the country’s military modernization.
Bilateral trade between the two countries hit a record high of $646 million in 2006. This represented a 36.1 percent increase over the previous year. In December 2007, amid the global "Made in China" recall scare, Xinhua ran this report by its Nairobi correspondent. The story discusses the fact that cheap Chinese consumer goods have been extremely beneficial to the Kenyan people, nearly half of whom live below the poverty line.
It was against this backdrop that on January 3 Xinhua and People’s Daily both ran the exact same opinion piece discussing the turmoil that has ravaged Kenya. Initially published in Guangzhou Daily, the official newspaper of the Guangzhou municipal party committee, the article characterized protests by Kenya’s opposition "Orange Democratic Movement" (ODM) over alleged vote-rigging as "street-corner politicking":
The world has seen such "street-corner politicking" before. Five years ago in Georgia, four years ago in Ukraine, and three years ago in Kyrgyzstan, there were conflicts resulting from protests by the opposition following a presidential election. Of course, in the above-stated cases, "street-corner politicking" was mostly carried out in a peaceful fashion, and these episodes were labeled "color revolutions" – because there was a hint of American intervention throughout…
The article found "no hint of Western meddling" in the Kenyan elections, but went on to attribute the subsequent turbulence to the "multi-party system that the United States has been promoting in Africa":
After Kenya gained independence in December 1963, its first president was the pro-Western Kenyatta. Under his leadership, corruption was rampant and the economy deteriorated. In 1978, Moi succeeded Kenyatta as president. Under what the West called a "dictatorship," the economy picked up. The economic growth rate in 1984 was five percent, the highest in Africa. Subsequently, Kenya began to practice American style "democracy" – the multi-party system. Domestic unrest ensued and the economy began to weaken…
Conspicuous by its absence from the piece is any mention of the tribal strife that has plagued this part of Africa for generations. The omission is puzzling, since political and economic domination by the Kikuyus in Kenya is clearly identified in other Xinhua and People’s Daily reports as a key factor in the current crisis.
Violence in Kenya appears to be subsiding as president Kibaki and ODM leader Odinga moved closer toward negotiations after their respective meetings with assistant secretary of state Jendayi Frazer. It will be interesting to see how Chinese media characterize efforts by the United States to mediate this potentially disastrous humanitarian crisis.
 Japanese prime minister Yasuo Fukuda. Yesterday Japanese prime minister Yasuo Fukuda wrapped up his first visit to China since taking office in September. Chinese media hailed the trip as a perfect conclusion to the series of bilateral exchanges between the two countries during the past year. In the words of Fukuda and his Chinese counterpart, Wen Jiabao, the four-day visit heralded the "arrival of spring" to Sino-Japanese relations.
In Beijing, Fukuda met with the top three Chinese leaders: president Hu Jintao, premier Wen Jiabao, and Wu Bangguo, chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress.
On Saturday, at the gymnasium of the Diaoyutai State Guesthouse, Fukuda and Wen played catch. The carefully staged photo op showed Wen in the same baseball jersey that he wore this past April while playing ball with students of Kyoto’s Ritsumeikan University during his visit to Japan. The back of the uniform bore the number 35, highlighting the fact that this year marks the 35th anniversary of the normalization of relations between the two countries.
The trip also took the Japanese leader to the northeastern port city of Tianjin, a magnet for Japanese investment and a growth engine for north China.
But what appealed to Chinese cultural pride most was Fukuda’s visit to Qufu, a city in the eastern province of Shandong famed for being the birthplace of Confucius. Chinese media noted that the pilgrimage was initiated by the Japanese side, and credited it with giving "depth" to Fukuda’s itinerary. Liberation Daily regarded it as a gesture by the Japanese leader to "show respect" and "to stress the common bond among East Asian civilizations."
That Fukuda happens also to be well versed in The Analects of Confucius did not go unnoticed by Chinese media, which reported that the Japanese prime minister not only sprinkled his speeches with quotes from the Chinese sage, but that during his stay in Qufu he wielded a brush pen and demonstrated his calligraphic skills. It was noted in particular that Fukuda penned the phrase wengu chuangxin (creating things new through learning things old), a slight modification of the famous Confucian maxim wengu zhixin (gaining insights new through learning things old). People’s Daily interpreted this to mean that the two countries are to "take a lesson from history while at the same time looking toward the future."
While coverage given by Chinese media to Fukuda’s visit was overwhelmingly favorable, a discordant note was sounded in an article titled "Japanese prime minister paying respects to Confucius; has Japan absorbed the essence of Confucianism?" The article has been circulating on the websites of various Chinese media outlets, including the Japanese edition of People’s Daily.
Continue reading "Japanese PM Visits China" »
Dmitry Medvedev is being officially nominated today by the congress of United Russia as the ruling party’s candidate for the March 2008 Russian presidential election.
His candidacy, first announced a week ago, has been well received in Beijing, and he was referred to by a spokesman for the Chinese foreign ministry as "a good friend of the Chinese people." Medvedev chaired the Russian committee that recently organized the "theme years" project, which designated 2006 as the "Year of Russia" in China and 2007 as the "Year of China" in Russia.
This past February, Medvedev appeared on People’s Daily Online fielding questions from the Chinese public. In discussing the future of Sino-Russian relations following Putin’s second presidential term, Medvedev stressed the "practical necessity" for bilateral exchanges to continue at a high level. As first deputy prime minister of Russia, he was the highest-ranking foreign dignitary to appear online in the Chinese media.
In December 2005, barely a month after being appointed first deputy prime minister, Medvedev visited Beijing and met with president Hu Jintao in the Great Hall of the People. This fueled speculation at the time that Beijing was taking a special interest in Medvedev, as it was unusual for the Chinese head of state to meet with a foreign deputy prime minister.
Chinese media coverage of Medvedev has been highly favorable. Pundits on China Central Television portrayed Medvedev as "a genteel and thoughtful man" well-equipped to tackle the major issues facing Russia today. These include strengthening the social safety net and narrowing the ever-widening income gap.
In other media reports, Medvedev is characterized as "more trustworthy than Zubkov and more loyal than Ivanov" and therefore the "best guarantor" that Russia will stay on the course mapped out by Putin. It is "necessary" for the "absolutely dependable" Medvedev to succeed Putin because the continuous implementation of the "correct policy" requires "stability," a sentiment often expressed by Chinese leaders when referring to China’s domestic policy.
The 42-year old Medvedev is, however, seen as lacking in experience and in need of the support of a seasoned mentor. Analysts therefore consider president Medvedev and prime minister Putin to be "the best partnership." China Youth Daily notes that the two leaders share "three sames"--being from the same city, having attended the same university, and having the same grand vision for Russia.
Chinese media paid attention also to the December 11 television address in which Medvedev announced his support for Putin to be prime minister while paying tribute to the former KGB officer for reforming Russia’s military:
Russia is different now, much stronger and better off. We are being respected and we are being listened to. We are not being treated as schoolchildren.
Perhaps even more significant is the ample coverage given by Chinese media to a USA Today report quoting a Russian government worker’s observation that "if Putin stays, we will make the United States kneel." The quote initiated much discussion in Chinese cyberspace. While some expressed admiration for the Russian civil servant’s "guts and spunk," others warned of possible "unfortunate consequences" from "forfeiting the democratic process." One posting asked, "If someday the United States is really to kneel at Russia’s feet, who then will be next?"
The Chinese have not taken kindly to Washington’s call for a probe into alleged voting irregularities in the December 2 Russian parliamentary elections, which the Putin-led United Russia party won by a landslide.
The Chinese press attributed United Russia’s victory to the potent combination of Putin’s effective leadership, popular support, and skillful campaign tactics. People’s Daily proclaimed that the win by United Russia is, in fact, the triumph of "Putinism."
The Russian president is portrayed not as a politician seeking to cling to power, but instead as a leader committed to rebuilding his country according to the "Putin Plan," the full implementation of which is expected to take 15-20 years.
The official Xinhua news agency ran on December 6 a commentary titled "Is democracy an 'obedient child'?" The piece, published the same day in Shanghai’s Oriental Morning Post, asks rhetorically:
Is it possible that a leader--even a duly elected one--is regarded as undemocratic simply because he does not comply with the strategic interests of the United States?"
Russia’s democratic transformation, the article contends, had essentially followed a formula advocated by the West, including the use of shock therapy in its economic reforms:
Indeed, "shock therapy" put the Russian economy in a state of shock for more than 10 years. Under Putin’s leadership, however, Russia has come out of a state of weakness, its economy has witnessed accelerated growth, its citizens are better off, and the national spirit has been invigorated. This has led the United States and Westerners to feel that Russia is straying from their idea of democracy.
A recurring theme in Chinese press coverage of the elections is that the United States has lost its ability to influence Russian politics, and that the "Putin course" has led the country on the "road to a renaissance" by departing from a "right-turn" policy modeled after the West.
Continue reading "China's View of American "Soft Power"" »
As Kevin Rudd and his new cabinet are being sworn into office today, Chinese media have given unprecedented coverage to the Australian Labor Party’s victory in the November 24 elections, and to the newly designated prime minister in particular.
Names of Western leaders are typically transliterated into Chinese characters. For example, Bush is referred to in the Chinese press as bu-shi, Blair as bu-lai-er, Brown as bu-lang, and so on. All sound somewhat alien to the Chinese ear.
Kevin Rudd, on the other hand, is known as Lu Kewen, a quintessentially Chinese name that he adopted while studying Chinese language and history at the Australian National University. Rudd endeared himself to the Chinese even more when he mentioned, during a pre-election interview with China Central Television (CCTV) conducted almost entirely in Mandarin, that his three children are all students of the language and his son-in-law is a Chinese-born, naturalized Aussie.
The Chinese take great pride in the fact that the leader of a major Western country speaks their language and has expressed a keen interest in their culture. Rudd’s interview with CCTV is characterized as a conversation that "demonstrated China’s cultural soft power," while the "Lu Kewen phenomenon" is viewed as a reflection of "China’s continuously ascending international clout."
The official Xinhua news agency found it "profoundly significant" that Australia’s "history" finally caught up with its "geography," as its voters ousted John Howard, whose Asia policy was "bogged down in history," and embraced Rudd, the widely acclaimed "China expert" who turned his "Chinese-ness" into a "campaign trump card."
Guangming Daily, run by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, attributed Rudd’s victory to his "forward-looking new thinking."
The gushing enthusiasm, however, is mixed with a certain degree of caution. People’s Daily ran on November 27 an opinion piece titled "Do not rush to label the China-expert prime minister ‘pro-China.’" The story, first published in China Youth Daily, states:
Being a "China expert" is not equivalent to being a "China lover." First and foremost, Lu Kewen is a citizen of Australia; secondly, he is the prime minister of Australia. In the eyes of Westerners, official duties and private affairs are strictly separated. Lu Kewen the "China expert" belongs in the personal realm. Being "prime minister" is Kevin Rudd’s official duty. We expect him to improve his country’s relations with China. But we cannot expect too much.
At an APEC lunch in Sydney this past September, then-opposition leader Rudd upstaged prime minister Howard by addressing Chinese president Hu Jintao in Mandarin. Howard, who had just inked a $45 billion gas deal with Hu, was left to listen to a translation of Rudd expressing his love for China and its culture.
The following day, Rudd and Hu held a 30-minute meeting conducted entirely in Mandarin. So impressed was Hu that he told Rudd: "You speak perfect Chinese and you know China inside out."
In his victory speech on November 24, Rudd referred to the United States as Australia’s "great friend and ally." Australia’s friends across Asia and the Pacific were characterized not as "allies," but instead as "partners." An indicator, perhaps, that Kevin Rudd, aka Lu Kewen, really does know China inside out.
Last Friday’s vote by Russia’s upper house of parliament to suspend compliance with the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty was characterized by official Chinese media as bringing "the Russo-American wrestle over strategic security to a critical phase."
Chinese media have followed the controversy closely since July, when Putin announced plans to suspend Russian participation in the treaty, which limits the number of conventional weapons deployed between the Atlantic and the Ural Mountains.
A November 7 Xinhua report cites "NATO’s continuous eastward expansion and U.S. plans to deploy a missile defense system in the Czech Republic and Poland" as a factor contributing to the unanimous vote one day earlier by the Duma, the lower house of the Russian parliament, to suspend CFE participation. The report ends by noting that while the Russian parliament had in 2004 ratified a 1999 revised version of the CFE treaty, not a single member of NATO has yet done so.
Conspicuously absent from the Xinhua report is any mention of NATO’s conditions for ratifying the treaty. These include withdrawal of Russian military forces from Georgia and Moldova. (Russian forces just completed their withdrawal from Georgia last week.)
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