Afghanistan's president raised quite a few eyebrows yesterday when he insisted he would provide safe passage to senior Taliban leaders for negotiations, including Taliban supreme leader Mullah Omar. The Taliban responded immediately to Karzai's offer, rejecting it of course.

Mullah Bahadar, the Taliban's second-in-command, insisted NATO forces must leave. "As long as foreign occupiers remain in Afghanistan, we aren't ready for talks because they hold the power and talks won't bear fruit," he told Reuters. "The problems in Afghanistan are because of them."

Taliban spokesman Zabiullah Mujahid also weighed in. "The Taliban's (leadership) decided they will not take part in any peace talks with Karzai or Karzai's administration until such a day when foreign forces leave Afghanistan," he told the Associated Press. "The Taliban will pursue jihad against foreign forces and (Karzai's) government."

Combined with other rejections of offers to talk, it is safe to say the senior Taliban leadership has no interest in negotiations. So why did Karzai make the offer? Slate's Fred Kaplan comes close to figuring it out:

Two inferences can be made from [Karzai's offers to talk to Omar]. First, Karzai is not really proposing anything; Omar has no interest in negotiating for peace, and Karzai certainly knows this. Second, he made the remarks in Kabul after returning from a meeting in London, so he may have meant them for domestic consumption—as a demonstration that he's not a puppet of the West.

There is another component to this: Karzai has to show the Afghan people he has repeatedly offered the olive branch to the Taliban, and that it is the Taliban leadership that refuses to sit down and talk.

Kaplan then asks if there are any Taliban that can be turned. The answer is yes, but the current focus on peeling off low mid-level Taliban leader and their fighters is not a new effort. In may of 2005, the Afghan government established the Tahkim-e-Solh program (Strengthening Peace) that did just that.

I saw this program in action in June of 2006 when I was embedded with the Canadian Army in Kandahar. The Canadians coaxed a Taliban leader named Mullah Ibrahim, who was influential in the Panjwai and Zari districts, the birthplace of the Taliban. At the time, the Strengthening Peace program had peeled off 1,569 low and mid-level Taliban leaders and fighters over the course of a year.

So the effort to pull in the rank and file of the Taliban really is nothing new. So what changed? The media has finally started to pay attention to Afghanistan after years of dwelling on Iraq. And so has the U.S. military.

Over the weekend, the Pakistani government closed down the vital border crossing to Afghanistan in the Khyber tribal agency. The decision was made after the Taliban hijacked and looted a convoy of vehicles transporting supplies and two Humvees to NATO forces in Afghanistan. The crossing was reopened today after Pakistan said it would provide military escorts for the convoys.

Attacks on NATO convoys have risen dramatically the past month. More than 70 percent of NATO’s supplies pass through Khyber, making this route the key supply line for our forces in Afghanistan. With the Taliban insurgency in Pakistan’s northwest worsening, NATO’s main supply route will increasingly be threatened.

The United States is looking for alternate routes, but these come at a cost: poor infrastructure along the alternate routes in the central Asian countries or China. Plus, the United States would have to rely on Russian or China to keep its troops in Afghanistan supplied. The reliance on these rivals for our lifeline to Afghanistan will come at a cost in other theaters vital to the United States’ national security.

There is much talk of a “surge” for Afghanistan to deal with the spiraling violence and the resurgence of the Taliban. Some experts, such as David Kilcullen, say we don’t need a surge in forces, but need to rethink how we are using our forces in Afghanistan. No matter what the answer is, until we secure our supply lines through Pakistan, the U.S. and NATO forces currently there are in danger of being choked off. Richard Fernandez sums up this problem well:

The two major issues raised by the situation are 1) the future of Pakistan’s ability to keep its territorial integrity and 2) the viability of the lines of communication between Pakistan and Afghanistan. It’s no use talking about a Surge in Afghanistan if the supply lines to the sea are largely cut. Pakistan has to be fixed first.

The Pentagon is planning to expand the number of air bases in the remote regions of Afghanistan’s south and east, USA Today reports. The bases will allow the U.S. military to sortie more of the deadly unmanned Predator and Reaper aircraft that provide surveillance and striking power for U.S. forces in Afghanistan. The bases are needed “particularly in the rugged mountain area near the border with Pakistan” as the region “has seen some of the toughest fighting for U.S. troops.”

The article focuses on using the Predators and Reapers to support U.S. and allied forces in Afghanistan, but the USA Today misses the elephant in the room. The U.S. military and CIA have been conducting covert airstrikes into Pakistan’s lawless tribal areas that border eastern Afghanistan, primarily with unmanned Predators and Reapers. The strikes have skyrocketed over the past year after President Bush loosened the restrictions on striking inside Pakistan. U.S. intelligence is deeply concerned the next attack on the West will be hatched in Pakistan’s tribal areas.

The United States has conducted at least 28 airstrikes and cross-border attacks in Pakistan in during 2008 (you can see the current list here). Twenty-one of these attacks have occurred between Aug. 31 and Nov. 7. At least four senior al Qaeda leaders have been killed in these attacks. In comparison, there were only 10 recorded strikes during 2006 and 2007 combined.

The big question is whether or not President-elect Barack Obama will continue the current policy of hitting al Qaeda and their Taliban allies inside Pakistan. The Pakistani government has already implored Obama to halt the attacks. Obama has run on a platform that emphasizes a kinder, gentler foreign policy that stresses diplomacy. He also promised to be aggressive inside Pakistan. He will soon learn that being “liked” and “respected” by the international community often conflicts with vital U.S. national security interests.

President-elect Obama's most confounding national security challenge may not lie with our enemies, but rather our allies.

Michael Yon writes

Most of our allies are not very helpful. With the exception of the British, Canadians, Dutch, and a few others such as the Aussies, we are not fighting this with an “A-team” of international allies. With a few exceptions, our allies on the ground are comprised of several dozen countries that mostly refuse to fight. The bulk of NATO amounts to little more than a “Taliban piñata.” The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is proving nearly worthless and provides no credible threat to armed opposition groups (AOGs) in Afghanistan. Most of the NATO member countries seem to break out in a cold sweat at the mere mention of “Taliban.” They piled in when the war looked easy and largely humanitarian. But now that it’s getting harder and more dangerous, they would like to pile out.

In addition, Obama will have to figure out a way to harden the softening alliance against a newly aggressive Russian Bear. The invasion of Georgia, much like Afghanistan, forced NATO to take a hard look inward. The same western European member states vetoed the assimilation of Georgia into the treaty organization--a move that ultimately led to the Russian invasion of South Ossetia--also have refused to engage the enemy in Afghanistan.

Nearly all of the NATO nations spend less than 2 percent on defense, compared to the United States' 4 percent. The British Admiralty is in a state of open revolt with the Labour government over their neglect of the Royal Navy. German Special Forces--constrained by politicians at home--have been forced to let high-value Taliban commanders slip away. And French carrier based fighters take the weekends off.

The alliance is weak. Defense bureaucrats at home know it. Our enemies know it. So here's hoping that Obama can forge all of that newfound goodwill abroad into steely determination on the battlefield.

On the heels of a successful mission in Kandahar, which cleared the area of hundreds of Taliban fighters, U.S. and Afghan forces dealt a second major blow to insurgents in the past week:

U.S.-led forces rained fire for two days on militants near Afghanistan's border with Pakistan, officials said Monday, killing about 55 insurgents and underscoring how fighting with Taliban insurgents is escalating.

The battle in eastern Paktika province was the second in the past week to reportedly inflict major casualties on militants, whom Afghan officials insist are swarming in from strongholds in Pakistan.

Pakistan's government on Monday reiterated an offer to fence the craggy, 1,500-mile frontier--a project begun but abandoned last year amid criticism that it would only enrage the tribes who straddle the frontier and among whom the Taliban find many recruits.

Yes, why would anyone risk upsetting the terrorists by building a wall to keep them away? Until President Karzai dismisses such frivolous concerns, successful battles will not translate into long-term stability.