May 19, 2008 • Vol. 13, No. 34
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From Centcom:
Use silenced guns to kill Coalition forces at Iraqi security checkpoints, smuggle weapons in gradual shipments to reduce the risk of detection, and poison Iraq’s water supply with nitric acid to spread disease and death.
Such tactics were fleshed out in a terrorist letter intended for Abu Ayyub al-Masri, the foreign-born leader of al-Qaida in Iraq. But the document never reached Masri. Instead, Coalition forces lifted it from the body of a terrorist they killed last month during an operation 30 miles northwest of Baghdad.
The slain terrorist and author of the 11-page missive was Abu Safyan, from Diyala, Iraq, according to military officials who made available all but two pages deemed “not releasable” on the Multi-National Force - Iraq Web site.
Now while that sounds like a nasty recipe for death and destruction, there's plenty of good news in between the lines there (besides the fact that the note was plucked from the body of a dead tango).
First, al Qaeda is acknowledging that the tactics which sustained them since 2003 have been rendered obsolete by General Petraeus. Second, they are reacting to us, instead of us reacting to them. Last, while al Qaeda's tactics appear to be changing, they continue to cling to the same failed strategy of death and destruction. That battleplan succeeded in landing an additional 28,000 American troops on Iraqi soil and turning almost the entire population of Iraq against al Qaeda's foreign jihadists--it's an objectively bad strategy.
Earlier this week, much hay was made when an Iraqi Army company deserted its position in Sadr City. The next day, the New York Times interviewed an Iraqi Army company commander, also from Sadr City, who left his unit to take leave and speculated he may not come back. In two days, the narrative for the Iraqi Army and U.S. military incursion is set: The Iraqi Army is falling apart.
Both of these stories get a feature-length report, while successes of the Iraqi Army are relegated to single paragraph throwaways. Buried in the April 16 story is the fact that an Iraqi company was rushed into Sadr City to take the place of the deserting company. In today’s New York Times, Michael Gordon writes about the wall being built to partition Sadr City. Buried in the article, we learn that the Mahdi Army assaulted a police station and the Iraqi forces were running low on ammunition. As the U.S. military prepared to reinforce the position, the Iraqi Army beat them to the punch:
The militias’ main effort on Thursday was focused on dislodging Iraqi forces from a police station. American advisers took up positions with the Iraqi unit.
As the fighting intensified and there were reports that militia fighters had closed to within 100 yards, Colonel Barnett moved tanks into position so they could rush to the Iraqis’ aid. Stryker vehicles also moved forward.
But two Iraqi T-72s and four other Iraqi armored vehicles arrived on the scene before the American tanks were needed. The Iraqi Army has rushed ammunition to Sadr City, including machine-gun rounds and rocket-propelled grenades to give its units more firepower and address complaints of shortages.
Moving armor into Sadr City while under fire is no small feat, particularly for the young Iraqi Army. The Iraqi Army outperformed their American betters on that day. Isn’t that worth a headline as well? There is certainly nothing wrong with reporting the defection of the Iraqi company on April 16, although the context of the story was seriously flawed. But when the Iraqi Army exceeds its expectations, that is news as well, and it should be treated in the same manner.
We are continually told how the Iraqi government was beaten and humiliated in Basra after it launched an offensive to clear the Mahdi Army and other Iranian-backed Shia militias from the city. Yet when the Iraqi Army announced it was going to dismiss the approximately 1,300 soldiers and police who either failed to carry out their duty or openly defected to the Mahdi Army, Muqtada al Sadr pleaded that they be allowed to keep their jobs and even be "rewarded for their loyalty."
In the process of asking for his infiltrators' jobs back--men who disobeyed their chain of command and either deserted or fought government forces--Sadr proves that he in fact ordered Iraqi soldiers and police to turn on their government. Sadr said these men "were only obeying their grand religious leaders" and "were driven by their religious duties."
Sadr clearly believes a soldier's loyalties should be to his militia, party, and cleric first, and the state second. The Iraqi military and government should squash this mindset immediately, and prosecute those who defected or abandoned their posts to the fullest extent of the law. The officers specifically should be made examples.
Four days after the Iraqi government, with the backing of the full spectrum of the political parties, moved to bar the Sadrist movement from running in provincial elections if it failed to disband the Mahdi Army, Muqtada al Sadr received yet another blow, this time from the clerical establishment. Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, the senior most Shia cleric in Iraq, has said Sadr should disarm his Mahdi Army as “the law is the only authority in the country.”
Sistani, who has been loath to weigh in on political issues over the past, has clearly backed Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki and his government’s offensive in Basra. With the political parties in line and Sistani backing him, Maliki is now moving to enforce the edict that Basra be free of heavy and medium weapons in the hands of militias.
The media was quick to call the Basra offensive a major failure for Maliki and his government and continues to do so. Yet Sadr was the one who declared a ceasefire and withdrew his forces from the streets, Sadr will be barred from elections if he doesn’t disband the Mahdi Army, and the Iraqi military is now moving to disarm his militia. All the while, his forces are being targeted in Baghdad. And Sadr was also forced to cancel a planned demonstration in Baghdad after moving the location from Najaf to Baghdad earlier in the week. Sadr claimed the Iraqi security forces blocked the movement of his people, but Sadr’s past demonstrations have had poor showings.
Sadr faces a real dilemma over the next few weeks. If he chooses to keep the Mahdi Army, he has become an official enemy of the state and his political party will be neutered. The U.S. will back the Maliki government in a move against the Mahdi Army. If he chooses to disband Mahdi, he will also be significantly weakened. Many Sadrists and Mahdi Army commanders already resent the ceasefire. Sadr can only hope for some sort of negotiated settlement. But the Maliki government is operating from a position of strength, not weakness.
So again, how did Sadr benefit from the confrontation in Basra?
Multinational Forces Iraq released statistics on the improving security situation and the current level of violence in Iraq, al Qaeda in Iraq’s area of operations, and the development of the Iraqi security forces. Violence in Iraq continues to drop as the Iraqi security forces increasingly take responsibility for security. Al Qaeda’s safe havens in Iraq continue to decrease as the terror groups is isolated in largely rural areas in the north. Mosul remains a major hub for al Qaeda activity.
Click the image to view the information presented in General David Petraeus and Ambassador Ryan Crocker’s testimony to Congress on the security and political situation in Iraq. General Patraeus and Ambassador Crocker's testimony is also available below, in PDf format.
General Petraeus’ testimony [PDF].
Ambassador Ryan Crocker’s testimony[PDF].
Kimberly Kagan has an excellent article in the Wall Street Journal on Iran's involvement in Iraq and the recent fighting in Basra. In the article, she notes that Iran's Qods Force was instrumental in drafting Sadr's cease-fire. She also notes that Muqtada al Sadr demanded the release of Qais Qazali, the leader of the Qazali Network, the primary group behind the Special Groups. It turns out this isn't the first time someone has demanded Qazali be released.
In November 2007, the Iranian-backed terrorists of the Special Groups, which Sadr claims to have no association with, have demanded Qazali be released. They offered to exchange five British citizens working in Baghdad earlier in the year for Qazali. The US military, which is holding Qazali, has refused to release him. The fate of the British hostages remains unknown.
Sadr is often portrayed as an Iraqi nationalist because his father was purportedly murdered by Saddam Hussein and his family remained in Iraq during Saddam's rule while other Shia parties such as Dawa and ISCI sheltered in Iran. Yet Sadr is clearly taking direction from Qods Force, and asked for the release of a Qods Force agent behind attacks on Iraqis and the kidnapping of British citizens. Sadr's attempts to distance himself from the Special Groups and Iran become difficult to believe under these circumstances.
| | Iraqi Army applicants wait outside the army recruitment center in Basra, 550 km (340 miles) south of Baghdad on April 1, 2008. About 1,000 men from the southern cities of Basra, Amarah, and Nasiriyah trooped to the recruiting center in Basrah to apply to be government soldiers.
Reuters photograph. |
Just two days after Muqtada al Sadr declared a cease-fire and withdrew his fighters from the streets of Basra, Baghdad, and elsewhere, the Iraqi Army held a recruiting drive in Basra. Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki stated his intent is to raise over 10,000 police and soldiers to help secure the city. Over 1,000 Iraqis showed up on the first day of recruiting to join the security forces. As a good friend told me the other day: "Since when to people rush to join a losing Army?"
This is not to say the Iraqi military was victorious in Basra. Michael Gordon does a great job of showing the limitations of the Iraqi government and its military's planning and logistical capacity as evidenced by the Basra operation, as well as the Iraqi Army's increasing proficiency in redeploying its forces and using its nascent air forces to resupply the mission. The Basra operation certainly had mixed results, as the Kagans ably pointed out. But it is premature to declare Sadr victorious.
Shouldn't journalist ask the simple question of why Iraqis in the South are flocking to join the Iraqi Army if Sadr dealt it such a decisive defeat? Perhaps the Iraqi perceptions of the operation are different from our own.
Long before the start of the Iraqi offensive against the Mahdi Army and the associated Iranian-backed Special Groups in Basra, pundits had been bending over backwards to claim Muqtada al Sadr is an Iraqi nationalist with no ties to Iran. As Matthew Duss wrote, "the repeated attempts by conservative defenders of Bush’s Iraq policy to dispute Sadr's nationalist credentials and treat him as an Iranian puppet indicate a real and troubling lack of knowledge of the Iraqi political scene, and of Sadr’s place within it." Such claims have been made despite the fact that Sadr is sheltering in Qom to study the Iranian strain of theocratic Shia Islam known as wilayet al-faqeeh. Sadr’s Mahdi Army has also been caught red-handed with Iranian made weapons, and there's ample evidence that Hezbollah and Iran’s Qods Force have trained his militia.
Today, McClatchy Newspapers pens an article that should blow the doors off any notion that Sadr is not in the Iranian sphere of influence. Sadr was apparently persuaded to issue yesterday’s order to end hostilities after Iraqi lawmakers lobbied the commander of Qods Force and accused Sadr of inciting the violence and using Iranian-made weapons to attack the people of Iraq.
The backdrop to Sadr's dramatic statement was a secret trip Friday by Iraqi lawmakers to Qom, Iran's holy city and headquarters for the Iranian clergy who run the country.
There the Iraqi lawmakers held talks with Brig. Gen. Qassem Suleimani, commander of the Qods (Jerusalem) brigades of Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps and signed an agreement with Sadr, which formed the basis of his statement Sunday, members of parliament said.
Ali al Adeeb, a member of Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki's Dawa party, and Hadi al Ameri, the head of the Badr Organization, the military wing of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, had two aims, lawmakers said: to ask Sadr to stand down his militia and to ask Iranian officials to stop supplying weapons to Shiite militants in Iraq.
Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki, who has been accused of receiving his marching orders from Iran, refuses to abide by the Iranian diktat. Maliki has said Iraqi security forces will continue operations to target anyone who fails to comply with Sadr’s order, and has demanded that the Mahdi Army surrender its medium and heavy weapons. The Iraqi military, for its part, is moving more forces to Basra. The Mahdi Army has taken significant casualties in Baghdad, Basra, and the greater South after seven days of fighting.
| | Click to view the slideshow of the Spear Brigade in Western Mosul. |
Some of the heaviest fighting in Mosul has occurred in the western neighborhoods of the city. Al Qaeda in Iraq and its terrorist allies fought pitched battles with Iraqi and U.S. forces there earlier this year in an attempt to prevent the security forces from establishing outposts in the city. Al Qaeda conducted suicide car and vest attacks as well as RPG and small arms attacks as the troops attempted to build these bases and checkpoints. The soldiers of the 2nd Brigade of the 2nd Iraqi Army division, led by Brigadier General Taha Askar, the Iraqi police, and the U.S. soldiers of the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment fought through the attacks and have since established a foothold in the neighborhood.
Attacks are still up in Mosul, but the attacks are less effective than in the past. Catastrophic IED attacks are the exception, not the norm. Multiple clear and hold operations are being conducted as the Iraqi and U.S. security forces work to consolidate their gains, but reconstruction in the western part of the city is lagging. This slideshow looks at the Spear Brigade and their U.S. advisors in action in western Mosul.
Mosul, Iraq
The Military Transition Teams (MTTs) in Mosul are slated to receive the new MRAPs. While the MTT advisers are looking forward to receiving the new vehicles, one major issue is the shear size of the vehicles. The Iraqis run their electrical lines across the streets in hap-hazard fashion, and the lines are often no higher than 12 feet off of the ground. The new, taller MRAPs are about 15 to 20 feet in height, including the gunner’s turrets, and they will wreak havoc on the makeshift electrical lines in Mosul. The MRAPs pictured above are fitted with the antenna tie-downs, which are designed to allow the electrical lines to glide over the vehicles, however if there isn’t enough slack in the lines, they can be broken, causing bad relations with the locals in the city. The size of the MRAPs may limit the MTT’s ability to go into the neighborhood to accompany their Iraqi counterparts on missions.
More evidence that AQI gravely miscalculated in their decision to take the fight to the Iraqi people:
Information gleaned from 48 foreign fighters detained in Iraq offers insight into al Qaeda’s methods, a Multinational Force Iraq spokesman told reporters during a briefing today in Baghdad.
“The foreign detainees told similar stories about what happened to them once they were smuggled into Iraq,” said Navy Rear Adm. Greg Smith, director of Multinational Force Iraq’s communication division.
“These 48 men told us they were lured here with the promise they would be killing Americans … but they were disappointed that most of the violence they saw was directed at the Iraqi people … fellow Muslims,” Smith said.
It's intensely satisfying to hear that Iraq has become an unrelenting hellhole.... for insurgents. Hated everywhere they go, and constantly dodging devastating American firepower, it's no wonder that AQI has to church up the old recruiting pamphlets in order to keep the warm bodies flowing.
Though the detainees described their upbringing as religious, but not extremist, they were drawn in by al Qaeda recruiters after seeing what Smith described as heavily edited videos depicting Americans allegedly abusing Iraqis and al Qaeda attacks on Americans.
After harsh treatment at the hands of their al Qaeda handlers in Iraq, and learning that the truth had been shaded, most said they just wanted to go home, Smith said. However, their handlers, who had confiscated their passports and money, pressured them to become suicide bombers.
“They were told, ‘This is your duty. This is what you can do for the jihad. You will be a martyr. This is what we need you to do,’” Smith said. “Ironically they were relieved having been captured by the very Americans their recruiters said they would kill in Iraq.”
Though I'm sure it wasn't deliberate, al Qaeda forgot to include this tidbit in the recruiting pitch:
Smith said the fact remains that about 90 percent of foreign fighters in Iraq become suicide bombers.
That figure smacks of desperation.
Click the photograph to view the slideshow of Iraqi soldiers in the
4th Brigade conducting training at Forward Operating Base Lion.
While the Iraqi Army is fighting a brutal insurgency in Mosul, the 4th Brigade of the 2nd Division is working to train its soldiers. This slideshow looks at some of the brigade-level training the 4th Brigade conducts for its new recruits before they go to basic training. The Iraqi sergeants are merciless in their discipline.
Click to view the slideshow.
Mosul, Iraq
The 2nd Iraqi Army Division is considered one of the most mature and effective formations in the Iraqi security forces. Led by the charismatic Major General Mouta’a, the division operates in Mosul and throughout Ninewa province. The Iraqi Ministry of Defense recently established the Ninewa Operational Command under the command of Lieutenant General Riyad to coordinate Army, police, and intelligence operations in the northern province.
While the idea of the Ninewa Operational Command coordinating operations between the disparate security forces is largely welcomed, the new command is seen as a burden by some Iraqi officers in the 2nd Division. The Ninewa Operational Command has failed to secure needed resources for operations in Mosul, such as materials needed to build the Riyad line, the berm, and checkpoints around the city. The new command has also caused friction in the ranks of the 2nd Division by accusing officers of incompetence or corruption, and has pressed for a Baghdad counterinsurgency model when some elements of that strategy may not work well in Mosul, according to several Iraqi officers. The command is viewed as just another layer in the failing bureaucracy of the Ministry of Defense.
The Ninewa Operational Command has also bled the division of needed resources. The command took over Tiger Base, a combat outpost in southwestern Mosul, to set up its command center, and absorbed almost a full battalion to serve as its base security and quick reaction force. This has hampered the 2nd Division’s operations in the city.
The command also barred Iraqi officers from talking on the television or radio, insisting all communications go through its own public affairs people. “Before we could communicate with the people,” Mouta’a said Forward Operating Base Marez. “Now with the Ninewa Operational Command we are not permitted to talk with the people.” Mouta’a explained he would frequently appeal to the residents of Mosul to provide tips on insurgent activity and cooperate with security forces. “Now I receive calls asking me why I am not talking to the people and telling me this has hurt confidence,” Mouta’a said.
But U.S. officers say the problems between the Ninewa Operational Command and subordinate units will work themselves out over time. The Iraqi Army sees value in elements of the Riyad Line, as controlling traffic into Mosul is needed to prevent insurgents from moving materials into the city. The decision to place the Iraqi police in the central neighborhoods of Mosul and the Iraqi Army in the outer neighborhoods is also welcomed.
This slideshow looks at a day with the 2nd Iraqi Army Division and the Ninewa Operational Command in Mosul. Also, General Jack Keane and Colonel HR McMasters dropped by in Mosul for a briefing.
Click image to view slideshow.
On March 14, Brigadier General Noor Aldeen and the Military Transition Team for the 4th Brigade, 2nd Iraqi Army Division toured the combat outposts owned by the 2nd Battalion, which is commanded by Colonel Hajji. The 2nd Battalion does not have US advisors assigned to it, but the battalion is considered the best in the brigade. Colonel Hajji is an aggressive commander who takes the initiative, the US advisors stated. He also leaves much of the planning work for his staff to complete, which is a rarity in Iraq’s top-down leadership model that often stifles innovation by junior officers. This slideshow will show some of the outposts in the 2nd Battalion’s area of operations in eastern Mosul.
Click to view slideshow
On March 11, the 2nd Battalion, 4th Brigade, 2nd Iraqi Army Division stopped a car in the Al Bakir neighborhood in Mosul, Iraq. After searching the car, the Iraqi Army found six improvised explosive devices (IEDs, or roadside bombs). The driver has been detained and the Iraqi Army is now looking for the bomb factory. This slideshow looks at an IED created by terrorists in Mosul.
The Iraqi Army continues to push its troops into the neighborhoods to counter al Qaeda in Iraq and its allied terror groups’ attempts to regain a foothold in the northern city of Mosul. The 4th Brigade of the 2nd Iraqi Army Division opened its newest combat outpost, called Knife, in the northern neighborhood of Rashidiyah, where attacks have increased of late. The 4th Brigade pushed out to Knife today to host a visit by Brigadier General Tony Thomas, the deputy commander for Multinational Division North, and Brigadier General Mouta’a , the 2nd Iraqi Army Division commander.
While waiting for the generals to show (they were a few hours late) there was little to do but smoke cigarettes and shoot the breeze. One intrepid soldier pulled a soccer ball from a Humvee, and the Iraqi soldiers and one of the U.S. advisors began to kick the ball around. Even Brigadier General Noor Aldeen, the 4th Brigade's commander, joined in for a bit. The soldiers played in full body armor. I was unable to capture any headers on film.
The Iraqi Army still has plenty of work to do before it can sustain independent operations, but their ability to plan and execute brigade-level operations in the city of Mosul was apparent during an operation with the 4th Brigade, 2nd Iraqi Army Division on March 9. The target was the kidnapping cells behind the recent spate of kidnappings in Mosul, including the Chaldean Archbishop. I wrote more about this at The Long War Journal. Below are some photos from the operation.
Brigadier General Noor Aldeen briefs the staff.
The Brigade leadership and the Military Tranistion Team does a pre-convoy briefing.
Iraqi soldier prep to roll out the gate of Forward Operating Base Lion.
The Iraqi Army convoy in Mosul.
A OH-58D Kiowa Warrior over the Al Noor neighborhood.
And Iraqi soldier hands a child a Beanie Baby.
Brigadier General Noor Aldeen at the end of the operation.
As luck would have it, I didn't have to wait any longer than six hours to catch a flight from Baghdad to Mosul. I saw a Mosul flight on the board at the passenger terminal and signed up for Space A, or Space Availability seating. It turned out that the flight was empty: I shared a C-130 with an Army Master Sergeant. The flight crew outnumbered us by two to one. The Master Sergeant and I racked out on the web-netting seats. The flight to Mosul was two hours, which made total time traveled from Washington, D.C., to Mosul, Iraq, just under 24 hours. The Military Transition Team wasn’t expecting me to get here until Monday--and neither was I.
I’m currently with the Military Transition Team for the 4th Brigade, 2nd Iraqi Army Division, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Eric Price. The 4/2 Iraqi Army Brigade is based out of Forward Operating Base Lion in northeastern Mosul. The accommodations here are unlike anything I’ve experienced during embeds in Anbar and southern Baghdad Province, or in Baghdad itself. The Military Transition Team is based out of one of Saddam Hussein’s palaces, but that isn’t what is unusual. We have running water, real toilets, a shower, and a washer and dryer. I have a spacious room, with a bed that was made for me. They even bought me a new pillow. While the Military Transition Team lives among the Iraqis, their living conditions are far better than the U.S. Army has at any forward operating base or camp I have visited in either Iraq or Afghanistan.
The 4/2 Iraqi Army Brigade controls a large swath of northern and eastern Mosul, and its companies are being deployed into Combat Outposts throughout the city. Some of the outposts are jointly manned with U.S. troops, others are manned solely by Iraqis. Brigadier General Noor Aldeen, the 4/2 Iraqi Army Brigade commander, set up a new outpost in the city on his own initiative today, without the support of U.S. soldiers or engineers. More outposts are planned as the Iraqi Army and police use a similar counterinsurgency strategy that secured Ramadi, Falluja, and Baghdad last year.
More to come…
Looking out the window on a night flight into Baghdad, you would hardly know there is a war going on. Iraq appears deceptively peaceful during the flight from Kuwait into Baghdad. The lights from cities and towns are clearly visible, as is the excess gas burned off from refineries in the South.
As the flight approaches Baghdad, the size of the city becomes apparent. Baghdad is a sprawling city stretching miles and miles along the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. As we approach Baghdad International Airport, some neighborhoods become visible. The grid of Sadr City in the northeast stands out, as does the Green Zone. Baghdad is lit up like a Christmas tree.
The only indication that you are entering a country at war is the rapid, corkscrew-like descent the plane takes on its approach to landing. This approach is often described in very harrowing terms, but the fact is I've taken my kids on amusement park rides that pulled more Gs. The approach is a little unorthodox, but certainly not terrifying.
As anyone who has flown into Iraq using military transport can attest, the process can be long and grueling. After arriving in Kuwait, you need to meet the Public Affairs Officer and turn over you passport for processing (which can take 24 hours or more to complete). You'll wait at Ali Al Salem, the military airbase, where there is little to do but eat fast food and hang out at the internet cafe. After getting your passport back, you have sign up for a space available flight into Baghdad. Flights are occasionally canceled, causing further delays. Military personnel moving into theater have priority in seating. This process can take anywhere from two to five days after touching down in Kuwait or longer if you get bumped from your flight.
There are ways around this. You can take a civilian flight into the civilian side of Baghdad International Airport (known as BIAP), but then you have to clear Iraqi customs. As of last year, the Iraqi government required you to get an AIDS test to enter the country. If you are going to embed with the U.S. military, you will also need to arrange transportation to the military side of the airport in order to get to your destinations beyond Baghdad.
But the best option, in my experience, is to fly Gryphon Air Services. Gryphon provides a direct flight from Kuwait into Baghdad and is the only civilian airline that lands on the military side of BIAP. If you fly the United Airlines flight from Washington, DC, you'll hop off the plane, the Gryphon staff will transfer your bags to their flight, and you'll board the plane in less than two hours.
During the flight, you get something to drink, a sandwich, and a bag of chips. Incidentally, this is more that I received on the short hop on United from Philadelphia to DC. And if you fly a U.S. Air Force flight from Kuwait to Baghdad, the odds are you'll take a C-130, packed into the cargo hold, sitting in web netting seats knee to knee with a soldier across from you.
Two hours after leaving Kuwait, you arrive in Baghdad. The total travel time from DC to Baghdad, including the short transfer in Kuwait, is a little over 15 hours. When you touch down, you are at the military Passenger Terminal Annex (PAX), where you can arrange for your transportation to points in Baghdad and beyond.
The flight isn't cheap--a little over $600 one way--but the time you save from bypassing the challenges associated with flying military air quickly makes up for the cost.
Now, with a little luck, I'll be in Mosul in 12 hours, where I'll embed with a U.S. Army Military Transition Team and their Iraqi Army counterparts inside the City.
(Check back for daily updates from Roggio. --ed.)
Finally, there is an Iraq war demonstration that we can support.
Three retired Army officers who have recently returned from Iraq have just embarked on the Resolve to Win March: a 16-day, 400-mile walk from South Carolina to Washington, D.C., to show support for our troops and their efforts in Iraq (H/T Hugh Hewitt). The vets are blogging their inspiring journey. One of the vets, Dennis McCool, who also served in Vietnam, wrote:
The purpose is to demonstrate resolve to do a difficult task and to create a dialogue about our National "Will to Win". We firmly believe that you can not support the Troops without supporting the Mission which the Troops are asked to give their lives for. The Troops are resolved to win and over 3900 brave men and women have sacrificed their lives for America and for victory. Sacrificing your life demonstrates the greatest possible sacrifice and resolve. The march will cover over 400 miles, but if it were not incredibly challenging, it would mean nothing.
The purpose of this march is quite different than other Iraq war protests we've seen over the years, in which protesters pretend to be killed servicemen and denounce the mission in Iraq. In fact, one such demonstration, the 5 Years Too Many march, will take place in our nation's capital three days after the Resolve to Win vets arrive. These marchers describe their less-than-honorable purpose:
We know there are key pillars of support that enable this illegal and immoral war for oil and global domination to continue. On March 19th we will take nonviolent direct action to disrupt each of these key pillars in Washington DC and in communities across this country.
It's easy to see which demonstrators really support the troops--and which think of them as "illegal and immoral" actors. It's also interesting to see Barack Obama supporters use the same rhetoric--on Obama's official website--as the anti-troops marchers.
The fictitious leader of al Qaeda's Islamic State of Iraq, Abu Omar al Baghdadi, has issued a new audiotape. Instead of addressing the very real problems his organization faces in Iraq--dwindling membership, defections, the Sunnis turning against them, a shrinking base of operation--“Baghdadi” (who is really an actor serving as a mouthpiece for al Qaeda in Iraq’s leader Abu Ayyub al Masri) addresses the Palestinians.
In the 30-minute tape, Baghdadi/Masri threatened to use Iraq as a staging area to attack Israel and criticized Palestinian terrorist groups for failing to free Jerusalem from Israeli control. Baghdadi/Masri also singled out Hamas for “for failing to liberate the Palestinians” and called on the Al Qassam Brigades, Hamas’ “armed wing,” to break away from the group and join al Qaeda. The AP reports:
In the latest audiotape, al-Baghdadi also threatened moderate Palestinians, saying that jihad makes "no distinctions between the infidel Jews and the renegade Palestinians ... between (Israeli Prime Minister Ehud) Olmert and his criminals and (Palestinian President Mahmoud) Abbas and his gang."
He called the state of Israel a "wicked germ sown in the (Palestinian) nation's body which should be uprooted, even if the traitors signed thousands of surrender treaties." Much of the audiotape was devoted to threats against Hamas political leaders "who betrayed the nation and turned against the blood of the martyrs," al-Baghdadi said, also saying that Hamas has been pressuring its military wing not to stage rocket attacks on Israel but to accept a truce.
Al-Baghdadi called for "opening new fronts to ease the American and Jewish pressure off the Palestinians while bolstering the fronts in Iraq and Afghanistan." He urged every "working Muslim to spare 2 dollars a month, half of it would go to our Palestinian brothers and the other half to finance other fronts."
As for attacks on Israel, al-Baghdadi said the "Islamic state in Iraq will be the cornerstone for the return of Al-Quds" and added the group was trying to use Iraq's western province of al-Anbar as a launching pad for missiles against Israel--the same way the late Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein fired 31 missiles against the Jewish state in the Gulf War. "The Jews and the Americans have realized this and tried by all means to prevent us from achieving this target including the fierce campaign on al-Anbar, knowing that it is easy to fire missiles on Israel from some parts there," al-Baghdadi said.
Al Masri’s call to expand the fight beyond Iraq is curious as his terror group has lost significant ground in its former terror strongholds of Anbar, Diyala, Baghdad, and Salahadin provinces. Iraqi and U.S. forces are massing in Mosul in Ninewa province to take on al Qaeda remnants attempting to regroup there. Iraqi and U.S. forces are currently pursuing al Qaeda holdouts in southern Baghdad province and northern Diyala province. Anbar province, which was once the most violent province in Iraq, will soon be turned over to Iraqi provincial control. It was once thought Anbar would be the last province to be turned over to the Iraqis.
Al Masri’s own commanders have called him aloof and inattentive to the needs of the organization and its fighters. He would almost certainly be better served dealing with the problems he faces inside Iraq before taking on any additional responsibilities.
The U.S. military continues to "communicate" with the Mahdi Army. Today, the military conducted a major raid inside Sadr City. "The U.S. said it was targeting 'criminal elements' responsible for mortar and EFP attacks on U.S. and Iraqi troops," the AP reported. Sixteen "criminals" were captured and one killed during the raid.
The U.S. military and Iraqi security forces are stepping up the campaign to convince Muqtada al Sadr to extend a six-month old ceasefire. Just in the last few days, Multinational Forces Iraq issued a press release noting the increase in EFP attacks and raided the town of Horriya after reports the Mahdi Army was inciting attacks. An Iraqi colonel claimed the Mahdi Army was behind an IED attack against Polish troops in Diwaniyah.
Sadr, for his part, has launched an internal debate over whether the ceasefire should be extended or dropped. One of the five committees formed suggested dropping the ceasefire, citing Iraqi military and police attacks on the Mahdi Army in Diwaniyah. He has now set a deadline - February 23 - to announce his decision.
Multinational Forces Iraq is not-so-subtly warning Sadr that canceling the ceasefire will make his Mahdi Army fair game--and Sadr likely will extend the ceasefire rather than be blamed for rolling back the security progress. But until then, he is likely to try and maximize political concessions from the Iraqi government and Multinational Forces Iraq.
While the reports of fighting against the Iranian-backed Special Groups terror network have dried up, the intensity of the fighting hasn’t. In January, Coalition and Iraqi forces encountered more of the deadly explosively-formed projectiles than at any time over the past year, Multinational Forces Iraq reported. The majority of the incidents occurred outside of Sadr City, a support base of Iranian-backed Shia cleric Muqtada al Sadr and his Mahdi Army.
Extremists have been responsible for a spike in the number of roadside bombs placed over the past month, especially explosively formed penetrators. There were 12 EFP attacks against Coalition Forces in January – the highest monthly total in more than a year. Through a five-day span, U.S. and Iraqi Security Forces have found and disabled two IEDs, including an EFP.
MND-B Soldiers also apprehended a suspected IED emplacer during a raid Feb. 1 in the Sha’ab neighborhood. The captured individual was reportedly a lieutenant in one of the special groups operating in the area.
MND-B Engineers were engaged by small arms fire on multiple occasions Feb.1 while conducting a roadside-clearance mission in the same Sha’ab neighborhood. The engineers were unable to positively identify the shooter and did not fire back in order to safeguard against injury to civilians or damage to property.
Over the past six months, Multinational Forces Iraq has sent a series of messages, via press release, encouraging Sadr to extend the September 2007 ceasefire and keep his Mahdi Army on the sidelines. After every kill or capture of a Special Groups operative, the press release would explicitly link the terrorist with Sadr by asking Sadr to keep his Mahdi Army in check.
Sadr’s ceasefire is due to end on February 8, and several leaders of the Mahdi Army are calling for the resumption of combat. The latest Multinational Forces Iraq press release is a warning to Sadr and his Mahdi Army to extend the ceasefire or prepare to face reprisals. The separation from the Special Groups that has been afforded to Sadr and the Mahdi can be lifted as needed.
After a summer and fall in which the press was filled with accounts of Muqtada al Sadr's power in Iraqi politics, Sadr and his Mahdi Army have essentially dropped off the radar. Other than brief mentions about Sadr's declaration of a cease fire and its impact on the security situation, there has been little news from the Sadr sphere. Over the weekend, the Sadr camp dropped a bombshell and stated the ceasefire may not be renewed.
The news was explosive, but not because the Sadrists said the ceasefire might end--Sadr has intimated he may not renew the ceasefire in the past. The story was that the Sadr camp admitted it was being "targeted" by the Iraqi Security Forces, the New York Times reported on January 20.
“Many officers in the Iraqi police and army and have made bad use of the freeze to pressure our people, and hundreds of families have been pushed out of their homes,” Mr. Obaidi [a spokesman for Sadr] said. “We’ve been thinking of renewing the freeze. We understand the situation, we are in a period of trying to rebuild Iraq and bring more security, but unfortunately our people are suffering.”
The decision to consider lifting the freeze came after a fact-finding tour by several high-ranking members of the Sadr organization in which they visited Samawa, Diwaniya, Kut, Amara and Basra, according to Mr. Obaidi. He said that for Mr. Sadr to remain credible with his followers, he has to stand up for them when they become targets.
Critics of the Iraqi government and the security forces like to point out that the military and police are dominated by groups like the Badr Brigade, which have been integrated into the security forces. Clashes between the military and Sadr's Mahdi Army are inaccurately described as intra-Shia violence.
But the fact is that Badr and other Shia groups decided to join the government of Iraq, and are carrying out the policies of that government. Sadr's Mahdi Army has taken support from Iran and seeks to undermine the government.
Sadr's spokesman is admitting that the Shia-led government is targeting the Shia Mahdi Army, which is backed by Iran. If Sadr drops the cease fire, this would be tantamount to declaring war on the government. This would destabilize the improving security situation, but would allow the Iraqi government and U.S. forces to shift focus from al Qaeda to the Mahdi Army. Sadr's six month ceasefire expires in February, while a drawdown of U.S. forces is not likely to begin until April.
The Iraqi Army and police have moved significant forces to the Shia South over the past several months to deal with the security vacuum created by the British drawdown in Basrah. Well over a division of troops have been moved to the South.
The Iraqi Army and police badly beat back the cult-like Soldiers of Heaven uprising last weekend. The Iraqi defense ministry said 272 members of the Soldiers of Heaven were killed, wounded, or captured during recent clashes in Basrah and Nasiriyah. These were well-armed, fanatical fighters looking to bring on the Shia version of the apocalypse. This has not gone unnoticed by Sadr.
The Iraqi Army claimed to have captured the minister of defense of the Islamic State of Iraq, al Qaeda’s political front organization. Ahmed Turki Abbas was captured after being wounded in a skirmish near Mahmudiyah and “claimed the rank of defense minister,” Qassim al Moussawi, Iraq's military spokesman told Reuters.
Confirmation on the arrest of Abbas, which is also likely a nom de guerre, has not been given by Multinational Forces Iraq at this time. The Iraqi government has made claims of killing and capturing Abu Omar al Baghdadi several times this year, which turned out to be false reports or cases of mistaken identity.
Abu Ayyub al Masri, the leader of al Qaeda in Iraq, is officially listed as the minister of defense for the Islamic State of Iraq, according to a press release put out by the terror group in April. But over the summer, it became known the Islamic State of Iraq was the invention of al Masri, who serves as the emir, or leader of the group. Abu Omar al Baghdadi is actually a fictional character played by an Iraqi actor named Abu Abdullah al Naima. This information was revealed after the captured of Abu Muhammad al Mashadani, the former Minister of Information for the Islamic State of Iraq.
With al Masri serving as the emir of both the Islamic State of Iraq and al Qaeda in Iraq, the portfolio of defense minister was delegated to Abbas, a senior US military intelligence official told The Long War Journal.
After learning of the arrest of Abbas, Marvin Hutchens of ThreatsWatch.org agreed with that assessment. “For purely pragmatic reasons, Al Qaeda in Iraq and the Islamic State of Iraq need as many Iraqi names in leadership posts as possible,” said Hutchens in an interview. “They are selling their legitimacy as the Iraqi state and having al Masri known as the Minister of Defense hides his real role as the foreign leader of an illegitimate insurgent state.”
If Abbas’ capture is confirmed, he would be the third member of the cabinet of the Islamic State to be captured or killed this year. Muharib Abdul Latif al Jabouri, the Minister of Public Relations, was killed during a major battle between the Anbar Awakening and al Qaeda in the town of Dhuluiya in neighboring Salahadin province last May.
With a sharp reduction in the deadly landmine attacks used by the Iranian-backed Shia terrorists known as the Special Groups, a debate has raged over whether Iran has worked to reduce the number of attacks inside Iraq. The newly released report "Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq" refutes the notion that Iran has eased the pressure. In fact, the report states that Iran has continued to fund, arm, and train the Special Groups fighters bound for Iraq, despite a pledge by Iran's president.
In late September, Iranian President Ahmadinejad pledged to Prime Minister Maliki to help cut off weapons, funding and other militia and insurgent support that crosses the Iranian border. There has been no identified decrease in Iranian training and funding of illegal Shia militias in Iraq. Tehran’s support for Shia militant groups who attack Coalition and Iraq forces remains a significant impediment to progress towards stabilization. The Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF) provides many of the explosives and ammunition used by these groups, to include Jaish al-Mahdi (JAM). Although Sadr’s late August 2007 freeze on JAM activity is still in effect, some elements continue to attack Coalition forces with Iranian weapons. The GoI (Government of Iraq) and the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq have made it clear to the Iranian Government that IRGC-QF’s lethal activities must cease.
Multinational Forces Iraq goes on to attribute the reduction in attacks to efforts to target Iranian networks, trainers, and ratlines. "This reduction may be attributed to effective interdiction of EFP networks, death or capture of EFP facilitators, seizure of caches and other factors."
Coalition and Iraqi Security Forces began heavily targeting the leadership of the Ramazan Corps in late 2006. Numerous commanders, including a Ramazan Corps regional commander, a senior Hezbollah leader assigned to establish the Special Groups, and several regional Special Groups commanders have been captured or killed. Numerous raids have been conducted against local leaders, facilitators, and cells. Most recently, Coalition forces have targeted Ramazan Corps trainers inside Iraq.
Iran's Qods Force created the Ramazan Corps as a command designed to specifically conduct operations in Iraq. Split into three sub-commands, the Ramazan Corps recruits, trains, arms, and funds the Special Groups, which include elements of Muqtada al Sadr's Mahdi Army.
A host of senior generals, diplomats and policy experts believe Iran has effectively cut support for the Iranian cells operating in Iraq. Major General James Simmons, the Deputy Commander for Multinational Forces Iraq, Iraqi spokesman Ali al Dabbagh, Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari, and the Brookings Institution's Michael O'Hanlonhave all stated that the Iranian government has dialed back the attacks inside Iraq.
But military commanders engaged in the fight against the Iranian networks disagree. Major General Rick Lynch, the Commander of Multinational Division Central, Colonel Don Farris, the commander of the 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division based in the heart of Sadr City in Baghdad, Colonel Mark Mueller, the commander of the border transition team in Wasit province, and Colonel Peter Mansoor, an adviser to General David Petraeus, have all expressed skepticism that Iran has cut its activities in Iraq.
Read Iran's Ramazan Corps and the ratlines into Iraq for a detailed account of Iran's activities in Iraq.
Multinational Forces Iraq has released the data of he effects of the "surge." The reduction in deaths, attack trends, sectarian violence, IED, suicide and car bomb attacks is dramatic. The number of weapons caches found per year has well over doubled. The graphs below have been provided by Multination Forces Iraq. Click each graph to view in detail.
| | The weekly attack trends are now down to or below 2004 levels, with less than 600 atacks overall reported per month. These numbers include inneffectual attacks. The number peaked during the summer of 2007, with almost 1,600 attacks in one week in June. Click map to view. |
| | The number of deaths per month nationwide are down to January 2006 levels, at about 600 per month. The niumbers peaked in December 2006, with about 3,000 deaths per month. Click to view. |
More after the jump...
Continue reading "Iraq by the Numbers: Graphing the Decrease in Violence" »
Fighting between the U.S. and Iraqi government-backed Awakening movements and al Qaeda in Iraq spiked over the weekend. At least four high profile engagements and bombings occurred in Baghdad, Anbar, Ninewa, and Diyala provinces.
The largest clash occurred on Sunday in the eastern region of Diyala province in the villages of Nai and Safit. Al Qaeda in Iraq fighters attacked the villages but the local tribes fought back. Twenty-two al Qaeda fighters and 17 tribesmen were killed in the battle, KUNA reported. Al Qaeda in Iraq is attempting to regroup in eastern Diyala after being ejected from much of central Baghdad province during operations this summer and fall.
To the west in Anbar province, al Qaeda fighters attacked an Awakening checkpoint in the city of Barwana near Haditha. Four terrorists were killed in the clash.
On Saturday, two engagements, one in Baghdad and one west of Mosul, resulted in both al Qaeda operatives and members of the Awakening killed. The largest strike occurred in Baghdad, where two were killed and ten wounded in a roadside bomb attack near the headquarters of the Adhamiyah Awakening Council. At least one member of the Adhamiyah Awakening was killed and eight wounded.
West of Mosul, "a platoon of the Ninewa Sahwa (Awakening) Council managed to kill three gunmen suspected of belonging to the al-Qaeda Organization in Iraq in the district of al-Biaaj," Voices of Iraq reported. "The al-Jazirah platoon of the Ninewa Sahwa Council attacked a stronghold of al Qaeda in an area that lies between Matar 3 and al Karakshi in the district of al-Biaaj, southwest of Mosul, and killed three gunmen." One of the Awakening fighters was killed and three wounded.
The provincial Awakening Councils and the independent Concerned Local Citizens groups have been targeted by al Qaeda and its puppet Islamic State of Iraq. These groups are softer targets as opposed to U.S. and Iraqi Army units as they are lightly armed and do not operate on secured bases.
The Awakening Councils and the Concerned Local Citizens are largely made up of local and regional tribes and former insurgents. These groups pose a direct threat to al Qaeda in Iraq. The movements can often identify al Qaeda fighters and possess intelligence on their networks, while boosting the number of security forces available to fight al Qaeda. As towns and cities are secured, it frees up Iraqi and U.S. forces to move to more troubled regions.
On December 3, "Abu Omar al Baghdadi," the fictitious leader of the Islamic State of Iraq, released an audiotape outlining its "ghazw campaign" targeting the Awakening movements, the volunteer Concerned Local Citizens movements, and all who cooperate with them. "The individual mission of each mujahid [during the ghazw campaign]... is to conduct 3 IED attacks or 3 attacks with explosives, especially martyrdom attacks, or at least to kill 3 'apostates and traitors.'" The campaign is to end on or around January 29, 2008.
Al Qaeda kicked off its anti-Awakening campaign off strongly, with eight significant attacks during the first five days. Attacks against the Awakening and Concerned Local Citizens movements have since decreased. In many cases, the Iraqi volunteers are initiating the fighting.
"Abu Omar Baghdadi" is the creation of al Qaeda in Iraq leader Abu Ayyub al Masri and is actually played by an actor named Abu Abdullah al Naima. The U.S. learned of Baghdadi's identity after capturing al Qaeda in Iraq's media emir earlier this year. Al Masri created Baghdadi to put an Iraqi face on al Qaeda’s operations.
| | An Iraqi National Policeman walks past one of the cars damaged in the triple bombing attack in Amarah. Reuters photo. |
The city of Amarah in Iraq's Shia south was rocked by a string of coordinated car bomb attacks designed to kill civilians. At least 41 civilians were killed and over 140 wound after three car bombs were detonated in a market in Amarah. It is unclear if the attack was carried out by al Qaeda in Iraq or the Iranian-backed Special Groups terror cells.
The three bombs were detonated in a manner to inflict maximum casualties. A small blast drew a crowd, and two subsequent car bombs were detonated as rescue efforts were underway. It is unclear if suicide bombers were used in the attack, and police arrested several bystanders using cell phones immediately after the strike.
"The explosions in Amarah were about five minutes apart, beginning with a small blast at the entrance to the market, said Mohammed Saleh, the provincial council spokesman, elaborating on earlier accounts by police and an intelligence official," The Associated Press reported. "Saleh said bystanders gathered to look at the aftermath of that blast, which wounded just a few people, when a second car bomb exploded. The third car blew up nearby as the crowd began to flee, he said."
The chief of police in Amarah was fired immediately as he ignored requests to secure the markets. "There was not a single police car in the street at the time of the explosion," Saleh told the Associated Press . "The provincial council complained many times to the police chief about the lack of security measures in the city, but he would not listen."
The attack certainly fits the profile of an al Qaeda bombing: multiple, coordinated bombings against a Shia target designed to incite sectarian violence. Al Qaeda has conducted numerous attacks of this nature in Baghdad and Shia cities and towns in central Iraq. While al Qaeda is seeking new safe havens since it lost control of the central regions of Iraq, Amarah would be a difficult place for al Qaeda to reestablish a base and conduct a sophisticate attack.
Continue reading "Coordinated Car Bombings in Amarah Kill 41" »
The region around Samarra in Salahadin province continues to be a flashpoint for raids against senior al Qaeda operatives and propaganda cells. U.S. forces have confirmed killing a senior Syrian al Qaeda leader near the city, and another media cell was dismantled in the city. As the U.S. targets al Qaeda's media operations, Al Furqan released two new products over the past several days, including a tape by Abu Omar al Baghdadi.
Multinational Forces Iraq has confirmed killing Abu Maysara, a Syrian al Qaeda in Iraq leader. Maysara "was a member of Abu Ayyub al Masri’s inner circle and served as a senior advisor," Multinational Forces Iraq reported. "Maysara was specifically responsible for providing extremist spiritual guidance and rebuttal on terrorist matters, perverting Islamic faith to allow terrorism, murder and torture. He was also known to provide logistical support to al Qaeda operations and was a key leader in the al Qaeda in Iraq media network." Maysara was a key aide to Abu Musab al Zarqawi, fought in the Second Battle of Fallujah, and was captured on November 29, 2004.
He escaped from prison during the March 2007 Badush prison break in Mosul. Al Qaeda claimed the Badush prison break was led by Abu Omar al Baghdadi, the leader of al Qaeda's political front organization the Islamic State of Iraq. The Kurdish guards were overwhelmed by over 300 al Qaeda fighters, and called U.S. forces in Mosul for support. The prison housed several hundred high value al Qaeda targets, and al Qaeda was able to free 140 of them. Also among those freed was Abu Tahla, the leader of al Qaeda in Mosul up until his capture in 2005. He was subsequently recaptured.
Maysara was killed during the November 17 raid on an al Qaeda in Iraq media cell near Samarra. Five other al Qaeda operatives were killed and ten captured during the operation.
Coalition special forces teams continue to hunt al Qaeda in Iraq's media cells. On December 4, Special Forces teams broke up cells in Samarra, Baqubah, and Baghdad. The Baqubah raid killed the leader of Diyala's propaganda network. His predecessor was killed just 23 days prior.
On November 30, Coalition forces captured "a wanted individual believed to be a key member in al-Qaeda in Iraq’s media and propaganda network" near Sharqat. "Reports indicate the wanted individual may have been using the target area as a safe haven to re-establish the network after significant degradation by Coalition forces’ recent operations."
Continue reading "Senior Syrian al Qaeda Leader Confirmed Killed" »
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